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Editor’s Note
Two hundred years ago, the French thinker and father of systematic social science, Comte
de Saint-Simon, “the most encyclopedic mind of his age,” foresaw the potential emergence
of authoritarianism, even totalitarianism, from democracy. He posited that social and
political institutions are but ideas in action. Crises occur in government and society when
major institutions are unable to respond adequately to general, typically inchoate ideas
prevalent or rising among the public. All societies require educated leadership, an elite; it
takes the emergence of a new elite, one “adequately educated according to the present state
of knowledge” to restrain the unruly “ambition of peoples and kings” and bring an end to
instability.
Saint-Simon theorized that this continuous inarticulation between changing public
sentiment and governing institutions led to the alternation of (a) long “organic” periods
during which social and political institutions are “in harmony with the state of civilization”
and (b) “critical” or revolutionary periods marked by chaos, conflict, and often destructive
criticism. Thus, his philosophy would say that an organic state preceded the critical period
during which Greek philosophy flourished. And to him, the establishment of the Church
in Europe constituted the commencement of a new organic period. Were he alive today,
he might write that a long organic period is now ending in the United States, one which
began with Franklin Roosevelt, brought the New Deal to the common man, built a large
American middle class, and lasted for over eight decades.
Moreover, to Saint-Simon, should a cloud move in, and a nation suddenly lose the
leadership of its elite, its productive scientists, artists, engineers, professionals, it will
become a “lifeless corpse.” Society is endangered when, under those who rule, respect for
scientific knowledge fades — or is rejected altogether; ignorance prevails when “in every
sphere men of greater ability are subjected to the control of men who are incapable.”
So, following the unexpected triumph in the fall elections of anti-intellectualism and
bigotry, and the concomitant failure of those who stood for climate science, environmental
protection, healthcare for all, fair immigration policies, and the promotion of culture and
education, amidst ugly political rallies that alternated between pummeling minority
students –– “throw them out!”— and threatening rote chants of “lock her up!” or “build the
wall!”, the United States has now entered a Saint-Simonian critical period. Incompetence
and ignorance ascend. Unqualified appointees rise on every front. Xenophobia is
triumphant.
Did, to some extent, our educated elite fail us this time? Had it been drawn, as another
Frenchman, Alexis de Tocqueville, warned was possible, into a world where privilege is
divorced from duty, authority is destroyed, and comfort becomes the only prize? Did a
“kind of virtuous materialism” emerge, to “not corrupt, but enervate, the soul and
noiselessly unbend its springs of action?”
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To de Tocqueville, of course, great danger to the American people could arise from the
omnipotence or tyranny of the majority, as he wrote in his magisterial work, Democracy in
America. But our democracy, he also wrote, is perpetually restless. Democratic societies
have both a natural taste for freedom and an insatiable passion for equality.
It is now the task of educated men and women, in this restless democracy, to rise to the
fundamental challenges newly presented to our nation, to champion science and progress,
to oppose bigotry and exclusion, and through leadership built on reason and capability, on
knowledge and tolerance, and on education accessible to all, to reverse course, to bring this
society safely back to its moorings, established in 1776, back to freedom and equality.
Joseph Drew
-------------------------As we consider what topics should be weighed in our annual meetings, one proposal would
be to institute a continuing education program. Every other profession and field of study
has one; why not this one? What specifically might be of most value to those who study
and write in the field of comparative civilizations? Perhaps it is a course in methodology.
Advances have been enormous over the past few decades, and yet most of the writing we
do takes little or no guidance from the growth in research methodology. While comparative
civilizationalists often are innovative in their methodology, rarely is whatever model
utilized subjected to rigorous examination for its validity and ability to be replicated.
There is a community of men and women interested in the comparative study of
civilizations, and many writers for this journal, participants in this community of
practitioners, adopt what is today called “qualitative” research. This type of research
explores a central phenomenon or issue and rests on the asking of broad questions,
analyzing the information garnered for themes, and interpreting the resulting data. But
“quantitative research,” which examines trends or variables in the literature and utilizes
instruments to gather and analyze data collected, often with numbers, has much to offer. A
third way is the utilization of what is called “mixed methods,” combining both qualitative
and quantitative research; it also should be considered. In the field of educational research,
these three broad categories offer rich possibilities for dissertations and for the process of
undertaking meaningful research.
The field of research methodology is explosive in its growth over recent decades. New
methods are emerging constantly, in many countries and in the fields of media and
communication, education, medicine, social science, evaluation, social work, family
research, nursing, policy research, and physical science research, and finding widespread
acceptance. Hundreds of grants from the National Institutes of Health, for example, the
National Science Foundation, the British Economic and Social Research Council, and other
sources, now involve mixed methods. The new “Oxford Handbook of Multimethod and
Mixed Methods Research Inquiry” has over 40 chapters written by authors from around the
world.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2017
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How have the types of methodological designs grown? Let me quote a listing drawn from
the Research Designs section of the Table of Contents found in the Fourth Edition (2011)
of John Creswell’s fundamental book, “Educational Research: Planning, Conducting, and
Evaluating Quantitative and Qualitative Research.”
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Experimental Designs
Correlational Designs
Survey Designs
Grounded Theory Designs
Ethnographic Designs
Narrative Research Designs
Mixed Methods Designs
Action Research Designs

In addition, today’s researchers must consider the paradigm to be adopted in their study,
the worldview, conscious or unconscious, taken by the researcher. Different methods relate
to different worldviews, with varying philosophical approaches to ontology, epistemology,
axiology, and rhetoric. The worldview affects the theoretical lens and, thus, the
methodology chosen.
If we consider further what are called today Mixed Methods Designs – the courses I’m
teaching this Spring, and several of the dissertations I am supervising, tend to involve the
use of such designs – we see three “core” mixed methods emerging, both of a fixed design
(i.e., where the use of quantitative and qualitative methods is predetermined) and of an
emergent design (where the use of mixed methods arises due to issues that develop during
the process of conducting the actual research). Three major types may be discerned:
Convergent Design, Explanatory Sequential Design, and Exploratory Sequential Design.
These designs may themselves be built and utilized in a wide variety of ways. Most studies,
however, are of a basic, simple nature: thus, a quantitative study, strand one (say, of a large
sample drawn from many civilizations) plus a quantitative study, strand two (say, drawn
from one civilization or manifestation) plus a qualitative study, strand three (say, drawn
from interviews with scholars or experts on the one civilization studied in strand two as
compared to the findings for the overall, large sample studied in strand one). Or,
comparative civilizationalists might prefer to use the comparative case study approach.
Yet another possibility would be a complex mixed methods approach that is especially
valuable when we are examining numerous phases, considering the work of multiple
investigators, weighing many previous studies undertaken over the years, connecting a
large set of multiple research questions to make an overarching point, or developing a
research “map” for foundational purposes in the field. The great expert in this mapping
exercise was the late Columbia University Professor Paul Lazarsfeld in his methodological
work, “The Uses of Sociology.”
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Such a mixed methods comparative civilizations research project might begin with a
statement of existing theory and research on a phenomenon that has arisen frequently over
time in multiple civilizations, then offer a theoretical concept or research map or model as
a working hypothesis, then carry out basic research on one civilization using a design that
is tentative, and thus formative, for the rest of the study. We would then, based on our
findings, modify the originating research or foundational theory (if necessary). Next, we
would develop our instrument that arises from our test of the original theory and validate
the method we would use to examine the phenomenon in additional civilizations, or aspects
of civilizations, that is of interest. Here we might insert a qualitative strand, such as
interviewing other scholars and obtaining their observations on our theory and method
being used in the study.
Then, we do our research, perhaps modify the theory or research design yet again as new
data are uncovered, changing our instrument or design as needed based on our findings
(i.e., utilizing grounded theory). We would then validate the revised theory, do final
research, and develop a grand, inclusive, summative explanation for the phenomenon we
have chosen to examine. This is combining grounded theory design (theory which arises
from our study) with several quantitative or qualitative strands, a mixed methods design.
In the field of the comparative study of civilizations, we are addressing what are amongst
the largest of human phenomena, developments that arise over very long periods of time.
Our findings are therefore likely to be controversial, subject to constant caveats, exceptions,
and potential attacks. So, we need to combine the ability to see the big picture, to grasp
reality, with a research methodology capable of capturing and organizing data and then
supporting an appropriate explanation of the data in a meaningful theory, one open to
challenge by other researchers.
The best way to begin, in my opinion, is via a comprehensive, widely acceptable research
map. If the field could agree on the key issues and on the boundaries of the domain of
study, then solid methodology subscribed to by all experts in the subject could be employed
to develop provable theories and premises that constitute foundational bases for research.
It would invigorate the study of comparative civilizations.
In the meantime, I urge the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations
to consider the institution of a continuing education component to our wonderful annual
meetings, this year to be held in sunny California.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2017
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Civilizational Analysis and Paths Not Taken,
Part II: The Great Divergence
Toby Huff
In Part I of this essay, I sketched an overview of several contrasting approaches to
civilizational analysis. I also pointed out that Europe from the twelfth century onward
underwent a revolutionary transformation that set it apart from all other civilizations. The
present discussion presents the analysis that follows from that background and the insights
of Max Weber’s “Preface” to his Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion (1920). It
assumes the plural conception of civilizations pioneered by Durkheim, Mauss, and
Benjamin Nelson.1 The intent of the discussion is to show how very different civilizational
development turned out in three civilizations, even with the mediating intervention of direct
encounters.
The first encounter was between Byzantium (Greek/Roman) civilization and Islamic
civilization during the 8th and 9th centuries; the second encounter focuses on the 12th
century interaction between Islam and the West; and the third, the 17th century encounter
between European missionaries and Chinese scholars, when the Europeans attempted to
introduce modern science to China. Because these issues are so large and complex, I can
only offer a rough sketch here of the many issues.2
Islamic Civilization: Encounters with Greek and Hellenic Culture
The first encounter, which has often been overlooked, concerns the transmission of cultural
resources from Greek and Hellenic civilization to the newly emerging Islamic civilization
of the ninth and tenth centuries. The focus here is not on military clashes and conquests
but upon what I shall call the axial institutions (Benjamin Nelson’s phrase) of the two
civilizations. The Islamic crusades or military conquests, fought over territory (although
fateful for the peoples displaced), have little to do with the shaping of the fundamental
religious and legal institutions that were to pervade Islamic civilization from that time to
modern times.
When Islamic civilization was ascending, the main representative of what has come to be
known as Western or European civilization was represented by Byzantium, inheritor of
both the Roman Empire and Greek philosophy. It was an impressive cultural formation
that often awed visitors (in places like Constantinople). For present purposes, I shall only

See Huff, “Civilizational Analysis and Some Paths Not Taken, Part I.” Comparative Civilizations Review
75 (2016): 9ff.
2
More details appear in the revised 3rd edition of my book, The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam,
China, and the West (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2017); and idem., Intellectual Curiosity and
the Scientific Revolution: A Global Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
1
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highlight the fact that Byzantium’s three central components were the legacy of Greek
philosophy, the unsurpassed Roman Civil Law, and the Christian faith.3
While focusing on the transfer of philosophical and scientific knowledge to Islamic
civilization, it should be borne in mind that the Emperor Justinian in the sixth century
reformed the whole Roman legacy of law in creating what is known as the Corpus Juris
Civilis or the Roman Civil Law. This was the most developed legal system in the history
of the world (as extravagant as that claim may sound.)4 Justinian made this new legal code
the law of the Byzantine empire in 534 A.D. However, because the Western portion of the
Roman Empire collapsed in the middle of the 6th century, the Roman legal texts (nearly
4,500 pages in English) were lost for centuries in Western Europe and were not
rediscovered until the eleventh century; that rediscovery reinvigorated European legal
thought as I discussed earlier.
For us, however, I need to emphasize that the Roman Civil Law was taught in the law
schools across the Middle East in the sixth and seventh centuries, and above all, in the
leading Roman law school in Beirut on the very eve of the rise of Islam. This is significant
because Muslims never paid the slightest attention to Roman Civil Law when Islamic law
was being shaped and refined. This was so because Muslims considered everything before
Muhammad’s message the state of jahiliya, or ignorance and moral confusion.
Consequently, Islamic law developed its own roots and its own path of jurisprudence. Only
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did Islamic rulers and legal scholars realize that
there were serious omissions in Islamic law from the point of view of economic
development and political administration (among many others). Only very selectively and
gradually did they replace Islamic law in government, economic transactions and some
other areas. The end result was that Islamic law was restricted to the realm of the family
and marriage. But that is to get ahead of our narrative. In the case of philosophy and
natural science, however, the borrowing was massive.

3

Among others see Judith Herren, Byzantium (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); The Oxford
Dictionary of Byzantium, edited by Alexander P. Kazhdan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 3 vols.
4
The difficulty here is that scholars who know Chinese or Islamic law have relatively limited exposure to
the history of Western law, especially the work of Western legal historians of the last several decades. But
what is clear is that neither Chinese law nor Islamic law had anything like the sophistication of Roman law,
which continued to evolve, above all, with the thorough reform of Roman law under Emperor Justinian and
its fusion with Canon law. Among others see Aldo Schiavone, The Invention of Law in the West
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012); James Brundage, The Medieval Origins of the Legal
Professions. Canonists, Civilians, and Courts (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); idem, "The
Teaching and Study of Canon Law in the Law Schools," pp. 98-120 in the History of Medieval Canon Law
in the Classical Period, 1140-1234, edited by Wilfried and Hartmann and Kenneth Pennington
(Washington: Catholic University Press of America, 2008); and Judith Herren, “Roman Law”,in Herren,
Byzantium. The Surprising Life of a Medieval Empire (Princeton University Press, 2007). Also more details
in The Rise of Early Modern Science. 3rd edition, forthcoming. This revised view of Western legal history
was launched by Harold J. Berman in Law and Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2017
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What writers on the history of Arabic-Islamic science often forget or omit is the
extraordinary legacy of Greek natural science and philosophy that was translated and
without which it can be argued there would not have been a golden age of scientific inquiry
in the Muslim world. As can be seen in Figure 1, the Greek Scientific and Philosophical
Heritage translated into Arabic was comprehensive. The cultural elite of the emerging
Islamic civilization, mainly Christians and Jews, translated an extraordinary collection of
scientific and philosophical texts into Arabic.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Pythagorus (c. 580-500 BCE) — Writings on mathematics
Hippocrates (c. 460-333 BCE) — Medical writings
Plato (428-347 BCE) — Only epitomes and incomplete translations of all the
Dialogues, especially the Timaeus
Aristotle (384-322 BCE) — “Organon” – works on Metaphysics, Physics,
Meteorology, Plants and Animals, On the Heavens, Generation and Corruption,
Logic (Analytics, etc), On the Soul, etc.
Archimedes (c. 287-212 BCE) — Works on mathematics, mechanics and
hydraulics
Apollonius of Perga (c. 262-190 BCE) — Conics
Aristarchus of Samos (fl. 270 BCE) — Sun-centered theory
Euclid (fl 300 BCE) — Elements of Geometry & Optics
Herophilus (335-280 BCE) — Medical works
Erasistratus (fl. c. 250 BCE) —Medical works
Galen of Pergamon (129 CE – c. 199) — Sixteen books on medicine and anatomy
Ptolemy (2nd century CE ) — Almagest (“the greatest” book), Tetrabiblos,5
Optics
Figure 1. Outstanding Scientific Works Translated into Arabic6

As time progressed, notable Islamic scholars became translators and masters of these new
materials. This was especially true of scholars like al-Kindi (d. 850?) and his circle in
Baghdad who did seminal philosophical and scientific work. In any case, it is fair to say
that with this new intellectual cargo, the Islamic world had the most advanced science
platform in the world, surpassing both Europe and China in foundational ideas that were
only to reach their zenith when transferred back to Europe.
We can reduce this list down to four main areas: medicine, especially anatomy;
mathematics; physical science; astronomy, and optics. However, the works of Aristotle’s
natural philosophy are very broad and include what we think of as natural science, even
5

This is foundational work on astrology used in the Middle East and Europe and still regarded by many as
essential for horoscopes and astrological forecasting.
6

This list was compiled from several sources, especially F.E. Peters, Aristotle and the Arabs (New York:
New York University Press 1968); Peters, Allah's Commonwealth (New York: New York University Press,
1973), and Dimitri Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture (London: Routledge, 1998) and other sources.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol76/iss76/27
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proto-physics, but also the logical instruments of reasoned discourse. Built into Aristotle’s
philosophy was the idea of natural causation: that natural forces operate autonomously.
The task of natural science was to analyze these forces and explain how they operate. So it
is not surprising that Aristotle's natural philosophy was not taught in the Islamic madrasas
because it violated the fundamental Islamic principle that God is the author of every event.
Second, we should note that Plato’s little book, the Timaeus, was not translated. Yet this
book contains the heart of Greek natural philosophy, with its proclamations that the cosmos
is like a great machine, guided by natural forces, and that the whole system is rationally
coherent and understandable by the human intellect.
Furthermore in Plato’s view, the pursuit of philosophy was the greatest boon that had ever
come (or ever would come) to mankind, precisely because it enabled human beings to
understand the natural universe. So here again, it is not surprising that this work was not
fully translated into Arabic because it would run up against Islamic occasionalism, the
worldview according to which God is always in control of everything and making
predictions about how the world would work in the future is the domain of thought reserved
to God.
Conversely, this rationalist account of the universe, and its notion that the human intellect
is part of that rational cosmos, was taken up by medieval Christians and shaped all aspects
of Western thought thereafter.7
Let us also note three additional elements in this translated material that would be necessary
to get to the European scientific revolution and Newtonian synthesis. The first of these was
the whole rationalist view constructed by both Plato and Aristotle. But in addition, there
were Aristotle’s Physics (and related books), the geometry of Euclid, and Ptolemy’s great
astronomical work called by the Arab translators, the Almagest or “the greatest book.” This
was the unsurpassed model for astronomical thinking that prevailed for nearly 1,000 years.
By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, all of these elements would come together to
give us the Copernican and Newtonian revolutions.
So now the question is, given this impressive cargo of Greek-inspired scientific and
philosophical thought, how was it received and how was it integrated into Islamic
education?
The Madrasas
The central educational institution in Islamic civilization was the madrasa, the place of
study dedicated to the teaching of the religious sciences, the so-called “transmitted
sciences” centered on Islamic law, its roots and methodologies as shown in Figure 2. This
T. Huff, “Science and Metaphysics in the Three Religions of the Book,” Intellectual Discourse
(A Journal of the Kulliyah (Faculty) of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Science), International
Islamic University Malaysia 8 #2 (2000): 173-198.
7
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educational plan meant the study of Islamic law and its auxiliary disciplines: Quranic
exegesis, hadith studies [comprised of the collected sayings of the prophet Muhammad],
Arab genealogy and arithmetic for the division of inheritances. Later the study of logic and
kalam (Islamic theology) were added but the central discipline was always Islamic law.
The study of Greek natural philosophy or medicine were never brought into the madrasas,
as the view was maintained that nothing inimical to Islamic piety should be permitted in
the madrassas. In the eleventh and twelfth century the great religious philosopher alGhazali (d. 1111) spoke out powerfully and harshly about the likely impious influence of
the Greek rational sciences, even suggesting that those who took them up could be accused
of heresy.8
Designed to teach the “Transmitted sciences”:
Islamic Jurisprudence (fiqh) and the shari’a composed of
Quranic studies
Hadith studies
Arab genealogy
Arithmetic for dividing inheritances
Kalam (theology, added later) and some logic
No teaching of the natural science or medicine
Figure 2. Madrasas: Pious Endowments (waqf)9

Because these madrasas were pious endowments (waqf), they were simply a collection of
self-appointed religious scholars, not a real faculty. There were no degrees, they could not
grant a formal diploma, and there was no intellectual autonomy: most madrasas were
devoted to a single school of law (of which there were four main schools). When the
student had mastered the material of his teacher, shown by oral recitation, the teacher would
then grant the student an ijaza, a “permission to transmit” that particular work, not a
certification of general learning, or anything like a “license to teach.” Consequently, there
was no attempt, even in those rare situations where all four schools of law were represented,
to create a broadly unified set of legal opinions or standard procedurals for jurisprudence.
At the same time, the natural sciences were left aside.
Given this background, the paradox has always been, how was it possible to make such
advances as the Arabs and Muslims did make in science when the natural sciences were
never brought into the madrasas? A small part of the answer to this question is the fact that
the “foreign sciences” (as Greek natural philosophy was labelled) were taught privately by
some scholars in their homes. This was a far cry from the institutionalization of scientific
inquiry as was carried out by the European universities from the twelfth century onward.
Yet, given the high levels of scientific inquiry that had been achieved by the Greek models
8

Al-Ghazali, The Incoherence of the philosophers: a parallel English-Arabic text, translated, introduced,
and annotated by Michael E. Marmura. Provo,Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2000.
9
Among others see George Makdisi, The Rise of the Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the
West (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Press, 1981); Jonathan Berkey, The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval
Cairo (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Michael Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice
in Medieval Damascus 1190-1350 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
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imported through the translation movement, during the two hundred years of assimilation,
Arabic and Islamic masters of these disciplines, commentary and improvement, did
advance serious inquiry in some areas, for example, mathematics, optics, and the study of
human anatomy.
Legal Impediments
For now I shall leave that question because we must look a little deeper into Islamic legal
development. As I pointed out, Islamic law, the shari’a, was always and exclusively tied
to its unique roots, that is, the Quran and the Hadith collections (the sayings of the prophet
Muhammad). This inhibited innovation insofar as improving on or changing the nature of
due process in shari’a laws.
Thus, to initiate a legal case, the believer would informally approach a qadi, a judge,
perhaps walk with him outside the qadi’s office or in his garden, explaining his complaint.
The qadi would then translate the complaint into legal language for a trial.10
But notice that there were no lawyers or advocates (for which there was no Arabic word11)
to represent either plaintiff or defendant, nor were there clearly specified “rights” whose
violations would be a basis for one’s case. Rather it was the various possible interpretations
of holy writ that allowed a trial to begin.
At the same time, note that there were various legal helpers, clerks, professional witnesses
and the agent known as the wakil; but he was simply any semi-literate person who could
represent someone else in legal proceedings, not one who had legal training, and his limited
knowledge of the facts of a case could be substituted for the defendant’s or the plaintiff’s
first-hand account. In short, none of these actors had anything like the university training
of clerks, notaries, and advocates in Europe.12 Consequently, the qadi presided over the
trial, asking questions as he might, and with little power to control the plaintiff or witnesses.
For example, the plaintiff could at any moment appeal his case to a religious scholar, asking
for a written opinion that could then be presented to the judge, who, though not bound by
such advice, would have to consider whether to accept the opinion or not.13
Second, we hear a lot about fatwas, legal opinions issued by legal scholars (muftis)
representing any of the four schools of law, but these opinions were not binding on anyone.
The only binding legal rulings were issued by the judge, the qadi, yet these were never
10

David Powers, Law, Society and Culture in the Maghrib, 1300-1500 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2002); and Muftis and Their Opinions, edited by Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, and
David S. Powers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).
11
Ronald Jennings, "The Office of Vekil (Wakil) in the 17th Century Ottoman Courts," Studia Islamica 42
(1975): 147- 169; and Emile Tyan, Histoire d'Organisation judiciare en Pays d'Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1960,
2nd edition).
12
These officials in Europe were sworn members of a legal profession, or the bar. See Brundage, Medieval
Origins.
13
See Powers, ibid.
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published, stored, or collected where they could be systematically studied. This absence of
such public records available to scholars until the last quarter of the twentieth century led
most scholars to conclude that there were no collections of such legal rulings. Only a very
few such cases have been found because they were kept by the qadi in his private home,
and they too disappeared with the judge’s retirement. The collections of legal opinions that
we do have come almost entirely from the legal opinions of religious scholars (muftis) that
are not binding juridical rulings issued by judges.14 Even when the voluminous records of
religious scholars provide details of particular cases (because a religious scholar was
consulted), the actual judicial decision was frequently omitted because it was not formally
published as was the case in Europe.
Only in the mid-sixteenth century under the Ottomans were courthouses made available for
such proceedings and for the recording of legal rulings, not solely the opinions of religious
scholars.15 Consequently, this way of proceeding (quite intentionally) never resulted in the
creation of a set of legal precedents that should be followed by other judges.
Third, because of this legal informality and the persistence of customary practice based on
Quranic models, there were no innovative legal manuals that systematized and reformed
actual legal procedure as happened in European law in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.
For example, the great philosopher and legal scholar Ibn Rushd (Averröes, d. 1198) wrote
a massive legal treatise, reviewing the legal opinions of the scholars associated with each
of the four main schools of Islamic law (i.e. Shafi’i, Maliki, Hanbali, Hanafi). But he
introduced no new legal procedures. His section on legal procedure (what we would call
the domain of due process of law) is a mere two and half pages, the whole section on
procedure only twenty pages. He only repeats what legal scholars said in the past that
conform to understandings of what the prophet Muhammad did in his lifetime.16
The Problem of Scientific Development and the Middle East
While we can say that scholars in Islamic civilization made contributions to the
advancement of medicine, optics, astronomy and mathematics, the fact is that after 200
years, when the Islamic Middle East was assimilating the Greek heritage, and after the
madrasas became widely ensconced across the Muslim world, innovative scientific activity
ceased.

14

See David Powers, Law, Society and Culture in the Maghrib, 1300-1500 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2002); and Muftis and Their Opinions, edited by Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley
Messick, and David S. Powers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).
15
Wael Hallaq, “The ‘qadi’s diwan (sijill)’ before the Ottomans,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and
African Studies 61 (1998): 415- 436.
16
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Defenders of Arabic-Islamic science often claim that certain advances in astronomy,
medicine, and mathematics laid the foundations for the rise of modern science. That,
however, is a problematic claim, though not without some truth.17
Let us consider first the case of astronomy: no scientific revolution occurred in Muslim
astronomy and no one has shown a direct connection between any Arab-Islamic
astronomical innovations and the actual revolutionary departure of Copernicus, not to
mention any connection with Galileo, Kepler or Newton. While it is true that Muslim
mathematicians did invent algebra and did perfect trigonometry, these advances were not
used by Copernicus (Galileo, Kepler or Newton) to make their revolutionary advances.
Those advances were brought about by the use of geometry.18
The second area of important work is medicine: it was Ibn Sina, the eleventh century
physician, who systematized a great deal of medical thought of the Greek physician, Galen,
especially Galen’s anatomical writings. These were translated into Latin and taught in the
European universities for several hundred years.19 But advances beyond that landmark
were entirely the work of Europeans who began dissecting (first pigs) then human bodies
in the twelfth century, whereas Muslims (and Jews) always rejected such practice as
something forbidden.
In a word, the one avenue open to scientific advance of knowledge
of the human body, post-mortem dissections, was forbidden in the
Islamic world. The positive effect of the more permissive attitude
toward anatomical inquiry in Europe after the twelfth century can
be shown graphically with the following illustrations. The ancient
view of the human body going back to Alexandrian physicians,
postulated five systems of anatomy, and hence the “five figures.”
These included the muscular, nervous, and skeletal structures, plus
veins and arteries as shown in figures 3-7. Alexandrian depictions
of these were later picked up by Arab and Muslim physicians

Figure 3. The Mansurian
Skeleton (ca 1390), still
reproduced in the nineteenth
Century.

.

17

George Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance (Cambridge: MIT Press,
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19
Among others see Nancy G. Siraisi, Medieval & Early Modern Renaissance Medicine. An Introduction to
Knowledge and Practice. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1990).
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2017

19

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 76 [2017], No. 76, Art. 27

Comparative Civilizations Review

13

Figure 4. Mansurian muscle structure.

With minor modifications and Arabic labels added, these primitive sketches continued to
be reproduced in the Muslim world all the way into the nineteenth century. The most
famous rendering of these illustrations is known as the Mansurian manuscripts that were
still being used in the Middle East in modern times.20 As we see, there was a great leap
forward in anatomical understanding made by Andreas Vesalius when he published his
illustrated landmark, The Fabric of the Human Body (1543). Only several centuries later
did Middle Eastern physicians, especially Turkish scholars, adopt these classic renditions
of human anatomy.21

Figure 5. Versalius’s Venous Man, 1543.

Tashrīḥ-i badan-i insān (MS P 18) (The Anatomy of the Human Body) by Manṣūr ibn Muḥammad ibn
Aḥmad ibn Yūsuf Ibn Ilyās (fl. ca. 1390). https://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/arabic/p18.html.
21
See Gül Russell, “The Owl and the Pussycat: The Process of Cultural Transmission in Anatomical
Illustrations.” In Transfer of Modern Science and Technology to the Muslim World, edited by Ekmeleddin
Ihsanoglu, (Istanbul: Research Center for Islamic History, Art, and Culture, 1992), pp.180-212.
20
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Figure 6. Vesalius’s Muscle Man, 1543.

But the most important area of research advances made by Middle Easterner scholars was
in optics. This was made possible by the extraordinary ability of Ibn al-Haytham, another
eleventh century scholar (d. 1042), who built on the Greek heritage as well as al-Kindi’s
work in optics. He demonstrated the straight-line transmission of light and thereby solved
a major optical problem accepted by all subsequent leaders in optical research and thus
setting a positive course for future optical study. He laid important foundations for optical
advance that greatly influenced eleventh century Europeans who were already poised to
supersede Middle Easterners in optics.
For example, Theodoric of Freiberg around 1310 showed that the rainbow is formed by
rays of light refracting and reflecting in drops of water. He came up with this explanation
virtually simultaneously with two Middle Eastern scholars, Qutb al-din al-Shirazi (d. 1311),
and Kamal al-Din al Farisi (d. ca.1320). Yet in a very short period of time, the Europeans
surpassed the Arab-Muslim world in optical studies and technology.
Indeed, it was a European monk in Pisa who invented eyeglasses in 1286, just as Roger
Bacon was demonstrating how a curved piece of glass could be used to magnify visual
images and serve as corrective lenses. Soon thereafter thousands of pairs of eyeglasses
were manufactured by Italians and shipped around the world, especially to the Middle East,
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India, and to China.22 Fifteenth and sixteenth century European and Mughal art has many
examples of clerics and scholars wearing the newly invented spectacles, as in Figure 7.

Figure 7. A German cleric wearing rivet spectacles in a painting by Konrad
von Soest from the altar piece in the Stadskirche of Bad Wildungen,
Germany, 1403. They had been invented by an Italian monk ca. 1296.

In the meantime, optical inquiries and similar scientific advances waned in the Muslim
world. As I pointed out in Intellectual Curiosity, when the telescope arrived in the Muslim
world, Muslims in the Middle East and Mughal India in the 1620s had little use for it and
did not use it to make new advances in astronomy.
A Second Encounter: Arabic Materials Translated into Latin
We should remember that during the rise of Islamic civilization, Europe (especially
Western Europe) was largely cut off from its earlier Greek inheritance. It was only when
Europeans in the eleventh and twelfth centuries began to discover the cultural and
intellectual resources of the Islamic Middle East that the recovery of such materials began.
This era of new encounters has often been discussed in connection with the “Renaissance
of the twelfth century” and the new “translation movement.”23 Europeans rediscovered the
major works of Aristotle, Plato, Euclid, Galen, and others, along with the pioneering work
of outstanding Arab-Muslim scholars and their commentaries on Greek works in natural
philosophy.
22
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This intercultural transmission project entailed a complex process whereby some Arab
scholars found their way to Europe through Italy, bringing important materials with them,
especially in medicine. Likewise, when European scholars visited Spanish libraries, they
found many resources illustrating the apparent “rationalism” of “our Arab masters,” as
Adelard of Bath put it. This translation project was in many ways similar to the earlier
translation of Greek thought into Arabic, except this time the Europeans were eager to
assimilate the full range of this new intellectual heritage, especially Aristotle’s “natural
books.” They not only translated all this material into their respective languages, but put
major Aristotelian works in the curriculum at the center of university education all across
Europe. Conversely, Muslim scholars found Aristotle’s naturalistic agenda too subversive
to religious orthodoxy and hence prohibited its incorporation in the madrasas.
When the Europeans incorporated the new Greek materials in the newly established
universities, they created a whole new scientific agenda within institutions of higher
education for the first since Plato’s academy. That agenda continued all the way to the
present, for these new books included Aristotle’s works on Physics, On the Heavens, On
Generation and Corruption, Meteorology, The Small Works on Natural Things as well as
biological works such as The History of Animals, The Parts of Animals, The Generation of
Animals, and so on.24 All of this served to inculcate the new rationalist ethos of science that
became the intellectual foundation on which the modern scientific revolution was launched.
Not to be forgotten is the fact that although the university faculties were composed of
Christian scholars, these new institutions were legally autonomous entities, a status entirely
absent in Islamic law and civilization.
The Third Encounter: China and the West
In order to understand our third encounter, that between the West and China in the
seventeenth century, we must shift our metaphysical outlook. As we recall, when the
Reformation broke out across Europe in the early sixteenth century, Catholic officials
began to look outside Europe for more believers to convert. Subsequently, the story of the
Jesuit missionaries is one the most striking tales of intercultural exchange in the annals of
world history. For these intrepid believers sailed around the world, often at great cost to
their own lives (taking six months or more to get to China), in order to spread their religious
message. That message, of course, was deeply embedded in Western philosophical and
legal thought, as well as Christianity, and that outlook was radically different from the
Chinese worldview.
In the Chinese metaphysical world, there was no monotheism, no push-pull causality, and
no laws of nature governing the natural world and the human world. Insofar as the human
world was concerned, it was the edicts of the emperor and the onerous rules of the past that
were meant to control human behavior through the threat of severe punishment.
24
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Moreover, neo-Confucian education of the time centered on texts that were seen as the
original source of wisdom, propriety, and moral probity drawn from past great sages.
These values were taken to be essential to inform personal identity as well as the
maintenance of the Chinese state. In an effort to make the wisdom and spirit of these
documents more accessible, the twelfth century Chinese moral philosopher Chu Hsi edited
those texts into a new collection called The Four Books, which were The Greater Learning,
the Analects, the Book of Mencius, and the Doctrine of the Mean,25 but none had any
scientific content. These were books about moral history, poetry, and the lessons one
should learn from visiting the ideas of the great sages of the past.
However, due to the influence of Chu Hsi and his followers, these neo-Confucian texts
became the canonical sources for the Civil Service Examinations that were administered
on a three-year cycle, all the way to the twentieth century. Also notable was that there
were no law schools nor was jurisprudence any part of the examinations.
In the realm of natural philosophy, the neo-Confucian worldview was suffused with the
notion of ineffable energy (chi’i), manifested in yang and yin, polar elemental forces or
states of nature. This organic conception of the universe of constantly recurring cycles
contained the wu hsing, the five elements, or five phases of nature, each followed by the
other: wood, water, fire, earth, and metal. With no causal forces governing these realms, it
was difficult to get to a worldview of lawful regularity that might be described with
mathematical precision.
So when missionaries arrived in China in the last third of the sixteenth century, especially
the leader of the Jesuits, Matteo Ricci, with his university education and high proficiency
in mathematics, they soon realized that Chinese science was not as advanced as Greek
natural philosophy. This was especially true of Chinese astronomy, a poor substitute for
the Ptolemaic system that had withstood hundreds of years of critical probing by Arab and
Muslim as well as more recent European scholars.
Furthermore, Ptolemaic astronomy was based on a notion of nested spheres in the heavens
and the utilization of the tools of geometry to analyze it. But both of these mathematical
tools were missing in China. Recognizing this deficit, Ricci and his most important Chinese
convert to Christianity, Xu Guangqi (also known as Dr. Paul), agreed that the first order of
business had to be the translation of Euclid’s Elements of Geometry, followed by the
European textbook, On the Sphere, written by Sacrobosco (in the thirteenth century) for
university students as an explanation of astronomy and the heavenly system. It had been
many times revised. Furthermore, Ricci and Dr. Paul believed that the native Chinese
interest in mathematics would find this new system of mathematical reasoning (and its
25
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unique methods for developing logic proofs) a fascinating addition to traditional Chinese
mathematics.
China and Western Science
Second, the missionaries hoped Chinese scholars would see the new system as a product of
a Christian civilization, thus further inducing them to convert to Christianity. (That part of
the plan was only modestly successful.)26
This led to the great enterprise of translating the best of Western science, philosophy,
technology, and mechanics into Chinese. In the end, the Jesuits brought at least 7,000
books to China and, with the aid of many Chinese scholars (some of them converts),
translated these works into Chinese by the middle of the seventeenth century.
But in addition to the European books, the missionary scientists wrote dozens of new works,
designed specially to explain all aspects of European astronomy. Here are some examples
of the translated materials in astronomy that were brought to China when Galileo was
making his revolutionary
observations using the
telescope.
These were
published by Galileo in a
little book called The Starry
Messenger in 1610; by
1615, the missionaries had
translated and printed
important parts of Galileo’s
discoveries in Chinese.
First, we have two pages of
a pamphlet translated into
Chinese by the Portuguese
missionary Manuel Diaz. It
mentions the telescope and
tells us what new things can
be seen with it; how close
they appear because of
magnification; the novelty
of Jupiter’s newly discovered
satellites, as well as Saturn’s
odd appearance of having
“handles.”

Figure 8. A Chinese brochure of 1615 advertising the
Appendix written by Manuel Diaz describing Galileo’s
discoveries with a diagram showing Saturn’s “handles.”
Owned by the author.

26
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The second extraordinary transmission of cutting edge astronomical knowledge was the
small treatise on making a telescope authored by the Chinese convert Wang Cheng (known
as Dr. Philip). According to him:
First place a lens that is made of glass which seems flat but in fact is not at the
mouth of the tube. The lens is called mouth-piece, also called center-protruded lens
[convex], or frontlens; next place a lens that is a bit curved-in [concave], also named
eye-piece, center-recessed lens, or rear lens, at the back of the tube; if the proportion
of the distance between the two lenses corresponds, one can see things.
There are only two pieces of lens, but the number of tubes can be added as desired.
One tube fits into the other, and the tubes can be shortened or lengthened. The tubes
can be fastened with screws which allow free movement of the telescope up and
down or left and right. Viewing is done using only one eye. An object of 60 li
(miles) seems two hundred steps away. One can thus observe the moon, Venus, the
sun, Jupiter, Saturn, and star constellations. When one observes the sun and Venus,
one adds thereto a dark green lens. Alternately, place a piece of white paper under
the telescope to observe the sun.27
In short, the missionary scientists wrote more than two dozen books on astronomy and the
telescope, explaining all the major elements of the Western system, which both Chinese
and European scholars knew was more accurate than Chinese astronomy. This was so
because at least a half dozen empirical tests (using solar eclipses as markers) of the two
systems were carried out by European scholars in China. All of them revealed the far
greater accuracy of the new or Western system.
Furthermore, the missionaries who had strong scientific backgrounds brought a large part
of Kepler’s new optical theory to China and used it to explain why objects on the horizon
may appear to be displaced from their actual positions. Some scholars have argued that the
Jesuits held back critical astronomical information and that this affected the reception of
European science.28 However, the historical record shows something quite different: the
27

The passage quoted is from Fang Hao, Studies in the History of the Relations between China and the
West (Peiping: Institutum Sancti Thomae, 1948), p. 293, who is quoting from Wang Cheng’s book. This
important discussion of Wang Cheng’s work based on Father Fang Hao’s research, published a year after
D’Elia’s original study, was added to D’Elia’s account by the translators on p. 38 of Galileo in China.
However, the translators mistranslated the key terms “chung wa ching “glass with sunken center” (or
concave lens) and chung gao ching “glass with a protruded center” (or convex lens). The result was the
reversal of the proper lens arrangement in a Dutch or Galilean telescope, that must place the convex lens as
the objective and the concave as the eye-piece (ocular). The same mistake was made by Keizo Hashimoto,
Hsü Kuang-chi'i and Astronomical Reform, p. 183, n58, who was probably following the translation in
D’Elia. I am indebted to Chai Choon Lee for providing me with this revised and corrected translation of the
Chinese text.
28
This was originally argued by Nathan Sivin, especially in his essay, “Copernicus in China,” Studia
Copernicana 6 (1973): 63- 122. Joseph Needham himself gave more credit to the missionaries. More
recently, and without providing any new or old evidence, Harriet Zurndorfer made the same claim of Jesuit
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol76/iss76/27

26

Civilizations Review: Full Issue

20

Number 76, Spring 2017

missionaries gave the Chinese scholars more than enough training and information to not
only understand basic empirical and theoretical issues, but in fact to set about empirically
testing major aspects of the assumptions of both Chinese and Ptolemaic astronomy. Xu
Guangqi carried this out when he took over the Chinese Bureau of Mathematics and
Astronomy in 1630. Xu chose a half dozen astronomical markers and compared the
predictions of European and Chinese astronomers. All of the Chinese predictions were
much less accurate than the European. That the Chinese scholars undertook this empirical
testing of the two contrasting systems of astronomy was first pointed out in considerable
detail by the Japanese scholar, Keizo Hashimoto, in 1988.29 Clearly the significance of this
research and testing is the fact that the Europeans gave the Chinese scholars all the
information and training they needed to carry out their own research program testing the
three systems (Chinese, Ptolemaic, and Tychonic). A great deal of the credit for this
empirical success belongs to Xu Guangqi who designed the research strategy.30
At the same time, it evident that when European scholars, first Adam Schall von Bell and
then Ferdinand Verbiest, took over the directorship of the Chinese Bureau of Mathematics
and Astronomy (in the mid-1600s), both leaders trained dozens of Chinese scholars in the
“new” or “Western” science of astronomy, so there were decades of European astronomical
guidance when the new system could have been fully assimilated by Chinese scholars.
There are many fascinating details regarding the successes and failures, of rejection, arrest
and imprisonment of the Jesuit scholars in China, but the point is that, despite all the efforts
they made to give Chinese scholars all the intellectual tools needed, in the end, the project
failed. Leading Chinese scholars clung to their old system of astronomy and astrology,
and, perhaps most significant of all, when Ferdinand Verbiest wrote a memo to the Kangxi
emperor (in the late 1670’s)31 urging the reform of the Chinese educational system to
accommodate the new science, the Emperor refused permission to allow the printing of the
memo. A prominent view among the Chinese scholars opposing the new system, was, “it
is better to have no good astronomy than to have Westerners in China.”32 Furthermore,
these nativist scholars thought, China had been a great civilization in the past when its
astronomy was poor, so it is better to be a great civilization than to have good astronomy.
As a result, no reform of Chinese education was undertaken; in the succeeding centuries
(from the seventeenth through the nineteenth), Chinese scholars made no significant
stalling. See Harriet Zurndorfer, “China and Science on the Eve of the ‘Great Divergence’1600-1800: A
Review of Revisionist Scholarship in Western Languages.” History of Technology 29 (2009): 81-101.
29
Keizo Hashimoto, Hsü Kuang-chi'i and Astronomical Reform. The Process of the Chinese Acceptance of
Western Astronomy 1629-1635. (Kansai, Japan: Kansai University Press,1988).
30
For more on this see Hashimoto, Astronomical Reform and my Intellectual Curiosity, pp. 91-97. Also: see
the list of Jesuit publication on astronomy in Appendix 2 in the third edition of The Rise of Early Modern
Science: Islam, China and the West (Cambridge/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
31
See Elman, On Their Own Terms, p. 145.
32
George Wong, citing Yang Guangxian, in “China’s Opposition to Western Science During Late Ming and
Early China,” Isis, 54 pt 1 (1963): 35.
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contributions to the scientific revolution (or modern science) that had begun in Europe, the
knowledge of which the missionaries attempted to bring to China.
Chinese Legal System
Finally, we must consider the Chinese legal system. Many scholars would argue that one
legal system is functionally equivalent to another and should have no impact on scientific
inquiry. The reality is, however, different.
Western legal scholars have pointed out that in virtually all European languages, the terms
used to refer to the legal domain mean law as well as rights (ius, diritto, droit, dercho,
Recht)33. In the Chinese legal codes, there are no such references, for traditional Chinese
law was entirely a penal code.34 The Chinese term that has been translated as “law,” fa,
means punishment, or at best a model of behavior that must be forcefully imposed on
recalcitrant subjects.
Thus the Great Ming Code of the late fourteenth century (carried over to the Qing dynasty
in the seventeenth century) begins with punishments, first spelling out the “Five
Punishments” (beating with a light stick, beating with a heavy stick, penal servitude, exile,
and the death penalty);35 then come the “Ten Abominations” (such as rebellion, sedition,
contumacy, depravity, irreverence and so on).36 This group is followed by the “Eight
Deliberations” that constitute a set of mitigating considerations that issue from Confucian
notions of status hierarchy and filial piety. These are not existential or accidental
circumstances that might mitigate punishment but are Confucian markers of status and
kinship that grant privileged exemptions and sentence reduction. Conversely, for example,
under these same principles, if someone violates the demands of filial piety (disrespect for
elders or seniors) he could be charged with the crime of being “unfilial.”37 Put differently,
this Confucianization of law meant that many offences to propriety had not been formally
stated (had not in fact been “justicized”38) but yet could be the basis for criminal
punishment, beating with bamboo and so on.39 In other words, the Confucian idea of
building the principles of sacred custom into the law, but without formally stating them,
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Kenneth Pennington, "The History of Rights in Western Thought," Emory Law Journal Review 4 (1997):
237-252.
34
McKnight, “From Statue to Precedent: An Introduction to Sung Law and Its Transformation,” in Law and
the State in Traditional Asian Societies (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), pp. 111-132
35
The ancient five punishments were tattooing, cutting off the nose, cutting off the leg, castration, and
capital punishment; T’ung-tsu Ch’ü, Laws and Society (Paris: Mouton, 1961), p. 364.
36
The Great Ming Code, translated by Jiang Yonglin (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2013), pp.
17-18.
37
T’ung-tsu Ch’ü, Law and Society, chapter 6, section 3, “The Confucianization of the Law,” especially
281ff.
38
For this important process of transforming custom into justiciable law, see Paul Bohannan, “Law and
Legal Institutions,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 9 (1968): 73-8.
39
Ch’ü, Law and Society, chapter 6.
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meant that a whole realm of possible offenses (“an ocean” of legal possibilities40) were
attached to the legal code. One could never be sure of what the law actually was.
As with the case of Islamic law, the idea of a formally trained and legitimate advocate (a
defense attorney) was absent in Chinese law. In place of such a professional with a sworn
oath to uphold the law, the Chinese system gave rise to the “litigation master,”41 an informal
legal specialist who worked behind the scenes, could not appear in public, and was often
known to manipulate the parties in the case as well as to exaggerate the offenses to gain
attention. If he were caught, the punishment could be very severe, leading to bambooing
or transporting. Moreover, all of these quasi-legal actors were self-taught as there were no
law schools.
Of course, it was the district magistrate (a legal novice) whose job it was to handle the vast
majority of the cases starting at the village or town level. But there was no straightforward
path for getting a formal hearing of a grievance, especially in cases where proper family
conduct should have occurred but did not, and thus gave cause for litigation. After
submission of a petition, the magistrate could (1) turn down the plaint without much reason;
(2) turn it down because he thought the claims of the case were untrue; (3) recommend that
the case be given back to the lineage elders for settlement; (4) give the case to a runner or
middleman to settle; or (5) take the case himself. All these delaying strategies ended up
generating still more petitions asking for legal intervention, thus clogging the courts.
These are just a few of the deficits in the Chinese legal system, standing in contrast to
European theory and practice of the late medieval period. But here are several crucial
points: first of all, there was no such thing as a legally autonomous entity in China: every
domain was regulated by the Penal Code and the Emperor's edicts. No group of scholars
could be considered legally autonomous, and no such scholars had the freedom to establish
a new curriculum or course of study in an autonomous organization in the way that
European universities were. Furthermore, if someone were trained in what the Chinese
would call, “heterodox” beliefs, such a person would immediately fail the official
examinations and be an outcast, if not seriously punished.
It was also true that possessing books on mathematics was illegal during certain periods of
time, and stargazing outside the Emperor's closed circle was strictly forbidden. On the
other hand, official stargazers were commanded to report to the Emperor what they saw
every night in case heavenly omens suggested Royal misconduct or heavenly disfavor.
Likewise, using a telescope was forbidden and one of the leaders of the Chinese Bureau or
Astronomy and Mathematics (in 1631) was nearly imprisoned for using the telescope
brought by the missionaries in 1619 before it was officially presented to the emperor.
This was the analogy used by the Japanese scholar, Shiga Shuzo, as cited in Huang, “Codified Law,” p.
142.
41
See Melissa Macauley, Social Power and Legal Culture. Litigation Masters in Late Imperial China
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
40
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Here is a final striking illustration of how Royal edict controlled and inhibited scientific
inquiry. It was standard practice in cases of suspected murder or foul play, that the
magistrate, accompanied by a semiliterate coroner (not a physician), would go to the scene
and examine the body. Since neither the magistrate nor the undertaker was trained in
medicine, the magistrate used a manual — called Washing Away of Wrongs — in which
were sketched the various so-called places of mortal wounds so that the investigation could
be done “by the book.” (See Figure 9).
This manual was first developed in the 12th century
and it was used into the 19th century. It should be
expected that people examining human bodies, in
effect doing proto-autopsies after foul play, would
discover various new anatomical structures. But the
Royal edict declared that no changes to the manual
could be made, and the scholars and officials
involved declined to change the manual in any way,
though they knew modification was needed.42
Civilizational Analysis and the Great Divergence
Civilizational analysis when based on the plural
conception of civilizations is neither a complete nor
comprehensive mode of analysis. It can always be
supplemented by the tools and techniques of the
various social sciences. But for a certain range of
phenomena and for certain periods of time, it is
indispensable. It attempts to focus on the largest
coherent
units
of
analysis,
civilizational
configurations composed of 2+ n societies or peoples
that transcend local constraints of time and space
because of their underlying institutions and symbolic
commitments.
Whatever the dynamics of these larger entities may
be, and whatever commonalities they may
have, the foregoing analysis has uncovered Figure 9. The dots in the figures indicate
places of potentially mortal wounds while
profound differences of development with
the circles indicate places of less severe
universal consequences which surely extend injury. From an 1847 document, the
into the twentieth century and beyond. They “Washing Away of Wrongs.”
dramatize the importance of this kind of
Pierre-Étienne Will, “Developing Forensic Knowledge Through Cases in the Qing Dynasty,” in Thinking
with Cases, edited by Charlotte Furth, Judith T. Zeitlin and Ping-chen Hsiung (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Pres, 2007), pp. 62-100.
42
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analysis. They suggest that these earlier historical developments of a civilization-wide
nature make a difference in world historical outcomes. Only by adopting such a framework
can one understand the uniqueness of Western development as well as the singularity of
the emergence of modern science, due process of law, parliamentary democracy, and other
unique legal and institutional devices that made long term economic development possible.
In Max Weber’s terms, the European transformation had universal implications for the
global order.
There are, for example, a number of crucial cultural and institutional differences between
the three civilizations of Europe, China, and the Islamic world. I have suggested that from
a civilizational point of view, indigenous legal systems serve as indispensable identifying
characteristics of the three civilizations. This was so because legal systems are institutional
arrangements that are meant to regulate all aspects of social and cultural behavior within
the jurisdiction of the cultural system during the formative period of civilizational gestation.
Once a legal system is put in place, it tends to remain as a crucial reference point for all
future action. Depending upon how elaborately the legal scholars worked out the fine
details of the legal universe, it has the potential to envelop the entire gamut of social and
cultural behavior within a civilization, and to do so in perpetuity. This is because only
highly developed legal systems have worked out processes and procedures for formalized
legal change (i.e., legislation). Neither the Islamic nor the Chinese system evolved to the
point of this legislative change option.43 Furthermore, even after upheavals and
“revolutions,” the elites within particular civilizations often revert to the rudiments of the
previous legal regime. One may also note that this same kind of analysis could be applied
to India and Russia as civilizational entities.
In reality, legal systems are alternative moral and intellectual geometries: they codify and
divide up the moral terrain in sharply contrasting ways. When looked at comparatively, a
large number of differences stand out, in effect creating contrasting limits and possibilities
of legal action, commerce, ownership, and much more. Additionally, not all legal systems
are equal, not all of them worked out the same (if any) conceptions of human rights, due
process, legal autonomy, and so on. Even when there are direct encounters between
representatives of contrasting civilizations, their fundamental legal and religious structures
often remain intact. Consequently, those codified differences have had profound
consequences for scientific, political and economic development. Max Weber had intuited
much of this during his early work in European legal history, but his death at the age 56
meant that his most seminal work, his essays in the Sociology of Law, along with his superb
cross-civilizational studies, remained a set of tentative reflections.
What is certain is that the three civilizations discussed herein did develop in entirely
different ways, creating what authors in other contexts have called “a great divergence”.
But that divergence was not confined to nor did it originate in the eighteen or nineteenth
43

More details on this will be found in the third edition of The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China
and the West by Anthony Huff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming April 2017).
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centuries as the conception was originally formulated,44 but far earlier in a defining “axial
age” of the European middle ages.
A brief summation of the great divergence seen through this lens, and despite the three
intercivilizational encounters, can be put as follows.
At all times, it is indispensable to maintain a comparative framework. I began these
inquiries with the question of scientific development, why modern science developed in the
western world but not Islam or China. Only much later did I fully explore the singular
importance of juridical ideas on social and cultural development. Nor did I at any time
exclude the importance of religious and philosophical ideas or economic factors.
Some people have imagined that modern science could have arisen anywhere, but the fact
is, it did not. As we saw in the three encounters between Europe, China, and Islam, the
cultural elite took the contrasting civilizations in very different directions.
Between the ninth and tenth centuries, the first encounter between Greek and Romaninspired Western civilization and the emerging Islamic civilization resulted in the transfer
to Islamic civilization of a wealth of intellectual resources, especially Greek natural
philosophy. During the early phase of this transmission, there were outstanding Arab
scholars who took the assimilation of this new material seriously.
But the religious scholars (the ulama) undertook to create a new educational institution
dedicated entirely to the religious sciences; therefore the study of the ancient or foreign
sciences was given over to private scholars who could not discuss this material in the
madrasas. The early Arab masters of Greek natural philosophy made some significant
advances in medicine, optics, astronomy and mathematics, but these petered out in many
fields by the end of the twelfth century. One could nevertheless suggest that at least the
theoretical modelling aspect of Islamic astronomy continued to the end of the fourteenth
century with the work of Ibn al-Shatir, (d. 1375), but no revolutionary breakthrough or
advances in theoretical or observational astronomy occurred. When the telescope arrived
in the Muslim world as early as the 1620s, no Muslim scholars or astronomers were
interested in its use for astronomical or scientific purposes. In its most important scientific
field, optics, Europeans had begun to supersede Arab scholars both practically and
theoretically by the fourteenth century. Despite Ibn al-Haytham’s genius in the study of
light, no one in the Muslim world invented the lens or eyeglasses. In astronomy, Muslims
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hung onto the ancient earth-centered worldview even through the eighteen and nineteenth
centuries.
In the realm of law, the early Muslims had no use for the Roman Civil law which had been
in use for centuries across the formerly Christian Middle East. Islamic legal scholars went
in an entirely different direction based on the revealed word of the Quran. Consequently,
they did not develop a clear sense of due process of law, and did not reform their legal
system until forced to by trade with Europeans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
They found no Quranic basis for articulating the idea of human rights, the beginnings of
which were found among Christian legal scholars in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.45
In the case of China, as late as the end of the seventeenth century, the Chinese rejected the
Western scientific worldview made available to them with great effort by the Christian
missionaries. Consequently, fully qualified Chinese scholars were prevented from making
any contributions to the rise of modern science.
In the domain of law, there was another dominating impediment to the development of
constitutionalism, parliamentary democracy, and due process of law. The whole legal
domain remained within the sphere of the Emperor’s wish, and no body of independent
scholars, no law schools, were allowed to emerge.46 The progressive legal development so
characteristic of European history was absent. These legal rigidities likewise ensured the
continuation of the backward-looking education regime centered on the ancient Chinese
classics, without any focus on natural science, all the way to the twentieth century.
Given these profound differences of civilizational architecture and progression, one would
think that social scientists would acknowledge the likelihood that supposedly universal
sociological and economic principles and processes have natural limits within civilizational
boundaries. A great deal of social scientific thinking presupposes universal application
(because results in the US, for example, were often replicated in European societies), but
fails to admit such results were achievable because of the underlying civilizational
foundations that had been put in place centuries earlier.
Economists in particular have often been purveyors of this perspective because of their
assumption that “economic man” is always the chief actor. This has been conjoined with
their assumption that economic man can simply tweak the underlying cultural resources to
arrive at the legal equivalents to the Western conceptions that were a long time in
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gestation.47 Much more research in a civilizational mode of analysis on these questions,
among many others, is needed.
In short, the study of civilizations and civilizational configurations of the past reveal quite
different paths of development suggesting that “path dependence” also applies to
comparative civilizational history. I hope to extend this analysis further in future essays.

47

There are scores of writings about this assumption in the literature, a good recent example of which,
building upon such typical assumptions, is Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail:
The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (London: Profile Books, 2012). My review in Contemporary
Sociology 42 1(2013): 55-59.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol76/iss76/27

34

Civilizations Review: Full Issue

28

Number 76, Spring 2017

The Transformation of The Information Wave Into Virtual Civilization
and the Ethical Questions It Raises
Andrew Targowski
Abstract
The purpose of this investigation is to define the main contents and issues of the impact of
informing systems on the rise and development of Virtual Civilization. The methodology
is based on an interdisciplinary big-picture view of the elements of development of virtual
civilization and their interdependency. Among the findings are the following: Virtual
Civilization has infrastructural characteristics, a world-wide unlimited, socially constructed
work and leisure space in cyberspace, and it can last centuries/millennia—as long as
informing systems are operational. Practical implications: The mission of Virtual
Civilization is to control the public policies of real civilizations in order to secure the
common good in real societies. Social implications: The quest for the common good by
virtual society may limit or even replace representative democracy by direct democracy
which, while solving some problems in a positive way, may eventually trigger permanent
political chaos in real civilizations. Originality: This investigation defines the question of
ethics regarding the role of informing systems in the development of Virtual Civilization
by providing an interdisciplinary and civilizational approach at the big-picture level.
Introduction
This article applies the civilizational approach to the understanding of the role of
information and communication in the development of civilization at the levels of society,
culture, and infrastructure. Such an approach treats a civilization as a live organism, one
that is larger than a nation, region, city, or village.
This investigation is particularly aimed at the impact of information and communication on
civilizations which are active in the 21st century. Its purpose is to evaluate the impact of
informing systems on the development of contemporary civilization which began about
6,000 years ago in 4,000 BC. This development is leading to the rise of a Virtual
Civilization in the 21st century. In addition, this inquiry emphasizes the role of informing
science in the development of Virtual Civilization. By civilization, one can assume the
following meaning (Targowski, 2009b):
A civilization is a complex of compatibly interactive entities of society,
culture(s) and infrastructure in a large frame of territory and time, usually
embracing several nations and centuries/millennia.
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Currently, the development and operations of social systems are investigated at rather low
levels, such as the family, the village, the city, and specific cultures, nations, and regions.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991, we have been facing a clash of civilizations
(Huntington, 1996) masquerading as the New World Order in the 21st century. It is no
longer sufficient to claim that the clash is only between the United States and ISIS. Indeed,
the clash, today, is between Western and Islamic Civilizations.
Analyzing social change at the level of civilization reflects social change over large areas
and long timeframes. We note, for instance, that Western Civilization has been functioning
in America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand for about the last 1200 years. Similarly,
Islamic Civilization has been functioning in the Middle East, Africa, and Indonesia for
about the last 1385 years. In the 21st century, the major civilizations can be broken down
into separate categories: Western, Eastern, Chinese, Japanese, Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu,
and African. These civilizations are spreading throughout the whole globe through the
actions of individuals who are migrating in order to study, work, and live. Yet today they
are in real-time communication with their families and friends in different countries.
How is this type of communication possible? Paper-based civilization cannot secure such
a good form of communication. In the 20th century, trans-civilizational communication
was only slightly improved by oral telephone-based communication. The development of
informing systems has transformed office-oriented information-communication technology
into real-time control systems now found in front-office and inter-personal powerful infocommunication of a type which has been embraced by almost every organization in the
world and by several billion people. This process is so powerful and overwhelming that it
transforms real civilization into a virtual civilization that impacts the social modus operandi
of society tremendously.
The Development of Civilization
The comprehensive scientific investigation of civilization was undertaken by English
historian Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975). His greatest published work is his twelve-volume
A Study of History [(1934-1961) (1995)] in which he compared the histories of twenty six
different civilizations and argues that each one has followed a similar pattern of evolution
through a cyclical pattern of growth, maturity, and decay. He believed that societies thrive
best in response to challenges and that the most important task of a society is to create a
religion. He stressed the importance of religious and philosophical factors in the guiding
of civilizations.
There is only one world civilization, and yet there are about twenty-six main autonomous
civilizations that have developed over the last 6,000 years. Perhaps if one included satellite
civilizations (cultures), this number might possibly reach about 100 or even more.
However, for the sake of clarity in this synthesis we would like to limit the scope to the
foremost twenty-six autonomous civilizations.
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The world civilization is a continuum. It never dies. It only evolves from one stage to
another. This evolution takes place through the life cycles of autonomous civilizations. At
the very beginning of human civilization, there were several successful formations of living
processes that could be considered autonomous civilizations. They existed in different
parts of the world and consisted of about eight cases. The first autonomous civilization
was the Mesopotamian Civilization (including Sumerian), which emerged in the valley of
the Tigris-Euphrates Rivers in the Middle East, about 4000 B.C. In the Far East, the first
autonomous civilizations rose inland: the Indus (Harrappan) about 2500 B.C. and the Sinic,
about 1500 B.C. In Africa, the initial civilization was the Berberic-Carthaginian
Civilization 600 B.C., and in South America, early autonomous civilizations included the
Andean Civilization that emerged about 1500 B.C. In Central America the first
autonomous civilization was the Meso-American Civilization which arose in 1000 B.C.
The latter two civilizations fell to Spanish invaders around A.D. 1600.
Autonomous civilizations arose in response to the physical challenges of nature
(ecosystems). Humans began to organize themselves into societies which provided
exchangeable and specialized services, such as hunting and food gathering, production,
house building, road construction, transportation, health care, entertainment, and so forth.
These services and growing human communication led to the formation of cities. These
types of autonomous civilizations we shall call societal civilizations.
In addition to environmental challenges, societal civilization as a whole has been
threatened by its own internal structure involving power, wealth creation, enforcement of
beliefs, family formation, leadership, and so forth. As societal civilizations evolved into
more complex entities, they were managed through cultural manipulation. We shall refer
to these types of autonomous civilizations as cultural civilizations. By culture, we
understand a value-driven patterned behavior of a human entity.
Ever since religion was transformed from beliefs in magic to beliefs in poly-gods and then
belief in a mono-god, cultural civilization has applied religion as the principal tool for
cultural control. Religious and military forces were the foundations of the power apparatus
that maintained societies as governed entities. These forces civilized societies and moved
them to increasingly elevated levels of organization. One can recognize around sixteen
examples of cultural civilizations. They include Egyptian Civilization (3100 B.C.), Minoan
Civilization (2700 B.C.), Mycenaean Civilization (1500 B.C.), Sinic Civilization (1500
B.C.), Hellenic Civilization (750 B.C.), Canaanite Civilization (1100 B.C.), Hindu
Civilization (600 B.C.), Roman Civilization (31 B.C.), Eastern Civilization (A.D. 350),
Hellenistic Civilization (323 B.C.), Buddhist Civilization (A.D. 600), Ethiopian
Civilization (A.D. 400), Sub-Saharan African Civilization (A.D. 800), Western Civilization
(A.D. 800), Islamic Civilization (A.D.1300), and Maghrebin Civilization (A.D. 1000). The
evolution of cultural civilization is influenced by challenges generated by intra- and intercivilizational issues of war and peace. These issues, arising from these challenges, have
been managed by technological means of domination. We shall call the resulting
civilizations infrastructural civilizations (Targowski, 2009).
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The purpose of infrastructural civilization is to expand spheres of influence by means of
technology. Technology drives the development of infrastructural civilizations. The prime
beneficiary of technological applications has been the military which supports the
fundamental values of given civilizations. The by-products of the military applications of
technology affect the civilian sectors of infrastructural civilizations. For purposes of our
discussion, we can recognize eight infrastructural civilizations: Sinic Civilization (1500
B.C.), Hindu Civilization (600 B.C.), Japanese Civilization (A.D. 650), Western
Civilization A.D. 800), Eastern Civilization (A.D. 350), Buddhist Civilization (A. D. 600),
Islamic Civilization (A.D. 1300), and African Civilization (A.D. 1885, following the Berlin
Treaty).
By the end of the 2nd Millennium A.D. infrastructural civilizations had become the
specific civilizations that are responsible for world hemisphere influence and domination.
Hence, Western Civilization dominates the Western Hemisphere; Eastern and Hindu
Civilizations rule the Eastern Hemisphere; Islamic Civilization rules the Near and Middle
Eastern Hemisphere and certain parts of the Far Eastern Hemisphere; Japanese Civilization
governs a part of the Far Eastern Hemisphere; Chinese Civilization influences the larger
portions of the Far Eastern Hemisphere, and Buddhist civilization influences a smaller
portion of the Far Eastern Hemisphere.
The evolution of civilizations at the end of the 20th century is depicted in Figure 1 according
to the kinds of challenges that they have faced and their responses to these challenges.
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Figure 1. The Evolution of Civilizations at the End of the 20th Century.
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According to a composite definition of a civilization (Targowski 2009b), the evolution of
a civilization is characterized by the following important attributes:
1) Large society
a. Labor specialization
b. Self-differentiating
c. Sharing the same knowledge system
2) Space and Time
a. Autonomous fuzzy reification
b. Distinguished and extended area or period of time
c. Reification not a part of a larger entity
3) Cultural system, values and symbol-driven
a. Communication-driven (e.g.: literate plus electronic media)
b. Religion, wealth and power-driven
4) Infrastructural system, technology-driven first by at least one of the following:
a. Urban infrastructure
b. Agricultural infrastructure
c. Informing systems infrastructure
d. Other infrastructures (industrial, information, etc.)
5) Cycle-driven, rising, growing, declining, and falling over time
6) Spaces; cognitive, real, and virtual
Based on these attributes, the composite definition of civilization is as follows:
(Targowski 2009b). It complements the brief definition given earlier.
Civilization is a large society living in an autonomous, fuzzy reification (invisiblevisible) which is not a part of [a]larger one and exists over an extended period of
time. It specializes in labor and differentiates[itself] from other civilizations by
developing its own advanced cultural system driven by communication, religion,
wealth, power, and sharing the same knowledge/wisdom system within complex
urban, agricultural infrastructures, and others such as industrial and information
ones. It also progresses in a cycle or cycles of rising, growing, declining and falling
in cognitive, real, and virtual spaces.
A graphic model of civilizations is illustrated in Figure 2. Civilizations are dynamic. They
rise, expand, decline, disappear, or transform themselves into other civilizations. Usually
the developmental phases of civilizations can be differentiated as feudal systems, state
systems, and imperial systems (Melko, 1969). However, in the study of the history of
political or technological developments, temporal categories are usually designated as
“ages,” “eras,” and “waves.”
Generally speaking, an “age” designates a dominant technology or political system applied
in practice at a certain time, although a given technology/political system will be sooner or
later replaced by the succeeding “age” of progressive or regressive solutions. An “era” is
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a synonym for “age” but implies a long “age.” An “era” can evolve into the next “era” as
a progressive or regressive evolution.

CIVILIZATION
Cognitive
Space

Real
Space

Time

Cultural
System

Virtual
Space

Reification
Large
Society

Informing

System
Systems

Infrastructural
System

Figure 2. A Model of Civilization Having Informing Systems that Portray
Their Place in the Dynamics of Civilization

A “wave” is associated with the production, processing, or trade of a kind of food, good, or
information related to a new technology or new rules. A wave has a very strong impact on
the modus operandi of a society. It is not replaceable, but is impacted by the next wave of
technology.
Ages, Eras, and Waves of Civilization with Special Consideration for the Role
of Information Handling
Humans have survived longer than animals with greater physical force than they because
they have had an important advantage: brains driven by information-communication. With
a brain, humankind has been able to learn, to communicate, and to develop a structure of
consciousness. At first, the nose was the most important organ for archaic, nomadic
hunters. Then, about 200,000 years ago, the human information system began to “upgrade”
human consciousness through emotions and rituals, and the ear became the most important
organ for hunters. Then ears developed an appreciation for music and dance and gave rise
to the first advanced pattern of human cultural behavior. About 10,000 years ago,
consciousness became mythical and 2-dimensional, with some appreciation for the natural
tempo of events.
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Humankind began to farm, to dream of an improved social order for its members, and to
create myths through symbolic imagination and language-driven communication. By this
time, then, the mouth had become the most important organ. Around 5000 BC, the Egyptian
calendar, regulated by the Sun and the Moon and providing for a year of 360 days (12
months of 30 days each), became the first organized information system (IS) device that
supported the survival and development of humankind. About 1000 years later, the
Sumerians developed writing and organizational patterns for “civilized” cities. About
2,500 BC, the structure of consciousness became mental and 3- dimensional, with a sense
of abstract time, cultural curiosity for science and art, dogma, rules, and laws. The first
knowledge centers appeared in Egypt, where written literature speculated about the
meaning of life. Speculations were recorded in writing on papyri and eventually collected
in the Great Library of Alexandria. The manufacturing of objects and the production of
food (bread, beer) took place. Thus, the eye became the most important organ for awakened
man having volition and reflection about himself and the world (Simpson, 1992).
For extended periods of time, the evolution of the Earth was understood as being regulated
by a relationship between the internal forces of nature: gravity, atomic dynamics, time, and
space dynamics. Today, the problem of life on Earth has become a puzzle based upon
relationships (info-communication) among people and their levels of cognition as
communicated through information-knowledge systems.
The tool by which this role is achieved is knowledge that was at first disseminated by books
and now by computers and their networks.
Mediated communication has a long history. The invention of the printing press by Johann
Gutenberg in 14541 boosted the spread of knowledge. The printing press became the most
significant invention for the separation of written print from the spoken word. Printing soon
became a means for disseminating and intensifying intellectual endeavors. Before
Gutenberg, each volume was handwritten, often by monks. In the fifteenth century, a book
was as costly and as rare as jewels.
Before the invention of the printing press, scientists would go on long journeys merely to
familiarize themselves with the contents of specific books. The enlightened ruler, Carl IV
of Luxembourg, collected 114 volumes, while the French king, Charles V, amassed as many
as 900. Then, printing houses began to print hundreds of books. By 1500, within fifty
years of the invention of the German press, 30,000 reasonably priced books were in
circulation (Figure 3). The satire of Erasmus of Rotterdam appeared during the lifetime of
its author in 27 editions. Print was steering thoughts and ideas in millions of people,
inspiring them to speed, simplify, and strengthen the work of the mind.

1

It is necessary to mention that the technique of woodblock printing of written characters was known in
China by A.D. 350. Ceramic movable type was in use in China by about A.D. 1040. The Koreans invented
print in the 5th century; however, it was not applied widely and became unknown for others outside Korea.
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Figure 3. The Gutenberg Press modernized civilization for the next 500+ years.
(Photo: Library of Congress, www.loc.gov)

The printed alphabet in book form, which was the first “computer terminal,” became an
absorber and transformer of civilization. New media such as letters and printed books
altered the relationship, one to the others, of our senses and changed the mental
(information processing) process. Print caused a split between the head and the heart,
creating a situation which has become a trauma affecting Western Civilization up to the
present day (McLuhan, 1962). It created government regulations, but it also inspired
individualism, science, art, and opposition to ideology. Science and technology began to
develop at an accelerated pace. Airplanes, automobiles, telegraph systems, telephones,
typewriters, phonographs, movies, radios, television sets, weapons, computers, automation,
and telecommunications modernized human life and its story. Human consciousness has
become integral and 4-dimentional (free from space and time), allowing us to enjoy
learning, loving, wholeness, and wisdom for the community and ourselves. The nervous
system has now become the most crucial organ, developing a “meta-sense.” We are better
at understanding than explaining the purpose and rules of our existence through education
and research.
American physicist John Wheeler has formulated the Theory of the Participatory Universe.
According to this theory, observers are central to the nature of physical reality, and matter
is ultimately relegated to the mind. Wheeler views the Universe as a gigantic “information
processing” system with a yet-undetermined output, and he has coined the phrase, “IT from
BIT,” meaning every “thing”—a particle, a field of force, or even space-time itself—all are
ultimately manifested to us through “bits” of information.
The strong role of mediated informing systems in the development of civilization began in
the Control Revolution (19th century) which led to the invention of the telegraph, punched
cards (the precursor technology which led to the development of computers in the 20th
century), and so forth to support the dynamics of the Industrial Revolution in the 19th
century. The following ages, waves, and eras have been strongly supported by the
intensified development of informing systems. The latter were transformed from
mechanical-electrical apparatus to electronic computers and networks. Certain “ages,”
“eras” and “waves” (only major and non-exclusive ones) which influence the role of
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information (and vice-versa) are characterized as follows:
1. The Era of Modernity (1454-1814): transition from the Middle Ages to early
modernity; development of printed books leading to the development of scientific
knowledge and to the application of navigational instruments (information
technology) by Portuguese sailors that led to the discovery of new navigational
routes (around South Africa to India) and to the discovery of new lands.
2. The Age of Science (1500-1800’s): rise of the theoretical sciences and modern
technology (maritime) led to the invention of the mechanical arithmometer by
Thomas de Colmar, a precursor of future information technology.
3. The Age of Revolution (1685-1917): the English, American, French, and Bolshevik
Revolutions. Claude Chappe invented a coded information system that
communicated through light beams from one tower to another with operators who
read and transmitted mediated information to the next tower. This system was
installed to protect the French Revolution. Later Napoleon expanded this system to
protect his regime.
4. The Modern Era (1814-1914): the Industrial Revolution (the steam engine,
electricity, and the factory system) led to complex processes which required
complex calculations. A punched tape applied by Joseph Jacquard to the steering
of a loom inspired Charles Babbage to invent the first mechanical “analytical
engine,” in fact, the first ever programmable “computer.” Trade required longdistance communication which led to the inventions of the telegraph, with Morse
code, and eventually punched cards (invented by Herman Hollerith), which laid the
foundations for the rise of modern information technology and its applications in
business and governments.
5. The Control Revolution (since the 19th century): telegraph systems, punched cards,
typewriters, the transatlantic cable, telephones, cash registers, adding machines,
movies, wireless telegraph systems, and radios supporting expanding bureaucracy
in a search for increased office efficiency (productivity), never mind that today
bureaucracy is viewed as a synonym for inefficient office work.
6. The Era of Modernity (1914-1990’s): technological innovations of the 19th century
applied on a large scale in periods of peace and war. The invention of the
automobile and the airplane led to technology-intensive wars supported by business
and advances in information technology. Another application of information
technology was the development of the Social Security System. It required the
efficient configuration of punched cards and the machines to read them developed
by IBM and UNIVAC in the United States. In Europe, the Bull Company produced
such machines. Encryption technology led to the development of binary languages
(Claude Shannon), computers (ENIAC), and advanced applications of informing
systems.
7. The Electronic Age (1940’s-): Computers and transistors were invented, which
provided the foundation for the rise of advanced informing systems.
8. The Computer Age (1950’s-1980’s): main-frames, minis, personals, and computer
networks spread computer applications for organizational informing systems.
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9. The Information Age (1980’s-): application systems such as management
information systems and e-commerce. Micro-computers triggered the quiet
revolution which led to personal computing by billions of people.
10. The Telecommunication Age (1960’s-): Satellites, breakup of AT&T. The huge
number of island computers needed led to the online exchange of data among them.
Telecommunication technology development was aimed at this task. Also the
Cuban Missile Crisis led to the invention and development of the packet switching
network (Paul Baran) which was expected to operate on the Day-After (an atomic
blast). Informing systems became online real-time organizational tools in developed
nations.
11. The Communication Age (1983-): the Internet, e-mail, mobile communication, and
smartphones, all serving as informing systems. Once the ARPANET was divided
into MILINET and INTERNET (1983) and the latter became the public common
network, the computer became the main online real-time ubiquitous tool for people
in developed nations.
12. The Next Globalization Wave (1990’s-): world-wide-web and a global economy.
This trend was made possible by the ease of application of the Internet around the
globe. This development led to the outsourcing of manufacturing to cheap labor
countries and the steady decline of Western Civilization.
13. The Virtualization Age (2000’s-): virtual organizations and social networks. This
trend was made possible when computer storage became inexpensive and almost
unlimited in size, thus creating a cyberspace for the unlimited virtual application of
informing systems to support organizational and personal activities.
14. The Internet of Things (2010’s-): info-communication among sensor-controlled
devices. This trend is leading to machine-to-machine applications of informing
systems with consequences that are unknown today. What can be perceived is that
such an electronized environment will easily host cybercrime and cyberwars.
15. Post-Modernization Era (1990’s-): from economic growth towards sustainability
and from materialism towards subjective well-being as the leading ideas that will
nevertheless not be applied on a large scale in world societies. This trend questions
the massive applications of informing systems which do not support but conquer
human culture and civilization
The curriculum of the Human Story driven by science, technology, and informing systems
is illustrated in Figure 4. This model attempts to establish relationships among the Political,
Labor, and Intellectual Perspectives in the modern history of civilization. This period began
in the Renaissance with a rebirth of learning following the darkness of the medieval period.
The modern era started in 1453 when Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Turks. Many
scholars who fled from the Byzantine Empire moved westward for safety (some are still
fleeing). Their learning spread rapidly with the development of printing in Europe (1454).
This expansion of learning boosted the questioning of established ideas regarding religion
(Reformation), art, and science. When scholarship began to develop independently of the
church, the human rather than the divine in life and art was emphasized. The well-rounded,
informed individual (for example, Leonardo da Vinci) become the ideal.
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Figure 4. Civilization Ages, Eras, and Waves in the last 500+ Years
(Targowski 2009).
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Although civilization began about 4000 BCE, meaning it is 6000 years old, modern
civilization is only about 500 years old, as characterized by fifteen ages, eras, and waves
described above. To establish more synthesized periods of civilization development, one
must view them in terms of waves.
Most of the writing on waves of civilization was that of Alvin Toffler (1980) who
recognized three waves: First Wave (Agricultural Wave), Second Wave (Industrial Wave),
and the Third Wave (Information Wave). However, one can note additional waves in the
development of humankind. Nowadays these number a total of seven (Targowski,
2009):
0. Settlers Wave (9,000 BCE - 7,000 BCE) — from nomads to settlers.
I.
Agriculture Wave (7,000 BCE+) — from settlers to farmers with specialized
common sense knowledge and skills.
II. Industrial Wave (1800+) — from farmers to workers and engineers with
theoretical knowledge and skills resulting from education and improved
handling of information.
III. Information Wave (1980+) — from material handlers to information
(informing systems) handlers who improve the control possibilities of previous
waves and increase productivity of labor and organizations.
IV.
Globalization Wave (1990+) — from local to global competition in the
delivery of goods and services owing to global informing systems that cause
the “death of distance.”
V.
Virtualization Waves (2000+) — steady migration from a real to a virtual world,
mostly by the young generation that is skilled in applying informing systems all
the time, 24/7.
VI.
Communicating Things Wave (2010+) — wide connectivity of machines and
people to optimize all sorts of hybrid processes from advanced smart informing
systems.
The Zero Wave — the Settlers Wave: This wave transformed hunters and farmers into
settlers who organized the first villages in the Middle East and stabilized their lives around
animal domestication and food production, which after 5,000 years of wealth accumulation
led to the rise of the first civilization in 4000 BCE. It is interesting to notice that after 9000
years (7000 B.C. — A.D. 2000) mankind is moving again and has become a “global hunter”
for profit and jobs, while the Fourth Wave, Globalization, took off in the 1990’s through
the global infrastructures of info-communication and transportation networks.
The First Wave — the Agriculture Wave: This wave began in 7000 BCE and will remain
active as long as food is needed, which means that it will be active as long as humankind
continues to exist. The Second Wave—the rise of the Industrial Wave—is about 200 years
old. It minimized the physical effort required by humans through mechanization and free
time for education which led to the Scientific Revolution and the invention of aircraft and
computers. The latter has led to the Third Wave, the Information Wave, and its magic tool,
the Internet. The airplane and the Internet have increased human global mobility, which
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has triggered the Fourth Wave, the Globalization Wave.
The waves of civilization are portrayed in Figure 5. Each wave has its own set of
civilizational tools which primarily support control processes by elites over their clients.
The main control solutions for each wave are portrayed in this figure. It is important to
notice that none of these waves replace the wave that precedes it. For example, information
cannot replace food, steel, or plastic. It can only improve their creation and utilization.

Figure 5. Civilization Waves and Emerging Informing Systems as the Transformers of
Technology and Distance-based Waves

None of the civilization waves are disappearing (with the exception to a certain degree of
the Settlers Wave, which is a de facto pre-civilization wave). Perhaps each new wave
assumes the leadership role in civilizational development and selects the best talent to work
for it. Moreover, each wave perpetuates other waves, as is shown in Figure 6. Current job
trends, which focus on outsourcing computing to India, contradict earlier assessments that
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2017

47

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 76 [2017], No. 76, Art. 27

Comparative Civilizations Review

41

the millennial American workforce would be heavily focused on computing. In the 21st
century, it is even possible to outsource computer programming to India, thousands of miles
away from Western headquarters, and similarly, the manufacturing of goods to China.
The Rise of the Information Wave at the End of the 20th Century
As the Industrial Wave declines and the Control Revolution rises, the Information Wave
also rises. The theory of post-industrialism advanced by Daniel Bell (1986) provides much
of the conceptual background for viewing the Information Wave as the Information Society.
Bell’s concept of postindustrial society has five dimensions:
1. There is a shift from a goods-producing economy to a service-producing one.
2. There is an increase in size and influence of the classes of professional workers.
3. Post-industrial society is organized around theoretical knowledge.
4. A critical aim is the management of technological growth.
5. An emphasis is placed on the development of methods of intellectual technology.
Intelligent technology in the form of global computer networks dramatically expands the
power of the brain so as to develop hyper-intelligence. With appropriate control
programming, a network becomes a sensitive device, not only as a physical device, but also
as an economic, social, and political one.
The spending on info-communication technology (informing systems) in the United States
reached $3.6 trillion in 2012 (The New York Times, July 9th, 2012), a sum which is about
22 percent of GDP, 20 percent more than what was spent on health care that year.
The 19th century eliminated the wilderness by means of railroads. The 20th century
developed science and technology that improved the well-being of many and pushed the
planet to its limits in terms of resources. The 21st century will perhaps implement the
Information Wave across all civilizations in order to improve knowledge-based, critical
decision-making about social life in conditions of limited resources.
The mission of the Information Wave (Targowski, 2009) is the following: To exercise
wisdom in controlling the development and operations of the Agricultural Wave, the
Industrial Wave, the Global Wave, and the other waves as well.
The goals of the Information Wave are the following:
1. To optimize the development and the operations of the Agricultural Wave, the
Industrial Wave, the Global Wave, and the other waves in order to minimize the
use of resources and ecology and to increase the citizen’s choices and quality of
life.
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2. To sustain the development of human cognition in order to make conscious and
wise decisions about the sense of human possibilities, life, education, health,
politics, defense, business, entertainment and leisure time.

The strategy of the Information Wave is to develop and apply info-communication
technology in control systems (as informing systems) in a rational and humane manner.
The role of the Information Wave in supporting other waves is portrayed in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. The Role of the Information Wave in Supporting other Civilization Waves

These goals should be applied at all levels of civilization, including national and local
governments, schools and colleges, businesses and other organizations, homes, and
individuals. The Information Wave is composed of the following metaphoric elements
derived through the application of informing systems (Figure 7):
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Figure 7. The Architecture of the Information Wave (2000)
(The Waves of Virtual and Communicating Things are not shown)

•
•
•

•

Info-factories, which generate information and seek new information. These include
the following: online enterprises: online schools and colleges, online communities,
online governments, e-Republics, etc.
Info-malls which provide the following services: e-mail, e-learning, e-banking, etrading, e-job recruitment, e-information services, e-research, e-publishing, eentertainment, e-calling, etc.
Infohighways, which transmit the content of information through infocommunication services including Local Area Networks (LAN), Metropolitan Area
Networks (MAN), Wide Area Networks (WAN), Global Area Networks (GAN),
Value Area Networks (VAN), the Internet, television, radio broadcasting, etc.
Cyberspace is a digital information-based dark space, that is, a dispersed, infinite
constellation of digital files, databases, home pages, bulletin boards, directories,
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•

menus, etc., where humans with a password navigate interactively in order to create,
update, exchange, and retrieve information.
Cybernauts (netcitizens), who are informed tele-computer users with passwords to
access billions of information tidbits and do everything on-line from shopping and
learning to working and resting. Cybernauts can be “electronic immigrants” who
can telecommute to work over long distances.

The Information Wave is not simply a matter of technology and economics. It involves
morality, culture, and ideas as well as institutions and political structures. In short, it entails
a true transformation of human affairs (Toffler and Toffler, 1994). However, the unwise
application of the Information Wave may be harmful for humans.
Let us pose the following questions to decision-makers of civilizations:
•

•
•

Is it wise to design automation, robotization, and informatization in such a way that
their operators only watch the screens of many instruments but have little to say in
the development control of a product? Sooner or later society will be divided into
two groups of people: “thinking” designers and “thoughtless” users of such systems.
This divide may lead to more productive solutions, but it may also degrade people
and create a bifurcated society.
Should the world apply automation, robotization, and informatization to reduce
employment when population growth and the demands of workers give rise to
interests that are frequently in conflict with strategies of efficiency?
Should business and public administration apply automation, robotization, and
informatization to promote endless economic growth when the reserves of
strategic resources are being depleted and sooner or later civilization as we know
it will literally run out of fuel?

Currently, civilization faces many questions of this sort. Most of the time they are
neglected, sometimes with catastrophic results. The potential of the Information Wave lies
in the optimization of economic performance as well as, to an even greater extent, in the
wise control of civilization.
The Rise of the Virtual Wave at the Beginning of the 21st Century
When the virtual mode was first introduced into information technology, it was applied to
memory simulated by the computer, that is, memory not actually built into the processor.
Over time, however, the virtual mode has been applied to entities that include organizations,
processes, and people that really exist and are simulated by means of information
technology. For example, virtual conversations are conversations that take place over
computer networks, and virtual communities are genuine social groups that assemble
around the use of e-mail, webpages, and other networked resources. The adjectives,
“virtual” and “digital,” and the prefixes, “e-” and “cyber-,” are all used in various ways to
denote information, things, activities, and organizations that are realized or carried out
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chiefly in an electronic medium. “Virtual” tends to be used in reference to entities that
mimic their “real” parallels. Thus a digital library would simply be a library that applies
information technology, whether it be a brick-and-mortar library equipped with networked
computers or a library that exists exclusively in electronic form; whereas a virtual library
could only be the latter of these. The prefix “e-” is generally preferred when referring to
the commercial applications of the Web, as in e-commerce, e-cash, and e-business, whereas
“cyber-” tends to be used when speaking of a computer or of networks from a broader
cultural point of view, as in cybersex, cyber-church, and cyberspace. But like everything
else in this field, such usages are evolving rapidly, and it would be rash to try to predict
how these expressions will be used in the future (The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language, Fourth Edition).
Virtual worlds have exploded out of online game culture and now capture the attention of
millions of ordinary people: students, husbands, wives, fathers, mothers, workers, and
retirees. Devoting dozens of hours each week to massive multiplayer virtual reality
environments, such as Civilization, World of Warcraft, or Second Life, these millions
represent the start of an exodus to the refuge of the virtual, where they experience life under
a new social, political, and economic order built around fun (Castronova, 2007).
The development of the Global Economy in the 2010’s is well established. The integrated
information infrastructure has led to a boom in the development of social networks. In the
past several years, some networks have thrived, some have vanished, and hundreds of new
ones have appeared. Social networks have become a huge area to follow. Nowadays, one
estimate is that about 500 large social networking sites offer services for about 1.242 billion
users. Table 1 illustrates the richness of this kind of info-communication-driven
socialization.
These 1,635,000,000 users of global social networks today create the Global Virtual
Society (GVS) which is composed mostly of young and middle-aged people (a new
emerging global information elite). They exchange info-communication (via informing
systems) about facts, events, feelings, situations, activities, pictures, videos, and opinions
faster and more frequently than they could in the real environment [117 million users visited
Facebook every month in March 2010 (Time, May 31, 2010, p.37)]
These facts are very encouraging given that the world in the 2010’s is not in good shape.
Some civilizations such as Western, Eastern, and Islamic are involved in conflicts and wars.
The global economy that is flattening the world economically is doing so at the expense of
Western Civilization which is declining economically because it is outsourcing its industry
to less developed civilizations with low labor costs. The world needs new ideas and a
political will to improve its well-being. There is hope that the young generation, which
populated and even created the GVS (complex of social networks), will come up with new
ideas and the political will to improve the well-being of the world.
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Table 1. The Ranking of the Largest Nations by its Citizenships/Memberships in 2012

Ranking

Nation

Population

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
15

China
India
Facebook
United States
MySpace
Indonesia
Brazil
Pakistan
Russia
Bangladesh
Nigeria
Japan
Twitter
Mexico
Vietnam
Other Social Networks
TOTAL

1.360 M
1.234 M
1,100 M
317 M
35 M
238 M
201 M
184 M
144 M
153 M
174 M
127 M
124 M
118 M
89 M
Estimation

Global Virtual
Society

1,100 M
35 M

200 M

300 M
1.635 B

In the spring of 2010, just after being elected Prime Minister of Great Britain, David
Cameron wanted to receive a few tips from somebody who could tell him how it felt to be
responsible for and accountable to many millions of people who expected things from him,
even though, in most cases, he would never shake their hands. The Prime Minister did not
turn to a fellow government leader but to Mark Zuckerberg, the founder and CEO of
Facebook, the largest social network. The two men talked about ways for networks to help
governments, for example, generate ideas on cutting public spending. They talked as
masters of two great nations (The Economist, p. 59, 7-24, 2010).
In the 2010’s, Facebook is the fastest growing social network. Within a few years it should
reach 1.5 billion users. It will be a social network with the potential to become the first
example in civilization of the Global Virtual Nation (GVN). To become such a nation,
Facebook must transform itself into a not-for-profit service and form a government,
government agencies, and acquire citizens. This transformation could take place sometime
in the near future. It would require some strong societal and organizational will as well as
initial capital.
The emerging social networks are leading to the birth of collective “mindspheres” of
intelligence, knowledge, and wisdom at global and national levels. Figure 8 illustrates the
architecture of these new collective mindspheres. Along with practice, these mindspheres
can multiply at all levels of the nation, for example, at the level of the village, town,
township, county, city, and state. It will take time for such mindspheres to become
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organized. This development will certainly not take place everywhere, but it will take place
where there is social will and organizational might.

Figure 8. The Architecture of Emerging Collective Mindspheres at
the Global and National Levels in the 21st Century (Targowski 2015)
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Mindspheres working in universal cyberspace should facilitate the collection and
exchanges of ideas and solutions which by doing so may liberate us from social and
political hierarchies that are blocking the advancement of humankind (Lévy, 1997).
According to Pierre Lévy, “it is a utopia but [it] is an achievable utopia.” Furthermore, he
thinks that “we cannot only exchange information but think together, share our memories
and our plans to produce a cooperative brain.” This collective brain, or rather mind, can
multiply our social and cognitive potential. With such a powerful tool, humankind’s
consciousness can become broader, deeper, more sophisticated, and perhaps be able to
solve what are currently unsolvable problems. Will we be ready with such a collective
mind to stop the depletion of the strategic resources of our civilization which will be
completely gone within 50-200 years if we do not find good solutions?
Of course, this “rosy” picture is full of unexpected motives and actions triggered by
computer hackers, criminals, and anti-social agents. Since the new virtual world is beset
by the same or even more intensified crimes as the physical world, it is, therefore, not yet
a paradise or a utopia! Rather it is a hope for a wiser and better civilization which one
would like to have last as long as possible.
The Rise of Virtual Civilization at the Beginning of the 21st Century
How good must one be and how much money must one possess to be elected president of
the Global Virtual Nation? What would be the nature of a virtual election? Can candidacies
be made more available for a greater number of candidates? Can elections be free from
pressure groups? Can they be free of fraud? Today it is too soon to answer these questions.
The coming operational practice of the GVN will certainly elaborate procedures for
political processes and systems. The development of GVN will be fascinating since it will
also be the birth of a new civilization which can be called Virtual Civilization. It will be
the next layer upon the existing civilizations. For example, in the 2010’s Western
Civilization is being transformed into Global Civilization and is also transforming itself
into Virtual Civilization. An American or Portuguese citizen will function concurrently in
these three civilizations! It will be a major challenge to be successful in such an
environment.
It will also be interesting to see whether the Global Virtual Nation, created by Western
Civilization, will be pro-Western, anti-Western, or universal—the most desirable position
of all. Perhaps Virtual Civilization will be conducive to the development of Orwellianism;
then again, it might just as well be opposed to the Big Brother polity. Today it is too soon
to state which way the new civilization will evolve.
In contrast to participative-representative democracy as practiced in Western Civilization
today, the GVN will apply populist-direct democracy where in order to pass a bill, every
citizen will vote electronically. Supposedly, every virtual citizen will belong to the
information elite whose members are well informed and aware of what is good or bad in a
proposal being submitted to a vote. The GVN will be dangerous for nations with
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authoritarian, dictatorial, and theocratic governments which neglect public opinion. Today,
China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries block Facebook operations and censor
the Internet. In the 1970’s, totalitarian Poland did not tolerate the INFOSTRADA Project
which enabled the bypassing of governmental communication channels in the delivery of
public information (Targowski, 2009, p. 193).
The impact of the GVN upon real global organizations (e.g., the UN, IMF, WTO, and other
international organizations) and national governments can be large and decisive. If virtual
citizens of the GVN agree on an issue and a strategy, they may enforce directions in the
real world, since these virtual citizens are also real citizens in real countries where real
governments rule. Today, most people feel that they have little to say about what
governments do. An overwhelming majority says that governments are run by a few large,
selfish interests. Therefore, the GVN provides an opportunity to organize unsatisfied
people and to enable them to pursue their issues and solutions (but not their particular
interests).
A question asked is whether or not the GVN will take over civilization and direct real
national governments.
Something similar occurred in totalitarian Poland when
underpowered society beat the dictatorship in 1989 as happened when the underground
press exceeded the volume and truthful content of the official press. It was the victory of
a well-informed and motivated solidarity movement which overcame a powerful,
militarized government. Later the whole Soviet Empire collapsed, mostly owing to the
info-communication-oriented policy of glasnost and perestroika implemented by M.
Gorbachev.
A generalized model of the dynamics of Virtual Civilization is provided in Figure 9.
One can expect that the GVN will create subunits in the form of virtual nations (VN). A
virtual nation will organize a National Virtual Government (NVG) and National Virtual
Citizens (NVC) around the important issues and solutions to be found within the boundaries
of a real nation. Lawrence Grossman (1995) has perceived the emergence of an electronic
republic in which electronic voting and opinion-registering technologies will go from the
bottom to the top (lawmakers). But as practice demonstrates, lawmakers listen to lobbyists
rather than to their constituencies. It is true that the views of citizens are known as reported
in the media and in political circles, but citizens are rather passive and unable to implement
their solutions through the official political parties, which are most concerned with
maintaining their own “jobs.” It is a fact that real citizens are unorganized and dispersed.
An example of a certain kind of self-organization of unsatisfied citizens in America is that
of the Tea Party in the 2010’s.
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Figure 9. The Dynamics of the Virtual Civilization in the 21st Century

Why is the Virtual Wave considered to have become Virtual Civilization in the 21st
century? The main reason is that the latter satisfies all the criteria of a civilization as it is
defined in Table 2 and has created its own independent, virtual society, parallel to the real
one.
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Table 2. The Classifying Criteria of the Virtual Civilization

CRITERIA
Space boundaries

Time span
Religion (ideology)

Society

Culture

Infrastructure

ATTRIBUTES
World-wide unlimited, socially-constructed work and leisure
space in cyberspace. It is an extraterritorial space with a postnational culture and in some circumstances even post-nations.
Centuries/millennia - as long as info-communication technology
as informing systems is operational.
Unlimited freedom, cyberspace, and progress supported by
collective intelligence — to secure common good in an alternative
virtual world, since the “real” one is going in the wrong direction
in the 21st century.
Virtual global, local and between communities, including the
Virtual Global Society and Virtual Global Nation (possibly) living
in spacial dispersion of social, political, and material processes.
Virtual techno-culture (Robins & Webster, 1999), is the culture
that has emerged, or is emerging, from the use of computer
networks for communication, entertainment and business (Horn,
1998). E-values: connected, expected feedback, rhythm,
productivity, velocity, impatience, techno-centrism, cyber-ethics,
informed, optimization, big-picture vs small-picture, global
awareness, self-conciseness. E-behavior: net-centric, anytime,
anywhere, “death” of distance, no-middleman, curiosity,
discovery, digital & virtual divide, information wealth, poverty of
attention (Targowski, 2009:306). It is also the study of various
social phenomena associated with the Internet and other new
forms of network communication, such as online communities,
online multi-player gaming, and text messaging (Jones, 1997). In
the 1990’s information took a sharp turn away from the concrete
and tangible to the abstract and intangible (Rheingold, 1993).
Computer networks and storage (online cyberspace as a repository
for collective cultural memory, whose narrative is created by its
virtual society) used through informing systems.

Virtual Civilization (of the infrastructural character) is to a certain degree an entity which
is parallel to real Global Civilization in space and time. However, the goal of the former is
to control the latter in order to secure the common good. The main infrastructure of Virtual
Civilization is collective intelligence (Lévy, 1997) which develops and shares a strong
ability to solve problems among virtual members and is based on a world-wide retrieval of
knowledge and wisdom kept in digital format.
Virtual Civilization penetrates horizontally all other autonomous civilizations including
Global Civilization, as is depicted in Figure 10.
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Figure 10. Virtual Civilization among other Civilizations in the 21st Century

The Future of Informing Systems and the Ethical Questions that They Raise
The future of informing systems, regardless of their societal value, is almost unlimited since
their advancement supposedly represents universal scientific progress. This statement
might be correct if working people (labor) replaced by these systems could have other
sources of income. Clearly they do not have them. Therefore the question is what is more
important, the advancement of informing systems to their limits, or the well-being of
working people? This urgent ethical question must be addressed by governments,
legislative bodies, professional associations, schools, and colleges.
The first priority for informing systems-driven business ethics is the well-being of society
which is under pressure from linked automation, robotization, and faceless service systems
since they are leading in the direction of a labor-less economy and structural
unemployment. This issue will be addressed with reference to relevant laws of robotics,
automation, and service systems. Of course, these laws reflect only a few of the sorts of
problems and are not limited to them in the context of a New Economy and the sustainable
functionality of society in the early 21st century.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2017

59

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 76 [2017], No. 76, Art. 27

Comparative Civilizations Review

53

Laws of Robotics
The Three Laws of Robotics, also known as Asimov's Laws, are a set of rules devised by
the science fiction author, Isaac Asimov. He introduced these rules in his 1942 short story
“Runaround,” even though he had foreshadowed them in a few earlier stories. The three
laws are the following:
1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being
to come to harm.
2. A robot must obey the orders given to it by human beings, except where such
orders would conflict with the First Law.
3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict
with the First or Second Law (Asimov 1950).
The development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in advanced informing systems is good
business, and businesses are extremely unconcerned with taking necessary precautions,
particularly precautions related to ethics. Some examples include the tobacco industry and
the nuclear industry. Not one of these businesses ever recognized at the start that important
protections were necessary. Each one of them resisted externally enforced precautions.
None of them has ever recognized or completely endorsed a commitment not to harm
humans. Furthermore, Ray Kurzweil (2005) predicts that a technological singularity will
be achieved around 2045 when computers will think faster than humans. The question is
why would humans risk building computers of a kind which could harm or kill them? His
comment is that the development of such computers is scientific progress and as such
cannot be controlled by any policy. What about the cloning of humans? Is doing so medical
progress even though the widely accepted policy states that human cloning is illegal and
might harm the clones themselves.
Automation Laws
According to known facts, factory automation has uniformly caused a worldwide decline
in manufacturing jobs during the 2000’s-2010’s, not only in developed countries but in
developing countries as well. Hence, the laws of Automation Systems that are driven by
informing systems should be merged into society’s undertakings because these systems are
very sensitive in terms of the well-being of society.
Automation systems are among the most complex systems in civilization. They have
triggered tremendous developmental trends in science and technology in the 20th century.
They looked very promising at their early stages but later gave rise to many doubts about
their positive role in society. Automation systems designed for better effectiveness,
reliability, and quality are positive as long as they do not harm and endanger human beings
and society.
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With respect to these issues, Andrew Targowski & Vladimir Modrák (2011) offered the
following Laws of Automation in Manufacturing:
•
•
•

Law I. Do not implement high automation technology if you are not sure that the
same goal can be achieved by another means.
Law II. Do not implement automation technology with the aim to totally eliminate
human presence in the manufacturing process.
Law III. Do not develop automation which harms society or endangers the human
race.

Service Systems Laws
The service economy which dominates Western civilization in the early 21st century is
steadily moving towards an electronization of services which will eventually replace faceto-face communication by faceless expert systems, causing, among many results, the death
of customer service. In order to protect quality services, the following laws of service
systems should be applied (formulated by Targowski, 2009, p. 273):
•
•
•

Law I - Do not develop service systems without a human presence.
Law II - Do not develop service systems which harm society.
Law III - Do not develop service systems which endanger the human race.

Law I protects people against passivity. Law II protects society against structural
unemployment. Law III protects the human race against bifurcation into two kinds of
species, one kind which is highly developed because it is engaged in the development of
sophisticated service systems, and the second kind, which is composed of passive users
whose skills are limited to knowing when to click the entry button.
In order to integrate all these laws into one coherent discipline, a new discipline should be
developed. Perhaps it should be named Informingsophy (Technosophy), which should
investigate wise info-communication engineering for wise civilization. This kind of
engineering should be developed today and aimed at the sustainability of our civilization
in times of shrinking strategic resources. It is widely known that a large population will
become too large to sustain our Western lifestyle, even for the short-term future. Hence,
the future is now, and Informingsophy (Technosophy) is needed today as never before.
Having learned that the potential applications of the Internet are almost unlimited, people
need to acquire some wisdom in order to avoid harming society (for example through
addiction and isolation). We must now face the next challenge, that of the rising Internet
of Things which has an even greater potential for improving and/or harming society if it is
applied only on the basis of a technological impulse. Certainly this new infocommunication channel provides progress for machine-to-machine communication but not
solutions for societal problems. Although such positive technology used to support the
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solution of societal problems back when technology or machines in general supported
culture (Mumford, 1934), there is an increasing awareness nowadays of the reality that
machines conquer culture. If this is true, it is bad for the well-being of society.
Conclusion
1. Virtual Civilization has transformed itself from the Virtual Wave to Virtual
Civilization owing to advances in info-communication technology as informing
systems in the 21st century, exemplified by the ability of the Internet to secure
operations of virtual organizations and social networks. Therefore, one can
characterize Virtual Civilization as having an infrastructural character.
2. The mission of Virtual Civilization is to control the public policy of other real
civilizations so as to secure the common good in these real societies. This mission
is being exemplified by the practice of certain virtual communities at the dawn of
the 21st century.
3. Today it is too early to judge the impact of Virtual Civilization upon the real
civilizations. However, despite the positive aspects, like the quest for the common
good, one can observe negative aspects, particularly in the young generation,
exemplified by a shortened span of attention and a craving for constant (electronic,
in fact) fun: playing computer games for long hours and engaging in “empty talk”
in virtual media. For example students, 18-24 years old, learn less, since on average
they send and answer about 100 text messages every day (Smith, 2011). This figure
is about five times higher than the number of messages that a college faculty
member receives and answers in one day. Some eager students send twice as many
messages per day (200).
4. The quest for the common good by virtual society may limit or even replace
representative democracy by direct democracy which although it may eventually
create a few positive policies may also trigger permanent political chaos in real
civilizations.
5. The many e-communications among people from different parts of the world are
causing a decline in local interrelations and intensifying connectivity among
international or/and distant, parochial cultures, which eventually will separate,
isolate, and alienate individuals in their real living places.
6. At this time it is very improbable that virtual society can be regulated by real
society. Thus, on one hand, Virtual Civilization can be positive, but on the other
hand, it can be harmful for humanity which is living in a declining civilization
owing to overpopulation, super-consumerism, depletion of strategic resources, and
environmental degradation.
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Chess Game of Civilizations
Ambassador Sallama Shaker and Colleen Bromberger
In his article “The Clash of Civilizations” published in the June 1993 issue of Foreign
Affairs, Samuel Huntington argues that,
The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault line between
civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. […] The civilizations to which
people belong is the broadest level of identification with which people intensely
identify. People can and do redefine their identities, and as a result, the composition
and boundaries of civilizations change. Over centuries, differences among
civilizations have generated the most prolonged and most violent conflicts.1
Applying Huntington's theory to the conflicts that the Middle Eastern region is currently
witnessing, as a region that is possessor of both ‘the cradle of civilizations’ as well as the
three Abrahamic religions, it is evident that the Middle East has been the playground of
prolonged wars for the past several centuries. From the 16th to the 19th centuries, the
Ottoman Empire (with a largely Sunni population) and the Safavid Dynasty were archrivals
during which the two empires fought for control over Eastern Anatolia, the Caucasus region
and Mesopotamia (Iraq). Referring once again to Huntington's narrative about ‘the West
versus the Rest,’2 he emphasizes that,
In the emerging world, relations between states and groups from different
civilizations will not be close and will often be antagonistic since the West will
always maintain its military superiority in its international agenda, which will shape
the future of the world.3
Contrary to Huntington’s narrative on civilizations as inherently clashing in the post-Cold
War era, some scholarship indicates that the civilizations of the Middle East are not
‘inferior’ to the West, as Huntington suggests. These civilizations instead have experienced
their own rise and fall in the context of changing world order. For example, in The Rise
and Decline of Nations, Mancur Olson emphasizes that,
Many have been puzzled by the mysterious decline or collapse of great empires or
civilizations and by the remarkable rise to wealth, power or cultural achievement of
previously peripheral or obscure peoples. The Middle East provides several
examples of such collapsed empires.4
Samuel P. Huntington. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, 72, no. 3 (1993): p. 2-3, slightly rev.
Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1996. p. 181.
3
Ibid., p. 185.
4
Olson, Mancur. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982. p. 1.
1
2
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Therefore, this paper will approach the ‘clash’ not of civilizations, but instead the ‘clash’
of power rivalry in the Middle East. The reader will not be able to appreciate the authors’
argument simply because he or she finds it plausible or consistent with known facts. Hence,
the authors will be arguing their case based on assumptions that are enhanced by historical
and political facts as well as case studies. This is due to the multiple causal forces and
proven theories that can substantiate the authors’ arguments.
The question that will be addressed in the context of Huntington's narrative and Joseph
Nye's theory (see footnote 5) of the balance of power is: are the current regional conflicts
in the Middle East validated by these theories we are portraying metaphorically as ‘chess
games in the Middle East,’ where civilizations have risen and fallen, and thus leave behind
them unfinished wars? Linking past with present, the Middle East, after the Arab Uprisings
of 2011, has been in continuous chaos and ongoing ethnic conflicts under the guise of a
cultural Sunni-Shiite rivalry wherein Islam is being used to justify the endless bloodshed
in countries such as Iraq, Yemen, and Syria. The ramification of all these conflicts, as well
as the humanitarian crises triggered by animosities and rivalries among the ‘old empires,’
is destabilizing the Middle East since the area is becoming a hot bed for regional and global
power rivalries as envisioned in the proxy wars in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Ultimately, it
is important to consider the following question: is the historical chess game repeating itself
with different players? Moreover, another question regarding this argument is how Joseph
Nye’s theory of power relates to the ‘chess game’ of the region.
Exploring the history of the post-Ottoman Middle East through the lens of a chess game
will reveal the reason why geopolitics, rather than differences between civilizations, seems
to be the game changer. This metaphor illustrates two key points: first, that the Middle
East has experienced several ‘matches’ between various global, as well as regional powers
depending on historical context and secondly, that key global power ‘team leaders’ have
formed respective teams for personal gain. While both the teams and team leaders differ
based on the historical context, a common theme persists in the geopolitics of the Middle
East in the 21st century: both global and regional players have consistently used the region
as a ‘chessboard’ to tilt the balance of power for self-interest.
So what is the impact of the remapping of the Middle East on the current regional conflicts
in Syria and Yemen since the 2011 uprisings? Can these conflicts be considered proxy
wars, where regional and global players manipulate the growing tensions in the region to
benefit their own self-interest as well as to achieve strategic geopolitical gains in the Middle
East? In contrast to Richard N. Haass’ ideas (see footnote 7), the author argues that the
Middle East is indeed not only a region of power, but at the same time will always be a
region of instability due to the artificial borders drawn by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of
1916. In response, we find that the nearly century-old chess game of the Middle East is
reaching a ‘zero-sum’ situation; despite the numerous teams, players, and matches, there is
no end, nor one winner in sight. Clearly, this is a chess game where nations like Turkey
and Iran are competing in order to resurrect their empires (Ottoman versus Persian) or
divisions of beliefs, such as the Sunni Arabs (Saudi Arabia) versus the Shiites (Iran and
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Alawite Syria). A catastrophic escalation between regional and global powers could be
triggered by the redrawing of maps and borders in the region. If there is no winner, then it
is important to consider how the power vacuum in the Middle East will be filled when the
‘king’ and ‘queen' on the ‘chessboard' lose their soldiers (i.e. people's support).
So what is ‘power’ and why is the Middle East considered a region of power? As Nye
argues, power is almost impossible to define. But for the sake of this paper, power will be
understood through the definition that Nye uses: “the capacity to do things in social
situations to affect others to get the outcomes we want.”5 Nye illustrates the distribution of
power as, “a complex three-dimensional chess game” with the first tier as military, the
second tier as economic, and the third tier as transnational relations.6 Yet all three tiers
must work together to create a constant ebb and flow of power dynamics in the international
world order.
After the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the two main powers that dominated the region
were the U.K. and France. Then the global powers shifted after World War II when U.S.
and Russia showed interest in the Middle East, which dragged the whole region into the
Cold War power rivalry between the two main superpowers. However, contrary to
American-centric critics such as Richard. N. Haass who argues that the post-2003 region is
not “home to any major power” or “great power competition,”7 the Middle East is one of
the most crucial ‘chessboards’ in the 21st century for both global and regional powers alike.
More specifically, the roles of both global powers (U.S. and Russia) as well as regional
powers (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey) are crucial to understanding the implications of
the global/regional power rivalry, which, especially in the case of Syria, can eventually lead
to a ‘remapping’ of the region. Contextualizing this understanding of power will help to
re-examine the reasons for which the Middle East is not only a region of power, but also
how this struggle for power is a chess game played between regional and global competing
actors.
In contrast to Haass’s assertions that there is a lack of ‘great’ power in the region, as well
as through the multifaceted framework of understanding power in both ‘hard’ and ‘soft'
contexts, the region can be re-contextualized through the lens of a chess game. The chess
game was selected as a metaphoric lens due to its inherently strategic nature: a player must
not only play the game to win, but also must anticipate the other player’s moves. However,
in this two-person, or team, game, there is not always a designated winner or loser;
sometimes, both sides can end in a ‘stalemate,’ or a ‘zero-sum game.’ Ultimately, this
game is beyond a mere winning or losing, but also must include predicting and assessing
how to conquer the opponent through a series of well-calculated moves, sometimes
including sacrifice on each player’s part. In view of these realities, the Middle East can be
5
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understood ultimately as the chessboard in which the various major superpowers of the
world, depending on the era, have partaken in this so-called ‘game.’ In fact, there have
been three notable periods in which different ‘matches’ have occurred in the region.
Beginning with the post-Ottoman/European colonial ‘match,’ the Middle East was quickly
divided up between the British and the French through the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916;
however, this match informally began a few years prior when British and Russian forces
invaded the declining Ottoman Empire.8 For example, in an attempt to corner the Turks,
the British army prepared for an invasion of Iraq in the beginning of World War I (this, of
course, was beneficial for the Allies; however it was not just for Britain and France to
control the oil rich lands, but also helped contribute to ending the reign of the long-held
opponent of Russia.) However, they were not prepared for the Turks to react by closing
the supply route through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to stop Russia’s supply of
weapons. Some scholars surmise that this struggle of power would ultimately contribute
to the fall of the Ottoman Empire, or the final illness of the “Sick Man of Europe.”9
Once the Empire fell, the two primary external forces of Britain and France conquered the
region. Both the British and the French were eager to claim territory in the region for its
geostrategic location, as well as its natural resources. While there was an attempt of some
internal/regional participants to play the ‘game,’ such as the Hashemite family as evidenced
in the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence,10 ultimately the region in the colonial-era game
was played between the external powers of the British and the French. For these two
superpowers of the time, the chessboard of the region was mapped from the creation of
artificial borders (e.g. Gertrude Bell and the formation of Iraq),11 to the implementation of
artificial government structures that remapped Iraq,Yemen, and Saudi Arabia.
The second ‘match’ of the Middle East chess game was the shift from the colonial era
powers to the United States (U.S.) and the Soviet Union (USSR) during the Cold War.
Suddenly, the chess game had different rules; no longer was the region the product of
colonial creation, it was now the region in an era of maintenance in the context of
containment and strategic intervention.12 Fragile nation-states from the colonial era were
left to their own devices; governments which had been previously established and propped
up by the colonial powers underwent transformations as some leaders advocated for a PanArab or Arab nationalism. Minorities not included in the division of states continued to
8
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p. 69.
10
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fight for autonomy, and ultimately, the intervention of U.S. and USSR worked strategically
for self-interest.
It is during this period in which nation-states within the region that were not necessarily
powers functioned as ‘pawns’ for global power ‘teams.’ While there were certainly ‘teams’
of this chess game before the period (for example, Baxter notes the critical mistake of the
Ottoman Empire siding with the Central Powers during World War I, ultimately hammering
one of the final nails in the Empire's coffin),13 the Cold War context transformed the chess
game from a two-member match led by colonial superpowers, to a two-team match in
which the superpowers counted advantages based on who and where their respective
teammates resided in geostrategic locations. In what some scholars call “the Broader
Middle East,” nation-states, such as Afghanistan, became critical pawns in the game due to
their geostrategic locations, and the intervention of states as well as the strategic
partnerships between regional and global powers functioned as critical alignments, or
‘teams’ in the ‘chess game’ for regional dominance. Overall, both superpowers functioned
on the premise that the Middle East in the Cold War context was a geostrategic region that
required continual maintenance to avoid the opposing power from emerging victorious.14
In the post-Cold War context, the rules of the game, as well as the players, changed once
again. Gone was the dual power rivalry, as well as “zero-sum relationship” that the U.S.
and the USSR projected for almost half century.15 Instead, a new game emerged in which
one player remained (or as some authors argue remains) unchallenged: the United States.
The nature of the game transformed as well ⸺ scholars allude to the lessening importance
of strategic partnerships and instead to the growth of an unchallenged hegemony as the
United States made decisions ultimately based on self-interest.16 Migdal alludes to one
such example of the post-Cold War U.S. Presidents George H.W. Bush and William
Clinton as they, “took some time […] to map out the new lay of the land.” Migdal is
ultimately referring to the administrations of the aforementioned presidents, in which “ad
hoc” decisions were made as the, “US. Foreign policy in the 1990s tended to be by the seat
of the pants rather than driven by a coherent decision.”17 Migdal emphasizes that the postCold War policy decisions (or lack thereof) were based on the rise of neoconservative
thinkers who during the 1990s focused efforts on strong foreign policy measures based on
American values. While neoconservative outlooks were indeed forming during the postCold War and pre-9/11 years, this shift in foreign policy, marked with George W. Bush’s
administration post-9/11, would be the best example of reflecting the changing attitudes
(e.g. invasion of Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein) of neo-conservatism as an
appropriate outlook, or as Migdal states “a new view of the world,” in U.S. foreign policy.18
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Re-contextualizing through the lens of the chess game, the post-Cold War, pre-9/11 era of
the 1990s was an era of the Middle East ‘chess game’ in which the newly unrivalled and
increasingly hegemonic U.S. sought new reasons to justify its invasion of Afghanistan in
2001 on the basis of human rights, or as Lila Abu-Lughod states “authorizing moral
crusades,” and Iraq in 2003 to build democratic institutions. 19
In order for Russia to recover the losses in Afghanistan and its role in the Middle East and
to counter the U.S.’s presence in the region, Vladimir Putin stated, “Russia must act to
balance America’s dominance by taking a more proactive approach in the international
arena and promoting a bi-polar global situation.”20 As a result, the emergence of either
pro-American or anti-American rhetoric/policies became critical in the formation of new
‘teams’ in the region (e.g. Saudi Arabia for the former and Iran for the latter).21 But it is
important to note that this rhetoric was not based upon a difference in culture or
civilizations, but instead upon the differences in power struggles as well as strategic
partnerships in the chess game of the region.
Returning to the core metaphor, the rise of unlikely or unassuming players in the Middle
East, especially those not on the superpowers’ teams, once again forced other players to
renegotiate their positions. For example, with the ‘rise of Iran,’ now unchecked by Iraq (a
consequence of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq), other nations in the region must re-evaluate
their partnerships, or their teammates, to ensure they are on the team that is most beneficial
to them. An important question that must be re-evaluated is: does the team benefit the selfinterest of the superpower/team leader? The answer of course depends on each player’s
goals in the region as it varies with the maintenance of power, dominance, and world order.
While our discussion is primarily focused on the global vs. global teams, there are regional
and non-state actors that are in the midst of playing their own ‘game.’ The most notable
example is undoubtedly the Sunni-Shia conflict, in which the 2003 invasion of Iraq upset
the centuries-long ‘winning’ team of the Sunnis to re-strategize their ‘game’ against the
opposing Shias. In addition, non-state actors, such as the aforementioned political Islamists
and stateless Kurdish population, also threaten the status quo of regional SunniShia/U.S./nation-state order.22 However, in the case of the Sunni-Shia conflict, it is
important to note that the primary underlying tension in the 21st century is not on the
religions nor any cultural divide, but instead upon the power struggle between rising powers
in the region. Thus, culture and civilization clashes are merely a façade for the ongoing
power struggle.
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In 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini became another ‘game changing player’ in the chessboard of
the Middle East, which was already losing some of the strong battalions. The region
witnessed a tidal wave of political Islam, and the Sunni-Shia conflict was politicized due
to the war in Iraq. Iran thus transformed itself as a new regional player; in fact, Migdal
traces the intricate moments in which the United States, after the end of the Cold War,
attempted to determine who the new major player in the Middle East would be, that is to
say, who the new opponent or the ideal strategic partnership for the U.S. would be. It was
here that the U.S. guessed wrong, since they assumed that they would be playing the chess
game of the Middle East against Iraq; they had not closely observed the new emerging
player of Iran.23
This ‘rise of Iran’ upset the power balance not only for global, but regional powers as well.
In regards to the latter, this upset of the power balance derives not only from the standpoint
of a theological perspective (i.e. Sunni-Shia conflict), but also from a political perspective.
Countries such as Russia, China and the U.S., to a certain extent (more recently with the
Iran Nuclear deal), attempt to create and maintain strategic partnerships with Iran in the
region.24 This is a marked shift from the once politically isolated Iran of the late 20th
century; now that the balance of power has tipped in the favor of Iran, more players, such
as Russia, Hezbollah, and China, are attempting to join a growing ‘team’ of pro-Iranian
regional dominance.25
As a player as well as a ‘team leader’ for Shia populations in the Middle East, the ‘rise of
Iran’ has led to both an increase in strategic partnerships as well as support for Shia groups
in the region. For example, in Phillip Smyth’s “How Iran Is Building Its Syrian Hezbollah,”
he notes how Shia opposition groups in Syria, “show loyalty to Tehran, over even the Assad
regime, marking an important shift in the wartime dynamic.”26 Smyth describes the
‘hezbollahization,’ a process that began in 2012, of such Syrian Shia groups as marking a
partnership between Iran and Russia. In fact, many of the groups in Syria refer to
themselves as “Hezbollah in Syria.” These are not the first non-state actors that Iran has
influenced; in fact, Smyth points to similarities involving Iran in other regional conflicts,
such as Iraq, which are, “multifaceted and carry out ideological as well as other regional
power-projection goals.”27 Ultimately, Smyth opines that with no end in sight to the
conflict in Syria, the infiltration of Iran in the region is a testament to the regional power’s
growing strength, clearly evident in the chess game of the Middle East.
The contemporary Middle East, especially considering the likely redrawing of borders that
Haass indicates, is in a state of flux that will ultimately result in a rebalancing of power.
This rebalancing, as noted in the previous section, is not self-contained in the redrawing of
23
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borders; the rebalancing is likely to affect the regional and ultimately global power balance
of nation-states. While the author previously noted many critical historical matches in
which Syria functioned as a pawn, the following section will turn to the current situation in
Syria, which can be best defined as its decimation and ultimately self-interested calculated
moves by regional and global powers alike. The author’s argument is indeed validated by
focusing on the Syrian conflict that erupted in 2011. Exploring the past will help us figure
out the various players’ roles in a chess game that seems to have no rules.
The region commonly known as Syria today was once a cradle of civilization and culture
in the Middle East, marked by numerous cities of culture and religion. Before the postOttoman chess game, Syria was geographically situated where ‘East’ and ‘West’ met both
culturally and metaphorically, since the region’s primary function was as a trading center
in the ancient cities of Damascus and Aleppo. There the mixing of cultures such as
Mesopotamian, Phoenician, Roman and the growing Islamic empires interacted as well as
established political authority. The state of Syria did not exist until the end of World War
I; instead, until the end of the Ottoman Empire, it was a land in which major cities such as
Damascus were crucial points of Christian and Muslim intellectual thought, as well as
freedom to co-mingle under the borderless and diverse Empire.28 However, as the authors
mentioned previously, the consequences of the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement (officially
the Asia Minor Agreement) and the imperialist artificial borders, have contributed to a
plethora of tension for groups in the current Syrian border.
The transformation of Syria in the context of the chess game of the Middle East is stark:
Syria has never been a team leader, or even team player, but instead a pawn on the 20th and
21st century chessboard. Migdal notes Syrian importance as well as its demise due to its
‘team’ of the USSR (one has only to examine the current political situation in Syria to see
the long-term effect that choosing the USSR held for Syria). Migdal stresses that Syria,
while possibly choosing the wrong team, has been a critical pawn in the ‘chess game’ of
the Middle East. In fact, he notes that, “[Syria] had tipped the balance of power in one
direction or another through the ages […].When Syria was controlled by or allied with one
of the two powers, that bloc tended to dominate.”29 In the context of the chess game, Syria
was a pawn that, due to its strategic position, had the possibility of benefitting its
teammates; however, it could also be easily disposed of as well as experience a polar
opposite reaction to whichever team the country was playing for. While Midgal does not
elaborate on Syria’s history as a critical region for power domination, his reference supports
the idea that Syria is ultimately subject to the will of the powerful countries which control
it.
An important discussion that can be linked to Migdal’s reference is that Syria has been the
pawn for proxy wars, wars that are controlled by remote countries. The hegemonic players
did not become directly involved, ultimately reflecting the movement of power in either
28
29
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direction. These proxy wars by no means ended with the end of the Cold War and the rise
of American hegemonic power in the region; in fact, the conflict in Syria today is evidence
that proxy wars are still very critical to the involvement of global powers in the region.
Using proxy war as a basis to discuss the current conflict in Syria is not favored by all
scholars of the region; in fact, Lionel Beehner’s “How Proxy Wars Work” focuses on how
the current situation regarding Syria in the Middle East should not be categorized as a proxy
war, but instead a “multidimensional war.”30 Aside from the semantic issue of definition
of proxy war in regards to the overall conflict, Beehner’s argument fails due to the fact that
there is more evidence, especially through the lens of the ‘chess game,’ that substantiates
the usage of ‘proxy war’ in defining this conflict. Beehner notes the implications of
defining Syria as a proxy war as the following:
First, describing the Syrian quagmire as a proxy war implies that the conflict is
mainly about larger fissures in the region, especially the rift between Sunni and
Shiite, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Second, it suggests that the conflict will be resolved
chiefly by outside actors hashing out their differences at the table. Third, the phrase
indicates that the conflict is an incredibly high-stakes game involving existential
issues over which compromise is impossible.”31
However, as has been previously stated, these three requirements of a proxy war are very
much applicable in the case of Syria. In particular, the ‘rift’ between the divisions of Islam,
as represented by Iran and Saudi Arabia, is a major contributor to the overall power balance
within the region, and therefore, their subsequent involvement (e.g. the aforementioned
Iranian funding of Shia groups in Syria to support al-Assad) has major implications on the
war overall. Furthermore, it is most likely that the only solution to the proxy war in Syria
is that “outside actors [will hash] out their differences;” this is evident in the historical cycle
of superpowers selecting pawns for their game. Only when the game has ended between
the two chess teams (U.S./pro-rebel/Saudi Arabia/Turkey and Russia/Iran/al-Assad/China)
will there be peace in Syria.
The current situation in Syria is leading toward a ‘zero-sum’ game, where neither of the
players (both regional and global) have committed to a clear cause. In a sense, the strategy
in which the game in Syria is being played is all in the context of self-interest for each of
the players. While this is hardly a new concept in realism-based foreign policy, the actual
consequences of such motivations and strategies based on self-interest are that no two
regional or global players desire the same outcome in Syria. In particular, the current clash
of interests can be seen in the basic disagreement of the current standing regime: Bashar alAssad, supported by Russia as well as Iran (i.e. teammates) versus the removal of al-Assad,
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as urged by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the U.S. Yet within even the issue of maintenance
or removal of al-Assad, there are different motivations.
More specifically, Russia wants to prop up the al-Assad regime because of the history of
Syria as a crucial ally of the Soviet Union since the Cold War. For example the
Congressional Research Service states that Russian military involvement in Syria dates
back to the 1950’s when the former Soviet Union embraced Syrian nationalist rulers as a
counterbalance to U.S. regional partners. Soviet and Russian Federation naval forces have
accessed a facility at the Syrian port of Tartus since the early 1970s, using it as a logistical
hub to enable longer Mediterranean operations. Former Syrian president Hafiz al Asad
(1971-2000) regularly hosted Soviet military and economic advisors but resisted attempts
by Moscow to leverage its military assistance to gain greater access to shore facilities. Syria
eventually became the largest Middle East recipient of Russian equipment and training,
with Russia supplying the majority of Syria's tanks, artillery, fixed-wing aircraft, and
helicopters.
While Russian personnel have since been based in Syria to maintain Russian military
equipment and train Syrians, their numbers have fluctuated over time. The number of
Soviet and Eastern European military technicians in Syria reached approximately 5,800 in
1983, according to CIA estimates, then gradually declined. By 2006, there were only 2,000
Russian military personnel, according to an academic study. Some reports suggest that
Russian personnel numbers further declined to a few hundred, many of whom were
withdrawn for security reasons prior to recent redeployments.32
Furthermore, Syria is not just a pawn on the Middle East chessboard for ideological
purposes (though the humanitarian crisis has shed light onto many of the atrocities such as
war-torn Aleppo), but also in the recurring theme of ‘teammates’: it is no coincidence that
Iran and Russia support the same goal, and that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the U.S. support
another. These are teammates supporting their respective teams so as to not ultimately
overhaul the strategic partnerships developed so carefully in the chessboard of the Middle
East, all of which are guilty of servicing self-interest over reform. Douglas Lovelace notes
that:
Regional and global powers, including Iran, Turkey, the Arab Gulf states, Russia,
and the United States, responded to the uprising and emerging conflict in Syria in
ways that prioritized their own interests and perspectives. Funding, weaponry,
political support, and personnel offered by outside forces—both state and
nonstate—have contributed directly to the intensification and continuation of
fighting across Syria from 2012 to the present.33
U.S. Congress. “Russian Deployments in Syria Complicate U.S. Policy.” By Carla E. Humud, Steven
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33
Douglas C. Lovelace. Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2015. p. 176.
32

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol76/iss76/27

74

Civilizations Review: Full Issue

68

Number 76, Spring 2017

Within the context of power and world order, the authors would like to highlight important
and very relevant issues. Haass formulates his judgment from an advantage and selfinterest point, but just because there is not anything there for the United States does not
mean there is not power at all; in fact, there is almost too much power, and the attempt to
balance has resulted in chaos. This chaos is not due to the intended disruption of order by
clashes between civilizations, but instead by an attempt to create order that is not
Eurocentric, as is evidenced by the struggle for power. Yet the ongoing ‘chess game’ is at
the expense of this regional order. The interest of what would benefit the region politically
is pushed aside for the global powers as well as regional powers attempting to use their
region for personal gain. There is clearly no simple solution; however, dismissing the
region as lacking power is not a helpful framework for development. If anything, it
dismisses the very chess game that has allowed superpowers to fight for, as well as
maintain, hegemony at the expense of others. As early as the 1950s, Lester Pearson warned
in his book, Democracy in World Politics, that humans were moving into:
An age when different civilizations will have to learn to live side by side in peaceful
interchange, learning from each other, studying each other’s history and ideals and
culture. The alternative in this overcrowded little world is misunderstanding,
tension, clash and catastrophe.34
Clearly, the Middle East is in this critical era where the clashes of civilizations and power
rivalry are catastrophically threatening peace and world order.
Ultimately, the chess game of the Middle East is manifested in a variety of different players.
The ‘chess game’ of the Middle East is a result of centuries-long power struggles between
the great empires and the void they left after endless wars. Perhaps it is best to recontextualize the triad of regional chess games in the three-tiered model illustrated by Nye;
however, rather than the levels containing different forms of power, each tier represents the
simultaneous games played by various actors in the Middle East. With the global
superpower match on the first tier, political Sunni-Shia conflict on the second, and finally
non-state actors on the third, all three ‘games’ are evidence of the critical nature regarding
why the Middle East is not only one of the most power-possessing regions of the century,
but also one of the most volatile in that none of the three games have a clear ‘winner.’
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The European Centre for Higher Education:
A UNESCO Effort to Reduce Cold War Tensions and to Promote
Co-operation in Higher Education in Europe
Leland Conley Barrows
The UNESCO European Centre for Higher Education (CEPES) operated in Bucharest,
Romania, from September 1972 through December 2011, as a decentralized unit of the
Education Sector of the UNESCO Secretariat*. Its initial Cold War mandate called for it
to promote international cooperation in higher education in the Europe Region of
UNESCO, a region so defined as to include North America, Turkey, and Israel1, and after
the 1991 collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Russia itself and other
successor states of the former USSR. This definition of Europe was intended to downplay
as much as possible the ideological divide that had characterized Europe from the end of
the Second World War until 1990. When the Cold War ended, CEPES expanded its
activities by engaging in efforts to bring the higher education systems of Eastern and
Western Europe closer together by the organization of common reform projects, many of
them in collaboration with the European Commission and the Bologna Process.
Cooperation took many forms. From the start, CEPES was called upon to collect and
disseminate information including educational statistics. It was also assigned a forum
function that stressed the organization of thematic conferences and workshops and the
diffusion and application of the results. The preferred method of diffusion was publication;
hence, the launching in 1975 of what would become the trilingual quarterly review, Higher
Education in Europe, which was published regularly until the end of 2009. In addition,
CEPES launched five themed series of monographs on various subjects that were published
periodically.

*

This article is a revised and updated version of the paper which the author presented at a seminar titled
“UNESCO and the Cold War” organized by the International Scientific Committee for the UNESCO History
Project in Heidelberg, Germany, in March 2010. He published the first revision in French as “Le Centre
Européen de l’UNESCO pour l’enseignement supérieur (CEPES) dans le cadre de la réaction de l’UNESCO
face à la guerre froide” in GeoPolitica: Revistă de Geografie Politică, GeoPolitică şi GeoStrategie 8 36-37
3 (2010): 210-223. The article is based on written sources and secondary materials, particularly successive
versions (1997, 2012, and 2013) of a monograph written by the author on the history and operation of CEPES.
A second version, titled European Centre for Higher Education (UNESCO-CEPES 1972-2011, appears as a
volume in the International Encyclopaedia of Laws: Intergovernmental Organizations series, an imprint of
Kluwer Law International. The article and the book reflect the author’s service from 1983 to 2004 as the
Senior Editor at CEPES. Having kept in touch with former colleagues, he wishes to expresses his gratitude
to these persons, even though they are not named, for the information that they were willing to share with
him.
1

The 19th Session of the General Conference of UNESCO included Canada, the United States of America,
and Israel within the UNESCO Europe Region in 1976.
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The presence of CEPES in Romania prior to 1990 conferred on UNESCO a European
presence on both sides of the Iron Curtain that was unique for an international organization
based in Western Europe during the years that Europe was split ideologically.
Origins of CEPES
In addition to the will of UNESCO to found a center like CEPES, there was the
determination of the Romanian communist authorities to reach out to the world beyond the
confines of the socialist bloc both to traditional friends, particularly France, that had been
both a mentor and a sometime ally of Romania, and to the rest of the world, frequently via
the organs of the United Nations. Another factor was a deliberate French policy to utilize
UNESCO, its headquarters situated in Paris, to further French cultural, linguistic, and, to
some extent, political objectives, including the reaffirmation of French influence in Central
and Eastern Europe. 2
Well before the founding of CEPES, France had been promoting the idea of a Third Force
in Europe. During the 1950s, France supported the organization of meetings of the national
UNESCO commissions of different European countries. In 1956, France took the initiative
in organizing the first Conference of European National Commissions for UNESCO in Aixen-Provence. Meetings between the French National Commission for UNESCO and the
UNESCO National Commissions of certain Eastern European countries followed.
In 1962, Professor Jean Stoetzel, a delegate to the French National Commission for
UNESCO, strongly supported the creation in Vienna, Austria, of the European
Coordination Centre for Research and Documentation in the Social Sciences.3 Stoetzel,
who had served between 1958 and 1975 as President of the Committee for the Social
Sciences in the French National Commission for UNESCO took steps to obtain generous
funding for this center from the French government. He served as a member of its
Executive Committee from 1964 to 1975. In the words of a Belgian delegate to the
Executive Board of UNESCO, this center served as a “meeting ground between East and
West”4—exactly what would be said, later on, of CEPES.
Higher education, which began to undergo an unprecedented expansion on both sides of
the Iron Curtain after World War II, seemed to provide an excellent venue for East-West
international dialogue and co-operation. Such problems as access, academic/cultural
versus practical education, the links between higher education and employment, continuing
education, financing, standard-setting, equivalence and mobility, massification — all were
common to both sides. Also, higher education offered the advantage of being more
ideologically neutral than other possible areas of cooperation. Moreover, the institutional
William R. Pendergast, ‘UNESCO and French Cultural Relations 1945-1970’, International Organization
30 3 (Summer 1976): 465-468.
3
The Center operated in Vienna from 1964 to 1989.
4
Pendergast (1976): 467, 480.
2
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structures of European higher education, both East and West, were strongly statist, and the
traditions of higher education in both parts of Europe harked back to the early modern
period in European history and in some cases to the High Middle Ages.
Thus, higher education would be a “safe”, but presumably productive, vehicle for EastWest European dialogue and co-operation. That was the view taken by UNESCO and its
French Director-General, René Maheu, who in 1966 had published La civilisation de
l’universel (Paris: Lafont-Gauthier), as preparations were being made to hold the first
Conference of Ministers of Education of the European Member States of UNESCO
(MINEDEUROPE I) that was held in Vienna, Austria, from November 20 to November
25, 1967. Although this meeting was indeed one bringing together ministers of education,
it concentrated almost exclusively on higher education, specifically access to higher
education.
Backtracking a bit, we note that Romania achieved United Nations membership in
December 1955 and UNESCO membership in early 1956. Very soon Romania became
active in the affairs of the United Nations system, as it had been in the affairs of the League
of Nations prior to World War II. In 1965, Romania was one of eight medium-sized
European countries, including Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Turkey, and
Yugoslavia, that sponsored a United Nations Resolution on Europe intended ‘…to improve
good neighborly relationships among countries belonging to different horizons, as the
tripartite spirit of the Resolution envisioned: East, West, and neutral.’5
Contributing to this effort was the mathematician, future member of the Romanian
Academy, and diplomat, Professor Mircea Malitza, a founder of CEPES, who, at the time
was the Vice Minister for United Nations Relations in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. According to him, the sponsoring countries of this resolution translated it into a
‘real UNESCO plan for Europe’, a first outcome being the MINEDEUROPE I Conference.6
Romanians played very active roles in this conference that took place at the same time that
the General Assembly of the United Nations was meeting in New York under the
chairmanship of Corneliu Mǎnescu, the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The
General Rapporteur of MINEDEUROPE I, elected by acclamation by its participants upon
the proposal of Ştefan Bǎlan, the Romanian Minister of Education, was Jean Livescu, the
Romanian Vice-Minister of Education, who, as Director-General Maheu recognized in his
inaugural address, had chaired the ad hoc committee which had met earlier at UNESCO
Headquarters to plan the Conference.
In the same address, Maheu suggested that ‘the fact that Europe, which [had] never before
been assembled on such a scale and at such a level on any subject [negated] …a cliché…
Mircea Malitza, ‘Reflections on the Creation and the Functioning of UNESCO-CEPES: The Personal
View of One of Its Founders’, Higher Education in Europe 27 1-2 (2002): 18.
6
Ibid.
5
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to the effect that Europe [was] only to a slight extent directly and properly concerned in the
action of UNESCO’.7
The General Recommendation formulated by this conference, quoted below, is considered
to have been the inspiration for the founding of CEPES:
The Conference
1. Recommends that [the] European Member States of UNESCO and the Organization
itself:
(a) consider appropriate ways and means of promoting activities designed to foster
European co-operation in the field of education, …particularly higher
education, taking into account the work already carried out by various national,
international and non-governmental organizations and expert meetings;
(b) develop the use of existing information services to enable the various
experiences in higher education to be exchanged on a wider basis;
(c) stimulate educational research in connexion [sic] with problems concerning
access to and the future planning of higher education;
2. Recommends, moreover [that] UNESCO:
(a) …pursue, in close cooperation with European Member States and taking into
account the work of international organizations, further methodological studies
and formulate recommendations on the provision of internationally comparable
data and the standardisation of educational statistics, terminology and definitions
on topics relating to access to higher education;
(b) …explore the possibility of making provision in the Organization’s program for
a further Conference of Ministers of Education of European Member States.8
As recommended, a second MINEDEUROPE Conference met in Bucharest between
November 26 and December 3 of 1973, a year and two months after the opening of CEPES.
The final report of this conference makes clear that ‘guided by the spirit of the
recommendations of the Vienna conference, UNESCO made provision…, as early as the
Sixteenth Session of the General Conference, for the establishment of a European Centre
for Higher Education, which was opened in Bucharest….’9
It was probably in 1969 that the Romanian government began to lobby systematically for
the creation of a UNESCO higher education center in Bucharest. In the next few years, it
would successively obtain the opening, in Bucharest, of a United Nations Information
Center (UNIC) in 1970, a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) office in 1971, a
7

UNESCO, Conference of Ministers of Education of European Member States of UNESCO (20-25
November 1967), Draft Final Report, Annex 1, p. 2.
8
UNESCO, Conference of Ministers of Education of European Member States of UNESCO (20-25
November 1967), Draft Final Report, Annex 1, p. 2.
9
UNESCO, Higher Education in Europe: Problems and Prospects 17, Paris, 5 September 1973
(unpublished ED 73/MINEDEUROPE II/3).
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United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) office in 1972, and the
United Nations/Romania Demographic Center (CEDOR) in 1974.
On one hand, the stance taken by Nicolae Ceauşescu, President of the State Council of
Romania and Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party, in opposition to the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia increased the popularity of Romania in the West. On
the other hand, the events occurring in France in May of 1968 and then elsewhere increased
the awareness on the part of higher education decision-makers and administrators in
Western Europe of their common problems.
For Romania, this period of opening towards the United Nations and its specialized
agencies corresponded to a reawakening of Franco-Romanian collaboration. A joint
venture linking Renault, the parastatal French automobile manufacturer, had given rise to
the launching of the Dacia plant in Piteşti between 1966 and 1968. For many years, this
plant assembled the “Renault 12” giving it the trade name, “Dacia 1300”. Collaboration
between the Société Aérospatiale de France and Industria Aeronautică Română (IAR) of
Braşov in the manufacturing of helicopters began several years later.
It was notable that even though the French social upheavals during May of 1968 began
while French President Charles de Gaulle was on an official visit to Romania, he did not
cut short his stay. One Frenchman who believed very strongly in this Franco-Romanian
rapprochement throughout its duration was the Director-General of UNESCO, René
Maheu.
The formal 1970 decision to set up CEPES in Bucharest was taken during the Sixteenth
Session of the UNESCO General Conference (October 12 to November 14, 1970), but not
without difficulty. The Report of the Program Commission that brought together delegates
from forty-four countries reveals that several countries, Sweden, Finland, Norway,
Denmark, and the United Kingdom initially opposed the idea, believing that all the
functions of such a center would best be assumed by the Paris Headquarters of UNESCO.
On the other hand, certain countries other than Romania, particularly Austria and the
USSR, wanted to host the Centre.10
10

UNESCO, 16th Session of the General Conference (12 October-14 November 1970), Rapport de la
Commission du Programme, p. 43; Valentin Lipatti, Strada Povernei 23 (Bucharest: Editura Garamond,
1993), pp. 166-167). Nevertheless, several of the CEPES directors were recruited from these countries: Two
of them were Swedish (Eric Ribbing, 1972-1974, and Carin Berg, 1988-1995); one was Norwegian (Audun
Ofjørd, 1978-1980), and one was Scottish (Lesley Wilson, 1996-1999). One director, (Frans Eberhard,
1982-1986) came from Austria, a country that had made a bid to host CEPES. With the exception of Audun
Ofjørd, a career UNESCO official, these directors were more or less political appointees. Another director
(Thomas Keller, 1976-1978), also a career UNESCO official, came from the Federal Republic of Germany.
Upon the retirement of the final CEPES director, Jan Sadlak (1999-2009), who held Polish and Canadian
citizenship, an English program specialist, Peter Wells, on post at CEPES as of 2003, was named “Head of
Office ad interim”, a position he held until CEPES closed at the end of 2011. His lack of enthusiasm for
keeping CEPES open and running evokes the original British attitude towards the founding of CEPES. All
the interim directors, including Wells, were career UNESCO functionaries. Two of them were French
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Obtaining the Centre for Romania, reported Ambassador Valentin Lipatti, the Romanian
Representative to UNESCO between 1965 and 1971, was not an easy task.11 It required
him and other Romanian officials to lobby vigorously in several European and UNESCO
venues, starting with a meeting of European university rectors sponsored jointly by
UNESCO and the Standing Conference of Rectors and Vice-Chancellors of the European
Universities, held in Bucharest in April 1970. The 48th Session of the UNESCO Executive
Board (May 4 to June 19, 1970) issued a positive recommendation.12
At its meeting of October 14 to 16, 1970, the Higher Education and Research Committee
of the Cultural Co-operation Council of the Council of Europe endorsed this
recommendation. It added that CEPES should be a European center ‘…for information on
the mobility of researchers, teachers, and students’.13
Summing up, Ambassador Lipatti could report that 1970, which, by coincidence, the United
Nations organization had designated as the International Year of Education, had been very
fruitful for Romania. We note Lipatti’s presence as an observer in the Meeting of Experts
on the Feasibility of Establishing a European Center for Higher Education that met from
September 27 to October 1, 1971, at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris and his satisfaction,
when, at the farewell dinner offered in his honor by Director-General Maheu upon his
transfer back to Romania the next month, the latter asked him to carry back with him the
formal letter of confirmation, addressed to the Romanian government, of the intention of
UNESCO to set up CEPES in Bucharest.14
Over the next year, a series of meetings were held between representatives of UNESCO
and of the Romanian government intended to iron out the details and to elaborate the formal
Seat Agreement (accord de siège). Professor Mircea Malitza, now the Minister of
Education of Romania, took a particular interest in the project the remote origins of which
he traces back to a chance encounter with René Maheu at the Rio de Janeiro Airport in
1954.15 Among the responsibilities of his ministry was the refurbishing of the Kretzulescu
Palace, in central Bucharest, including a two-story annex, the free use of which as the
CEPES office the Romanian authorities had offered to UNESCO.

citizens: Louis Ziéglé (January-December 1975) and Jean-Claude Pauvert (1980-1981. The others, Dragoş
Vaida (September-December, 1974), Dumitru Chiţoran (1986-1988), and Lazăr Vlăsceanu (November
1995-1996) were Romanian assistant directors. A list of CEPES directors and interim directors can be
found in Barrows, 2013, p. 193.
11
Lipatti, 1993, p. 166.
12
UNESCO, 16th Session, Rapport de la Commission, p. 43.
13
UNESCO, Note d’information, ED/WS/217 (15 March 1971), p. 2.
14
Malitza (2002): 17; Lipatti, 1993, pp. 166-167.
15
Malitza (2002): 11.
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Anomalies in the Staffing of CEPES

Nothing was said, at this point, about the assignment of Romanian local staff members to
CEPES. Rather, the documents speak of the possibility of other types of professionals,
possibly university faculty members on temporary assignment from European
universities.16
A few days before the inauguration of CEPES, however, an exchange of letters between
Director-General Maheu and Minister of Education Malitza elicited a positive response by
UNESCO to a Romanian offer of fourteen local employees—Romanian civil servants
employed by the Ministry of Education and Instruction—to be assigned on a permanent
basis to the center. Their positions were strictly categorized by professional function. Their
salaries were to be paid by the Romanian government.
The Romanian local staff at CEPES prior to 1990 included five program assistants and
multilingual documentalists, one librarian, three multilingual secretaries, a driver, a
receptionist, a general technician, and two housekeepers. These employees had the
appropriate academic or vocational qualifications obtained at the corresponding Romanian
universities or professional schools. The driver was a former Romanian army mechanic.
The housekeepers had only very basic levels of education. What all the Romanian
personnel had in common was that they were vetted and approved by the security services
(Securitatea) of the Romanian government and were required to report on the international
staff to the Securitate agent(s) charged with the supervision of CEPES.
Almost all the members of the Romanian local staff, including the Romanian assistant
directors who held international professional staff status, were members of the Romanian
Communist Party and as such were required to participate each month, usually on a Friday
afternoon, in the required political-ideological meetings held at the Ministry of Education
located two blocks away from CEPES. As these persons never informed their nonRomanian international colleagues of upcoming meetings, the latter were periodically
confronted with empty offices and unoccupied desks upon returning from their lunch
breaks.
But there were always two members of the Romanian local staff who were never absent on
such occasions. ‘They are the two who refused to join the Party’, declared a former Director
of CEPES. After the Romanian Revolution of December 1989, she learned that Securitate
personnel, who were responsible to the Ministry of the Interior and not to the Ministry of
Education, held their meetings on Saturdays.

UNESCO, Réunion d’experts sur les modalités d’établissement d’un centre européen d’enseignement
supérieur : Etude de justification provisoire…, Unpublished ED/71/CONF. 31/3, para. 47 (1971), pp. 31-32,
and UNESCO, Note d’information, ED/WS/217 (15 March 1971), p. 7.
16
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It also seems that just before the actual inauguration of the Center by Director-General
Maheu and Secretary-General and State Council President Ceauşescu, Maheu and Malitza
made a further agreement, a so-called “Gentleman’s Agreement” by which the secondranking international post, that in all but title was that of an assistant director, would always
be filled by a Romanian national — a senior academic — who nevertheless would not be
permitted to officially hold the title of assistant or deputy director. The reasons for this
rather humiliating denial of title to the ranking Romanian international staff member at
CEPES (made even more humiliating because he was sometimes called the “assistant to
the director”) are obscure; however, the impetus for this action seems to have come purely
from UNESCO, where an anti-communist current wished to limit the prestige that the
Socialist Republic of Romania might derive from CEPES.
Yet, the intellectual as well as the academic qualifications of the Romanian assistant
directors of CEPES were considerably more distinguished than those of all the directors of
CEPES except for the last director. The first assistant director of CEPES, Dr. Dragoş
Vaida, was an Associate Professor of Mathematics at the Polytechnic Institute of Bucharest.
Those who succeeded him were full professors. The last assistant director to serve before
the 1989 Romanian Revolution, Professor Dumitru Chiţoran (1983-1989), a distinguished
specialist in linguistics at the University of Bucharest, had served as Chairman of the
Department of Philology and Pro-Rector for Exterior Affairs at the University of Bucharest.
Only the last of the CEPES Directors, Dr. Jan Sadlak (1999-2009), could boast comparable
intellectual and academic qualifications.
The question of the “correct” title for the Assistant Director of CEPES was summarily
resolved with the nomination in 1991 of the Romanian sociologist, Professor Lazăr
Vlăsceanu, to fill the position. He simply assumed the title of Assistant Director, and
nobody complained. However, when Vlăsceanu retired in 2007, the demand made by the
Romanian government that the post still be reserved for a senior Romanian academic, as
per the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” of 1972, led to some friction. This Cold War era
arrangement was no longer acceptable to the UNESCO Secretariat. All vacancies for
international posts at CEPES were now to be truly opened to international recruitment. But
because the Education Sector of UNESCO was already considering the possibility of
closing CEPES, the Assistant Director’s post was not filled.
A question one might legitimately ask is to what extent the various Romanian citizens,
officials, academics, and others who contributed to the setting up of CEPES or who later
worked there, were convinced and/or influential communists. In vain does one peruse the
2006 Raport Final on the communist dictatorship in Romania that was compiled by a
Romanian presidential commission chaired by Professor Vladimir Tismăneanu (currently
a Professor of Political Science at the University of Maryland at College Park) in search of
references to CEPES and its founders.17 There are none in the main text. However, an
Vladimir Tismăneanu et al, Raport final, 2006, electronic version available at
http://cpcadcr.ro/upload/Raport_Final_CPADCR,pdf
17
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appendix titled ‘Biografiile nomenklaturii’,18 lists Gheorghe Maurer, Prime Minister and
President of the Council of Ministers of Romania between 1964 and 1974, and Ştefan
Andrei, Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1978 and 1985, both of whom had contacts
with CEPES and with the UNESCO Secretariat. Both were favorable to CEPES, Maurer
having even formed a friendship with Director-General Maheu thanks to his many trips to
Paris, his half-French ancestry, and his mastery of French. He was present at the
inauguration of CEPES on September 22, 1972.
On the other hand, the tell-all account by Mihai Pacepa, Red Horizons (1987), indicates
that when Ambassador Valentin Lipatti had completed his term of service at the UNESCO
Secretariat, he returned to Romania to become Assistant Director of the Section on
Disinformation in the Office of Information on Foreign Countries (DIE) of the Securitate.
Here he was known as Colonel Leonte Lipatti and held the title, Director of Cultural
Relations, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Pacepa wrote that even though Lipatti was
‘bourgeois… [and the brother of the famous pianist, Dinu Lipatti], he had been recruited
and retained by the DIE as a unique exception because of his devotion to Communism, his
talent for diplomacy, his perfect mastery of French, and his exceptional understanding of
the West’.19
Possibly one should class a large proportion of the Romanian officials who supported and
even collaborated with CEPES during the Cold War as being among those who, according
to the classification presented in Raport final, resisted communism through culture.20
The opening of CEPES in Romania and the assignment there of a certain number of
Romanian local staff members was linked to the possibility for Romania to obtain a major
reduction in the annual membership dues that it owed to UNESCO. In offering the free use
of the Kretzulescu Palace and the free services of fourteen (eventually fifteen) local staff
members, the Romanian government succeeded in reducing the convertible hard currency
portion of these dues to zero. Thus, the apparently generous offer that the Romanian
government made to UNESCO masked its realization of certain financial advantages.
Romania also obtained hard currency by exploiting the Romanian Assistant Directors of
CEPES whose salaries were paid by UNESCO in US dollars (two-thirds) and Romanian
lei (one-third). In common with the practices of the other socialist bloc countries,
Romanian citizens earning hard currency were required to “contribute” a portion of it to
their governments. The portion required of Romanians became particularly large after 1980
as the economic situation of the country deteriorated. Thus, the Romanian Assistant
Director who joined CEPES in 1983 was required to hand over his whole salary to the
Romanian government, both the portion paid in US dollars and the portion paid in
18

Ibid., pp. 645-666.
Ion Mihal Pacepa, Red Horizons: The True Story of Nicolae and Elena Ceauşescu’s Crimes, Lifestyle,
and Corruption (Washington, D. C.: Regency Gateway, 1987, rev. 1990), p. 122.
20
Tismăneanu, 2006, p. 364.
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Romanian lei. In return, the government paid him a salary in lei comparable to what he
would have been earning as a senior professor and pro-rector at the University of Bucharest.
The government changed the dollars into lei at a special rate that yielded more lei than the
usual black market rate. It then used all the lei obtained to pay the salaries of the whole
Romanian local staff and to cover the maintenance costs of the Kretzulescu Palace.
Functioning During the Cold War
After its inauguration on September 21, 1972, CEPES began to function in December of
that year with a skeleton staff. The first Director, Eric Ribbing of Sweden, a former Head
of the Department of Higher Education in the Swedish Ministry of Education, arrived to
begin a two-year assignment during which he participated in the Second Conference of
Ministers of the European Member States of UNESCO (MINEDEUROPE II). Indeed, the
first meeting organized by CEPES, an Ad Hoc Panel of Experts on European University
Co-operation, which met in Bucharest from June 5 to June 7 of 1973, provided input for
this conference.
It had been established in advance that CEPES would not be divided into smaller sections
(divisions, sections, sub-sections) as were the various sectors at UNESCO Headquarters in
Paris, the CEPES staff being viewed as too small for such a grouping.21 A further
clarification came in 1974 when the CEPES Advisory Committee report of that year stated
that ‘…the Center cannot operate as a research center…’ Rather, it is expected ‘…to act as
the host institution for the promotion of co-operation in the field of higher education in
Europe and for the promotion of research….’22 Thus, two characteristics for which CEPES
would be roundly criticized many years later, its lack of clear internal organization and its
brokering function, were clarly established immediately before and after the Centre opened
its doors.23
As structured, CEPES would broker many activities dealing with various aspects of higher
education which would be undertaken by outside specialists on contract or via the synergy
stimulated by the various forum activities that started almost from the moment CEPES
began to function. Indeed, the debate as to whether CEPES should conduct research on its
own or identify areas of research and farm out ideas for projects to co-operating
organizations and individuals was really part of a much larger debate regarding the role and
activity of UNESCO as a whole, one that began almost as soon as UNESCO itself came
into existence.24
UNESCO, Réunion d’experts…, Unpublished ED/71/CONF. 31/3, para. 45 (1971), p. 30.
CEPES/UNESCO, Report of the Second Session of the CEPES Advisory Committee, Unpublished
ED/74/CONF.511/5 (1974) para. 7, p. 5.
23
Peter Maassen, Agnete Vabø, with contributions by Ossi Lindqvist, Evaluation of UNESCO-CEPES,
Bucharest, Romania, Unpublished draft, Oslo: NIFU STEP Studies in Innovation, Research, and Education
(15 December 2005). See, in particular, pp.7-8, 36-37, 51-55, and 59.
24
See James P. Sewell, UNESCO and World Politics: Engaging in International Relations (Princeton:
University Press, 1975), Chapters 4 and 5, and William Preston Jr., Edward S. Herman, and Herbert I.
21
22

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol76/iss76/27

86

Civilizations Review: Full Issue

80

Number 76, Spring 2017

Just as MINEDEUROPE I had suggested tasks for a future CEPES, MINEDEUROPE II
defined itself, to a great extent, as a forum for the further refinement of the CEPES program.
It urged the Center to pursue the elaboration of a European diploma and equivalence
convention, to develop modalities for the mobility of students and teachers in higher
education, to propose activities that would further the aims of the Helsinki Process, to
develop methods for the international exchange and diffusion of information on higher
education policies, and to examine the possibilities of multimedia teaching and learning.25
Within these parameters, the work of CEPES consisted of the organization of thematic
meetings and workshops in Bucharest and elsewhere in Europe and the preparation of
publications, some of them reflecting the results of these meetings or reflecting other
activities as they were periodically added to the CEPES agenda. In 1984, for instance,
CEPES was appointed Secretariat of the Regional Committee Responsible for the
Application of the 1979 UNESCO Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diplomas,
and Degrees Concerning Higher Education in the States belonging to the Europe Region.
This one responsibility spawned a particularly large number of derived and related
activities and projects including the participation of CEPES as of 2003 in the Bologna
[Process] Follow-Up Group. Indeed, writing in 2008, an American researcher, Chris
Darling, suggested that ‘…policy drafted by UNESCO-CEPES from 1973 to 1977 led to
the elaboration of the Bologna Declaration’.26
Over its lifetime, CEPES sponsored or co-sponsored 174 international meetings (50 before
1990) held at CEPES or elsewhere, not counting the periodic meetings of the CEPES
Advisory Committee (Advisory Board as of 1995) and the CEPES Liaison Officers.27
CEPES also edited and published 87 volumes distributed among five publication series,
some of them printed in-house, others by Romanian or foreign commercial publishers,
including several in collaboration with other units of UNESCO, the International Bureau
of Education (IBE), for instance, and in one case, the International Labor Organization
(ILO).28 In many cases, a meeting, a colloquium or seminar, a consultation led to one or
more follow-up publications.
Schiller, Hope and Folly: The United States and UNESCO, 1945-1985 (Minneapolis: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1989), pp. 188-201.
25
UNESCO, Second Conference of Ministers of Education of European Member States of UNESCO
(November 26 to December 3, 1973), Final Report, Part III, Report of Commission II, European Cooperation in the Field of Higher Education: Objectives, Ways, and Means, pp. 16-20.
26
Chris C. Darling, UNESCO-CEPES: Origins, Accomplishments, and Solutions, Washington D. C.
unpublished paper, 2008.
27
See Barrows, 2013, pp. 155-192, for the lists of all the CEPES meetings and publications of which the
author could find a record.
28
In 1981 and 1987, CEPES compiled two successive editions of an International Directory of Higher
Education Research Institutions for IBE. A symposium organized in collaboration with ILO titled Relations
between Higher Education and Manpower Planning in June 1977 gave rise to seven national case studies
that were published in the ILO World Employment Program Research Working Papers series. A
comparative synthesis based on this work was published in 1982 in the ILO World Employment Program
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Given the importance that the MINEDEUROPE I and II Conferences and the founders of
CEPES imparted to the collection and the interpretation of statistics on higher education,
the second meeting organized at CEPES in July 1974 was a Seminar on Planning of the
Center’s Statistical Activities, organized in collaboration with the Office of Statistics of
UNESCO. The outcome of this seminar gave rise to other activities on statistics that led to
the preparation of three publications, the first one in 1978, Statistical Study on Higher
Education in Europe: 1970-1974, a second and more important bilingual (French-English)
one, Higher Education and Economic Development in Europe, 1975-1980: A Statistical
and Economic Study (two volumes), by Petre Burloiu, and the third one, in 1989, a little
more internationalized than the first two studies, Statistics on Higher Education 19801985: A Study of Data on Higher Education and Research from the Countries of the Europe
Region, by Valentin Nicolae, René H. M. Smulders, and Mihai Korka.
Over several years, meetings of various kinds were organized on the general subject of
higher education and research that gave rise to monographs or articles for the quarterly
review, Higher Education in Europe, and another set of meetings on the planning of higher
education. Thus, a symposium on planning in higher education held in Bucharest in
December 1983 gave rise in 1986 to the volume, Planning in Higher Education: Study on
New Approaches in the Planning of Higher Education in Centrally Planned Economies and
in Market Economy Systems, by W. Wolter, a professor from the German Democratic
Republic, and Ch. Oehler, a professor from the Federal Republic of Germany. The aim of
promoting East-West collaboration was very evident.
The flagship CEPES publication was the quarterly review, Higher Education in Europe. It
began modestly in 1975 as a reaction to a complaint voiced at the second CEPES Advisory
Committee meeting that ‘the Centre’s activities had started so slowly, that the results were
few, and little initiative had been shown’.29
In reality, this criticism was aimed at the first CEPES Director, Eric Ribbing, who had only
recently resigned. It spurred a program specialist (and future CEPES Director), Jan Sadlak,
who had joined the CEPES staff in September 1973, and the next Director, Thomas Keller
(January 1976 to February 1978) of West Germany, to begin the production of a news
bulletin. An experimental issue appeared in April 1975 and was followed in January 1976
by the regular publication of a typed and mimeographed bulletin titled Higher Education
in Europe that initially appeared five times a year and then as of 1979 four times a year.
Through a slow process of mission creep, the bulletin, as it was first designated, that began
simply as a vehicle to reproduce and to diffuse, after translation when needed, news items
and articles from other publications, East and West, evolved into a scholarly review.
creation of a publication series, Monographs on Higher Education [in the Europe Region of UNESCO] in
1978 that between 1978 and 2011 produced volumes having a standardized format on the higher education
systems of 22 countries. Several country monographs were revised and republished in order to take account
of post-Cold War changes.
29
CEPES/UNESCO, Report of the Second Session of the CEPES Advisory Committee (unpublished),
ED/74/CONF.511/5 (1974), paragraph 7, p. 5.
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Higher Education in Europe was published in three linguistic versions: English, the lead
version, French, and Russian. As of 1979, the issues were themed. Between 1976 and 1982,
the three linguistic versions of the review were produced in-house by electric typewriter
and stencil duplicator. As of 1983, they were printed professionally by ILEXIM, a stateowned Romanian press. Beginning in 1997, the English version was printed and distributed
by Carfax (now Taylor and Francis/Routledge) in the United Kingdom, and, as of 2000, the
French and Russian versions were published on-line, the French version being translated
and prepared in-house, the Russian version by Logos Ltd. of Moscow.
Between 1979, when Higher Education in Europe began to be themed, through 2009, it
developed 115 themes or topics. Most of them were derived from CEPES activities,
particularly the subjects and the outcomes of meetings and colloquia. The planning of
higher education was chosen twice as the theme of a given issue, and research on higher
education, four times.
Given both the international and the Cold War vocation of CEPES, the question of what
was called geographical (including ideological) balance was always a matter taken very
seriously both regarding the assignment of international staff members to CEPES and the
selection of participants in conferences, authors for CEPES publications, and, after 1990,
consultants for various higher education reform projects. The selection of such persons
from the Western countries could generally be undertaken through contacts made by the
Director, the other international staff members at CEPES, and the UNESCO Headquarters
staff. Prior to 1990, collaborators and authors from the socialist countries usually had to be
requested via the so-called Liaison Officers, designated officials serving as resource-person
recruiters and information officers in each country, usually mid-level officials in the
respective ministries of education or of higher education.
Before 1990, it proved particularly difficult to initiate contacts with the higher education
institutions that were closest to CEPES, Romanian institutions. Foreigners were not
permitted to enter Romanian institutions without prior arrangements, and these might be
difficult or impossible to make. Typically, Romanian citizens were not permitted to have
contacts with foreigners unless granted prior permission by the Securitate.
In theory, CEPES, particularly its library that was supervised by a Romanian librarian, a
local staff member, was open to the public; however, few Romanians before 1990 actually
frequented the library. Those who attempted to do so might be turned away by this librarian
or possibly reported to the Securitate. Other Romanian visitors, students or colleagues of
the Romanian professors who served successively as the assistant directors of CEPES,
would avoid having any contacts with the CEPES international staff as they entered and
left the building unless they were engaged in specific CEPES projects.
The Romanian and the international staff members nevertheless worked together quite
harmoniously, but they rarely if ever fraternized outside of work. In addition to worries
about the Securitate, the differences in status and, above all, salary, could be embarrassing.
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Salary differences could be a major source of bitterness when local and international staff
members undertook similar or identical tasks, secretarial duties for instance.
From the start, CEPES was mandated to work in three United Nations official languages:
English, French, and Russian. Thus, the provision of high quality interpretation for
conferences and translation for publications was always an important, difficult, and usually
expensive part of the CEPES program. Producing the three linguistic versions of Higher
Education in Europe was especially crucial and difficult.
In 1983, the CEPES Director, Frans Eberhard, and the newly hired Romanian Assistant
Director, Dumitru Chiţoran, who was concurrently a Professor of English at the University
of Bucharest, negotiated a contract with the University of Bucharest whereby translations
would be undertaken by the staffs of the respective language departments. CEPES paid the
university for this work according to generous standard UNESCO page rates. For the
individual translators, however, the work they did was unremunerated, so-called “patriotic
work”, undertaken in addition to their normal (and heavy) teaching and research loads.
They might at best receive some token rewards from the CEPES international staff: bags
of coffee—real coffee—or packs, sometimes whole cartons, of cigarettes of the Kent brand
that circulated in Romania prior to 1991 as a sort of parallel currency. Of course, they
might also earn good will or special privileges from the Romanian authorities. In 1984, an
English-French translator of half-French origin “earned” permission to spend a summer
vacation in France, her first visit there in twenty years.
The Romanian local staff members at CEPES continued to be paid by the Romanian
government through 2000. It even increased their number, but salaries remained very low,
much lower than what Romanian staff members earned in the other UN offices in Romania
where they had a special local/international status and were paid in US dollars by their
respective organizations.
As of January 2001, thanks to lobbying in Paris by CEPES Director Jan Sadlak, all the
Romanian local staff members at CEPES were granted local/international status entailing
salaries paid by UNESCO in US dollars. Unfortunately, this generosity on the part of the
UNESCO Secretariat increased the total personnel costs of the center and served in 2009
as an argument for closing CEPES.
Despite the realities of the pre-1990 period, CEPES did indeed bring together scholars,
professors, and academic administrators from all over a divided Europe. In April 1985,
CEPES helped to initiate the process by which several Eastern European, particularly
Soviet rectors whose universities had broken with the Standing Conference of Rectors and
Vice-Chancellors of the European Universities (CRE) in 1975, renewed their memberships
in this organization.30
Andris Barblan, ‘Academic Co-operation and Mobility in Europe: How It Was and How It Will Be’,
Higher Education in Europe 27 1-2 (2002): 45.
30
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Through its multilingual publications, particularly Higher Education in Europe, CEPES
helped to diffuse the writings of Western scholars among Eastern European academics (and
vice versa). Clearly, the three-language version policy was an aid to diffusion.
Subscriptions to the review remained free to subscribers from the socialist countries having
non-convertible currencies even when paying subscriptions were introduced in 1985 for
certain categories of Western hard currency subscribers. Over the same period, copies of
the other CEPES publications were always provided free of charge to persons and
institutions in Eastern Europe wishing to receive them, and a certain number of copies of
the three linguistic versions of the review were always provided to the Liaison Officers
from these countries.
Looking back at his collaboration with CEPES in the 1980’s, Adrian Nǎstase, the Romanian
Prime Minister in 2002, referred to CEPES as a ‘personal window of opportunity’ in an
otherwise isolated country.31
Although not a stated purpose of CEPES, it did offer a chance to a few Eastern Europeans,
prior to 1990, to defect to the West. However, the three cases with which the author is
familiar involved UNESCO international staff members. In two of these cases the
defections were made to look like the normal transfer of UNESCO international staff
members to Paris. The third case, however, the so-called Sorin Dumitrescu Affair,
temporarily soured relations between UNESCO and the Romanian government but without
unduly affecting CEPES.32
Into the early 1980’s, CEPES continued to be strongly supported by UNESCO (even
though as a decentralized unit of UNESCO Headquarters it did not appear prominently in
the program documents the way the UNESCO institutes did) and by the European member
states, East and West. During the lead-up to the temporary withdrawal of the United States
from UNESCO (1985-2003), the American authorities made it clear that CEPES was one
of the “good” UNESCO projects that would continue to receive American support.
As the western powers drew away from Romania in the late 1980’s — Mikhail Gorbachev
with his policies of glasnost and perestroika superseding Ceauşescu, in Western eyes, as
the perceived progressive communist leader ― the UNESCO Secretariat began to cut back
both the CEPES program and, via attrition, the international staff of CEPES. Certain
Adrian Năstase, ‘The UNESCO-CEPES Jubilee: An Opportune Event for Some Observations about
Higher Education in Romania’, Higher Education in Europe 18 1 (2003): 45. Earlier, as a professor of
international law, Năstase had collaborated with Robert Aspeslagh and Dumitru Chiţoran, at that time the
Assistant Director of CEPES, in the publication of a volume on peace education: Pax et Libertas Civium:
The Role of Universities, UNESCO Papers on Higher Education, No. 34 (Bucharest: CEPES, 1989).
32
This affair involved a ranking Romanian UNESCO official, who, in June 1976, while transiting to
Bulgaria via Romania on official UNESCO business, was prevented from leaving Romania and forced by
the Romanian authorities to submit a letter of resignation to the Director-General of UNESCO, Amadou
Matar M’Bow. The latter not only refused to accept Dumitrescu’s resignation but demanded that he be
permitted to return to his post in Paris. After a two-year standoff, President Ceauşescu permitted
Dumitrescu to return to Paris.
31
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Western member states of UNESCO began to suggest that CEPES be shifted from Romania
to another Eastern European member state. The declining economy of Romania along with
the extreme austerity measures imposed by the Romanian government as of 1983 made
living and working conditions in Bucharest increasingly difficult. The urban renewal
project, which Ceauşescu imposed as of 1981 and accelerated, particularly in Bucharest, in
1984, and the “rural systematization” project that he launched in 1974 and accelerated in
1988, both elicited the increasing disapproval of governments on either side of the
European divide.33
In 1984, when the Romanian government abruptly closed the United Nations/Romania
Demographic Center, many observers believed that CEPES would be next. The favorable
stance on birth control of CEDOR seemed to contradict the pro-natality policies of the
Ceauşescu regime. Also, Elena Ceauşescu claimed that CEDOR harbored dissidents.
CEPES, however, was not affected by this closure, probably because higher education in
the Europe Region of UNESCO, still very much a matter of the respective national or state
governments, was something about which West and East — even Romania — could agree.
Also, CEPES apparently continued to be a source of “economies” for the Romanian
government. In 1988, when the Romanian authorities scrutinized the costs to Romania of
hosting CEPES, the Romanian Assistant Director was able to prove, that, counting the
salary he earned and turned over to these authorities, and the costs of the services and the
goods that the Centre itself and the international staff purchased in Romania in hard
currency, CEPES was profitable.
UNESCO initially seemed to be uninterested, at least at the official level, in Ceauşescu’s
very harmful urban development and “rural systemization” projects. In 1985, when the
Romanian architect, Ştefan Gane, attempted, through an international association he
organized, to obtain the intervention of UNESCO to halt the damage being done to the
architectural patrimony of Bucharest, he had no success.34 However, a new DirectorGeneral, Professor Federico Mayor, elected in November 1987, did become interested,
probably because a new Director of CEPES, Carin Berg of Sweden (1988-1995), expressed
harsh, if unofficial, opinions about both projects while on her visits to Paris.
Over the spring of 1989, out of solidarity with the Belgian-initiated Opération Villages
Roumains that had recently gotten underway, Director-General Mayor charged a former
Algerian Ambassador to Washington and Moscow, Layachi Yaker, with a special mission
to enquire in Bucharest about the effects of “rural systemization”. He met at the residence
of the CEPES Director with the ambassadors to Romania of several countries that were
particularly supportive of Opération Villages Roumains: Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland. Over the next two days, this group toured several systematization sites guided
Both projects are described in some detail by Dennis Deletant in Ceauşescu and the Securitate: Coercion
and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989 (New York: M. S. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 294-319.
34
Ibid., p. 312.
33
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by Romanian officials. One can assume that Ambassador Yaker’s mission report was
negative; however, it seems to have disappeared from the UNESCO Archives.
By the end of 1989, the UNESCO Secretariat, out of solidarity with the now very strong
international opposition to Ceauşescu’s policies, was seriously planning to remove CEPES
from Romania. Indeed, it had permitted the international staff of CEPES to shrink to three:
the Director, the Senior Editor, and the administrative officer. Two other Eastern European
countries, Bulgaria and the USSR, were by now openly expressing a desire to inherit the
CEPES.
After the Cold War
The sudden collapse of the Ceauşescu regime in December 1989 gave CEPES a new lease
on life. The post-communist government of Romania renewed and reinforced the
Romanian commitment to CEPES, including increased financial support and the
assignment of additional local staff remunerated by it. Although there were some
complaints at UNESCO Headquarters that ‘…CEPES [had] not play[ed] the part it should
have… after the collapse of the communist system in Central and Eastern Europe’, and
there were even some suggestions that CEPES should be closed because it was no longer
relevant, the first UNESCO General Conference (October-November 1991) held after the
collapse of communism in Europe called for the renewal of CEPES. A report on the future
of CEPES prepared for Director-General Federico Mayor by two senior professors,
members of the CEPES Advisory Committee, Justin Thorens of Switzerland and Gottfried
Leibbrandt of the Netherlands, drew the same conclusion. They recommended that
‘CEPES… be maintained and developed even further’ and that it… remain in Bucharest.35
For the next eighteen years, CEPES prospered in post-communist Romania. Its activities
expanded to include technical assistance to the post-communist higher education systems
undertaken in cooperation with such partners as the World Bank, the Council of Europe,
the European Commission, the Soros Foundation, particularly its Open Society Institute,
the Japan Grant for the Reform of Romanian Higher Education, and the Japanese Trust
Fund for the Preservation of the World Cultural Heritage. In 1998, CEPES assumed the
task of assuring the European follow-up to the UNESCO World Conference on Higher
Education held that year and as of 2003 was named a consultative member of the Bologna
Follow-up Group.
But CEPES was unable to shed its image at UNESCO Headquarters as a Cold War relic. A
detailed evaluation of the Centre commissioned by the UNESCO Internal Oversight
Service (IOS) in 2005 and undertaken by three experts of the Norwegian Institute for
Studies in Research and Education - Center for Innovation Studies (NIFU-STEP)
35

Justin Thorens and Gottfried Leibrandt, The Renewal and Reinforcement of the UNESCO European
Centre for Higher Education (CEPES)—The Report to the Director-General of UNESCO, 1992, reprinted
as ED-96/CEPES/A.B.5.2/Ref.3 (unpublished) August 1996.
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concluded that although CEPES was a productive unit of UNESCO, its activities were
overly remote from the European higher education goals of the major Education for All
initiative and the related Forum on Higher Education, Research, and Knowledge flagship
activity.36 And as Romania moved toward membership of the European Union, there were
those at the UNESCO Secretariat who argued that the political justification for the existence
of CEPES was rapidly disappearing, despite the continued strong functional justification
for its continued existence. It was, after all, undertaking a slate of activities of greater
number, variety, and intensity than had ever been the case during the Cold War.
In January 2009, UNESCO Director-General, Koichiro Matsuura, by then nine months
away from retirement, announced that he would close CEPES at the end of September 2009.
He justified his decision in terms both of cost: ‘Out of a biennial budget of $2.3 million,
less than ten percent [was] devoted to program activities,’ and of politics: ‘CEPES played
an essential role in the strengthening of co-operation in higher education in Europe…. But
given the new political realities in Europe, CEPES ha[d] fulfilled its role in Europe with
success; therefore, its status as a center funded by the regular budget of UNESCO [was] no
longer tenable’.37
Unfortunately, the Director-General and his advisors failed to consider that CEPES was
obtaining extra-budgetary resources despite impediments to doing so that were being
created by the UNESCO Secretariat. They also failed to consider that CEPES was
rendering direct and indirect services to its stakeholders that could not be given a specific
monetary value but were nevertheless valued very highly by these same stakeholders.38
And they ignored the opinion expressed by the authors of the NIFU STEP report that
‘UNESCO gets “value for its dollars” in the sense that CEPES manages to produce a lot…
for UNESCO [in terms of] relevant outcomes for the relatively small amount invested [by
it] in CEPES’.39
Fortunately, official Romanian attitudes about the role and the value of CEPES had
changed. Rather than viewing the center as a source of hard currency, as had been the case
before 1989, the Romanian government agreed, via a Memorandum of Understanding
signed between Director-General Matsuura and Prime Minister Emil Boc on September 25,
2009, to cover the full costs of operation of CEPES for at least two years if the plan to close
CEPES were deferred.

36

Peter Maassen et al., 2005, pp. 7-8. Although this Forum was inaugurated with great fanfare in 2001as a
follow-up to the 1998 UNESCO World Conference on Higher Education, it was not funded by the regular
program budget of UNESCO, but by the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency that
chose to end it in 2009. Given the focus of the Forum on developing countries and its lack of permanence,
Director Jan Sadlak was wise not to have involved CEPES in it.
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Director-General of UNESCO to the Prime Minister of Romania (4 February 2009).
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The top management of UNESCO, particularly the leadership of the Education Sector,
accepted the Romanian offer; however, this leadership began immediately to weaken
CEPES by transferring many of its activities to the Division of Higher Education in Paris
and by offering generous separation packages to certain members of the local staff who
were then not replaced. The Draft Program and Budget for the UNESCO 2010-2011
Biennium then in the making stated that “…a feasibility study [was] to be prepared [by
Romanian experts] for the possible creation of a category I UNESCO institute in Bucharest,
fully funded by Romania, to replace the existing UNESCO-CEPES. During this two-year
transitional period, the Center [would] focus on the higher education needs of the Central,
Eastern, and South-Eastern European sub-region.”40
Conclusion
What stands out in the train of events leading to the first announcement that CEPES would
close as of September 30, 2009, and then, after protests, to the second announcement that
closure would be delayed December 31, 2009; and finally to the decision to keep CEPES
alive through December 2011 ⸺ but weakened ⸺ is the speed and lack of transparency of
the decisions taken and the bad faith of some of the actors in the UNESCO Secretariat.
There were no prior consultations with stakeholders and little if any prior warning to the
Romanian government.41 It seems that Director-General Matsuura and, particularly,
Assistant Director-General for Education, Nicholas Burnett,42 an English and a former
World Bank official, deliberately rejected any prior consultations with stakeholders on the
grounds that because CEPES was not a Category I UNESCO Institute, like its counterpart
in Venezuela, the UNESCO International Institute for Higher Education in Latin America
and the Caribbean (IESALC), for instance, but a decentralized unit of the UNESCO
Secretariat, its closure, representing nothing more than an internal administrative
restructuring, did not require prior consultations with stakeholders or approval by the
Executive Board or the General Conference of UNESCO.43 By comparison, the decision
to found CEPES had evolved over a five-year period (1967-1972) with the greatest of
transparency and took shape following discussions in several fora.
The real motives for the abusive way that the UNESCO Secretariat announced the
anticipated closure of CEPES and then followed through with it are not particularly clear.
Personal conflicts and jealousies played a role. CEPES appeared to be overly successful
40

UNESCO, Press Communiqué, Paris, 6 October 2009; Extract from Monitorul Oficial 634 of 25
September 2009 (M. Of. 634/2009); UNESCO, Draft Program and Budget, 2010-1011, revised version,
Corrigendum 3 of 35 C/5 Rev. Vol. 2 (October 2009).
41
Mircea Malitza to Director-General of UNESCO, 11 February 2009.
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Burnett served as the UNESCO Assistant Director-General for Education from September 2007 to
October 2009.
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Originally a decentralized unit of the UNESCO Secretariat patterned on CEPES, IESALC had opened in
1978 as the UNESCO Regional Center for Higher Education in Latin America and the Caribbean
(CRESALC). In 1997 it acquired Category I UNESCO Institute status and a changed name. Between 1995
and 2008, the CEPES Advisory Board made several recommendations that CEPES be granted the same
status, but to no avail.
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and more independent of the Education Sector than was acceptable in the eyes of certain of
its senior managers.44 There was, in particular, the negative position taken by Assistant
Director-General Burnett. And one must not overlook a comment appearing in the 2005
NIFU-STEP evaluation that ‘if UNESCO Headquarters is convinced that no argument
exists for including the needs of European higher education in its educational strategies,
the transfer of CEPES to Africa might be proposed.’45
While the casual reader might have taken this remark as a joke, others, unfortunately, took
it seriously. The intended allocation for CEPES from the UNESCO regular program budget
for 2010-2011 was instead transferred to the UNESCO Regional Office for Education in
Dakar (BREDA) and to the International Institute for Capacity Building in Africa (IICBA)
opened in Addis Ababa in 1999.
The future of CEPES thus became very doubtful. When consulted on April 2, 2010, the
CEPES webpage only listed four major projects that it would be undertaking during the
2010-2011 biennium: (i) work in favor of the Bologna Process; (ii) a project dealing with
the future of higher education in Romania, (iii) a project to develop a method for monitoring
graduates of higher education in order to anticipate future curricular reforms, and (iv) the
organization of seminars on the qualifications of higher education leaders in Romania—
altogether a very weak program. Nothing was said about the preparation of the feasibility
study on the creation of a UNESCO Category I Institute specializing in higher education in
Eastern and South Eastern Europe to supersede CEPES. Except for a first draft prepared
by the Romanian Ministry of Education in March 2009 that the Education Sector of
UNESCO summarily rejected, 46 the study in question was never produced.
Upon the July 2009 retirement of Jan Sadlak, the last CEPES Director, Peter Wells, the
remaining international staff member assigned to CEPES, took over as Head of Office ad
interim. He was expected to remain in charge until a new director had been recruited;
however, the UNESCO Secretariat seemed incapable of finding the “right” person to fill
the position.
Additionally, the Romanian government that took power in October 2009, confronted as it
was with economic problems, showed little enthusiasm for the agreement made by the
outgoing government by which Romania would fund CEPES over the 2010-2011
biennium. At first non-committal about the post-2011 period, it finally informed the
UNESCO Secretariat that it would not fund the whole CEPES budget beyond 2011.
Possibly the Romanian authorities expected that the incoming Director-General of
UNESCO, Irina Bokova, a Bulgarian national elected in October 2009, would be motivated
by a sense of Eastern European solidarity to restore the CEPES regular program budget,
but she did not do so.
44
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As Head of Office ad interim, Wells was a disappointment. He made no effort to save
CEPES, failing to rally the many stakeholders that CEPES had at the time. Not being
properly informed, many of these did not realize how precarious the situation of CEPES
was. Nor did he make any effort to persuade the Romanian authorities that CEPES was
worth financing and thus saving. Instead he concurred in the discontinuance of CEPES
projects, particularly publication of Higher Education in Europe, even though it was not
only the longest running of the CEPES projects but had evolved into a world-class scholarly
journal and was actually earning some money for CEPES.
To make matters worse, neither Wells nor the Director of the Higher Education Division in
Paris, Professor Georges Haddad, responded positively to an offer made by the publisher
of the review, Taylor and Francis/Routledge, to assume more of the costs of publishing the
English language version,47 increased responsibility for the identification of contributors
and the editing of issues, and even to continue the publication of the review at its expense
as a UNESCO-CEPES journal, should CEPES close.48
And CEPES did close on the last day of December, 2011. One is reminded of the words of
Ambassador Valentin Lipatti: “…diplomacy is one of those professions that gives rise to
the least durable of satisfactions. If one can speak of creation in this domain, [it] will no
doubt be subject to rapid depreciation.”49

47

The Russian version ceased publication in 2006; the French version, in 2008.
The managers at Taylor and Francis/Routledge continued the legacy of Higher Education in Europe by
founding a new journal titled European Journal of Higher Education, but it has no link to UNESCO. Its
first issue appeared in March 2011.
49
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Leveraging Diasporic Power for Nation Building
Uttam Gaulee

A king is respected in his own kingdom
whereas a scholar is respected everywhere.
- The Chanakya Neeti
In September 2016 when Prem Baniya, a journalist and literary figure who had gained
celebrity for his televised Nepali language talk show titled “Glory Be To Dignity” left the
country to live in the United States, the Nepalese public erupted in an intense debate. Some
argued that he was just another hypocritical intellectual who sank into the quagmire of
personal opportunity abroad. Others defended him by saying that the political situation in
Nepal had inspired despair even among the likes of Baniya, who was beloved for his many
speeches challenging the political brass for their lack of patriotism (a reference made in the
name of his television show).
Yet others rationalized that while a developing nation cannot stop its skilled manpower
from being attracted by a globalized world, society at home might in the long run benefit
from Baniya’s gain in knowledge and perspectives. They argued that his work could bolster
a positive image of Nepal abroad, while the country could potentially benefit from his
contributions to journalism elsewhere and a wider appreciation for the arts of Nepal. This
argument, which evokes the popular Sanskrit verse cited above, notes that an intellectual
who leaves home can bolster respect for the society from which he or she has come
wherever he or she goes in the world.
The hotly debated and unusually publicized departure of this one public intellectual
exposed the tip of a longstanding discourse about brain drain versus brain gain, a debate
that arose in response to the increased global mobility of people in economically less
developed parts of the world. The debate has taken different forms depending on time and
context, but the underlying issue is linked to the social role and the responsibilities of the
intellectual. The terms of the debate were defined strictly in nation-based terms during the
period of developing nationalisms over the past two centuries.
When an intellectual crosses political or national borders, his or her role and responsibilities
suddenly become undefined (both literally and in terms of the mathematical metaphor of
being divided by zero). In nation-based socio-political and intellectual/professional
paradigms, the identity, ethos, and respect for the “foreign scholar” are often as
romanticized as that of the scholar in the Chanakya Neeti of ancient India, but there is
always as well an underbelly of rejection, ambivalence, and confusion surrounding the
intellectual’s place and value to the new society. Thus, the mobile intellectual’s unmooring
from a national location can result in a double-edged sword, a reality on which public
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol76/iss76/27

98

Civilizations Review: Full Issue

92

Number 76, Spring 2017

discourse has not yet focused (perhaps typically because the focus is on how the receiving
land can benefit from the gain, not on the experience and perspective of the in-coming
outsider).
The debate on the “sending” or the “losing” side of brain drain often mirrors covert or overt
resentment of highly-skilled migrants in the usually more developed destination countries.
However, neither side of the issue has been addressed in a substantive manner in the
scholarship of higher education. While the underlying power dynamics have been
addressed theoretically within literary studies and political science by scholars of postcolonialism, literary critics have focused on the inability of creative writers to understand
or to authentically represent their homelands, the people, and the cultures that they have
left behind (Rao, 2004). Traditional and social media abound in conversations about the
mobile intellectual, but the public ambivalence, volatility, and multi-dimensional nature of
perception in the media is yet to be substantively discussed in higher education scholarship.
For this reason, it is important that we begin to ask questions. We need to understand the
challenges that these intellectuals face and the obstacles that institutions, societies, and
individual advocates can help them in countering. The need is especially significant when
migrating intellectuals cross civilizational boundaries.
How can institutions and societies from which intellectuals leave overcome public
resentment so as to tap into the potential benefits for higher education at home resulting
from the departing intellectuals? In other words, how can willing intellectuals at home pass
over the roadblocks created by public discourse and resistance among scholars and others
at home in order to explore pathways of collaboration and contribution? Similarly, what
implications can scholarship draw for discussions about policies and practices in
transnational higher education from the local/foreign power dynamics erupting among
intellectuals who leave when these intellectuals start to work in receiving countries?
While the benefits of transnational collaboration made possible through collaboration with
these transnational scholars are increasingly recognized in the abstract in receiving
societies, the tensions, uncertainties, and changing attitudes that these scholars face in their
new institutions are a different matter. Put together, how may higher education institutions
tap into the unused resources of these mobile intellectuals, connecting them with
institutions back home and inviting them to contribute on transnational terms to institutions
in their destination countries?
The author argues that members of the educated diaspora not only serve as intellectual
ambassadors in destination countries but also create bilateral and multilateral traffic in “soft
power” that benefits all sides. Thus, he will critique the dominant view that losing or
gaining scholars physically or intellectually is a zero-sum game, a view that fundamentally
misses the very definition of the intellectual—and instead posits that both sides must
reconceptualize the “scattering” of the diaspora intellectual as a process whereby the
potential impact on the world of higher learning, both at home and abroad, is increased.
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Finally, he notes the existence of certain roadblocks that, in practice, hinder this potential.
He illustrates the resistance and tensions, ambivalence, and changing perceptions of the
“defecting scholar” by evoking the case of Nepal while also drawing some broad lessons
from the conscious efforts by China and India to curb contemporary brain drain.
Brain Drain versus Brain Gain
“Diaspora” literally means "to scatter about." Used historically to describe the Jewish
people in exile, the word in modern times refers to people from any ethnic or national
background who live outside the territory to which they historically belong (Carter, 2005).
As opportunities and attractions for transnational mobility increase, the tendency of such
dispersal from homelands to places across the globe, to civilizations near and far, has
become increasingly manifest. Simultaneously, the opportunities of diasporic individuals
and social/professional communities to “give back” to their homelands has also increased
dramatically, given heightened numbers of practicing intellectuals, emerging means of
communication, and the development of affordable transportation.
The increasing predominance of knowledge-sharing as a critical ingredient of
socioeconomic development for knowledge-based national/global economies—enhanced
and accelerated by rapid advancements in the information technologies—has not yet been
adequately theorized in scholarship, not to mention appreciated by the general public,
especially the publics of nations that lose intellectuals to the world beyond. Scholars of
higher education seem to hesitate to engage the rather discomforting topic of resentment at
home and rejection abroad that diaspora scholars may face.
The binary concepts of brain drain (or losing the national asset of intellect and skills) versus
brain gain (or the gaining of knowledge and skills when people return or contribute to the
homeland) are simplistic. They must be viewed in light of the complex realities of today’s
globalized world. Diaspora intellectuals today have become a critical global asset to be
tapped into by both local and global professional and social institutions and communities.
This reality is particularly significant in higher education because transnational scholars
not only study issues in particular nations but also issues that cross borders. Thus, their
research is relevant both locally and across the various civilizational, national, and cultural
borders. As such, higher education scholarship is tasked with finding ways by which to
turn the “drain” into “gain,” thus disrupting the dichotomy, and conserving, recycling, and
putting into productive use the intellectual resources of those who study and make an
impact on institutions and issues across geopolitical territories.
While the dominant pattern of intellectual diaspora is one of people leaving underdeveloped
countries for more developed ones, the major narrative of the brain drain in less-developed
countries like Nepal frequently paints a bleak picture of the country. At the same time,
however, arguments in the international development literature suggest that some countries
have found a way to regain lost brainpower.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol76/iss76/27

100

Civilizations Review: Full Issue

94

Number 76, Spring 2017

Toward the end of 2015, when the unofficial blockade imposed by India was suffocating
Nepal, the Nepali diaspora worldwide was mobilized by its intellectuals who prompted
Nepali expatriates in all the professions to take to the streets to demonstrate solidarity for
the security and sovereignty of their home country. The spirit of love for the homeland that
was reflected in the power of the diaspora indicates that when channeled effectively, it can
be instrumental in addressing the challenges at home and raising intellectual and economic
resources during a crisis. The expertise gained by the diaspora along with the social, even
diplomatic, relationships built up over time can provide a critical nation building asset for
a developing country such as Nepal.
Even in times of peace and strong economic growth, governments have invoked the power
of their diasporas in support of national development. Both China and India have made
conscious efforts to leverage their respective brainpower on the outside. Thus, in a recent
plea to the Indian diaspora, Indian external affairs minister Susma Swaraj solicited
donations for national development. In a message disseminated via recorded video, Swaraj
said: “The money will not be just a donation. It is a way to get connected with the roots. It
is a way to pay back to your motherland. It will be a reflection of emotional attachment to
the country.” (Times of India, 2016).
By 2000, more than half of the highly skilled workers in Silicon Valley, the center of
American innovation, were foreign-born. Most of them happen to have migrated from
either India or China, accounting for over one-quarter of the scientists and engineers in the
region. These individuals not only innovate in the United States, but they also combine
their research insights with professional and business linkages to create critical nationbuilding mechanisms for their homelands.
Anna Lee Saxenian, a University of California professor and dean, terms such a process as
“brain circulation” rather than “brain drain.” Her scholarship focuses on regional
economies and the conditions under which people, ideas, and geographies combine and
connect into hubs of economic activity. In her 2005 seminal article, Saxenian argues that
these engineers and entrepreneurs, aided by the lowered transaction costs associated with
digitization, are transferring technical and institutional know-how between distant regional
economies faster and more flexibly than most large corporations can manage.
Saxenian further explains how brain drain becomes brain gain:
[T]he same individuals who left their home countries for better lifestyles abroad are
now reversing the brain drain, transforming it into “brain circulation” as they return
home to establish business relationships or to start new companies while
maintaining their social and professional ties to the United States (Saxenian, 2005:
36).
Saxenian has studied how Chinese- and Indian-born engineers have been accelerating the
development of information technology industries in their home countries—initially by
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tapping the low-cost skills available there, and over time, by contributing to highly
localized processes of entrepreneurial experimentation and upgrading while also
maintaining close ties to the technology and markets in Silicon Valley.
A case in point: after a long period of wailing over lost brain power, India awoke to the
possibility that there might be tangible benefits arising from brain gain. They can be
spectacular. Recently India surprised the world with a successful operational mission to
Mars. India's space program succeeded on its first attempt. The mission was budgeted at
4.5 billion rupees (74 million USD), which, by Western standards, is staggeringly cheap
(BBC, 2014). This example is a manifestation of the power of diaspora that benefits nation
building in specific ways. Since a large part of the scientific community in the United
States consists of Indian-Americans, the sharing of technical insights coming out of
thousands of expensive experiments happens informally.
During the 1986-1987 biennium and even more intensely during the 1989 Tiananmen
Square crackdown, China pursued a policy of not recognizing its citizens who went to the
United States to study. Thanks to Deng Xiaoping’s initiative, China began to reach out to
its diaspora. It developed more favorable policies, offering higher-ranking positions, more
attractive salaries, and better benefits to those willing to return. In 1992, the Chairman of
the State Education Commission publicized the slogan “support overseas study, encourage
people to return, and give people freedom to come and go” (Li Tieying, 1992: 190).
China’s entry into the World Trade Organization led to an increased demand for returnees.
In this effort, China is following in the path of South Korea and Taiwan, where thriving
economies supported by liberalized policies have turned brain drain into brain gain. China’s
return flow has picked up despite an authoritarian regime and low per capita income
(Zweig, 2006: 66).
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Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2001, 2008) found that most developing countries are
losers in the game of brain drain or brain gain. However, there are many developing
countries (about 20 percent according to the sample derived from Beine et al.) that have
been able to enjoy benefits coming from remittances and from diasporic externalities.
While very few other studies focus on the tradeoff, it appears that scholars who are resilient
enough to pursue any modest opportunities for transnational projects regularly confirm that
they can bring significant self-realization and social contribution to their home countries.
A Nepali expatriate who teaches at the State University of New York, Shyam Sharma,
wrote recently about the satisfaction of “visit[ing] a Nepali town every month, without
having to pay airfare, or even brave the snow” (2016) through video conferencing to train
fellow professors in a small town in western Nepal. “No amount of money,” he goes on to
quote his trainees in Nepal as saying, “would motivate [us] as powerfully as the desire to
help the next generation catch up.” These trainees know that educators in Nepal and the
world must come to grips with the “knowledge economy” and leverage all possible
resources to benefit their nation and the world.
The author worked with other scholars in 2014 to investigate this idea. Using secondary
data available from the Institute for Employment Research, they investigated the following
question: Is there a relationship between the increasing rate of brain drain in a given country
and its economic growth as demonstrated by such indicators as the positive enrollment in
tertiary education for increased human development?
The number of male and female educated migrants to OECD countries from Nepal, in the
years 1980-2010, supplemented with statistics available from the Central Bureau of
Statistics of Nepal and the World Bank, were analyzed in five-year intervals to draw
conclusions about the relationship between the out-migration of the educated population
and the economic growth of the country.
The preliminary results of these analyses have indicated that no clear patterns have emerged
(Gaulee, Ullman, and Bista, 2014). Faini (2003) finds little empirical support for this socalled “revisionist” approach but goes on to employ a different equation, one relating
educational achievement to a set of explanatory variables that include migration. These
contradictory theories complicate the research conducted and the theory developed by Gary
Becker (1964) that clearly established a connection between the education and training of
a population and the economic and social benefits that extend specifically to the individuals
concerned but are enjoyed by the people and the respective governments as well.
The Case of Nepal
Nepal has a great need for its highly educated manpower; therefore, the resentment cited
above is understandable. But what the author is arguing here is that resentment is extremely
counterproductive for higher education institutions and higher education in general.
Indeed, one can also cite implications of the power dynamics and the social psychology
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involved that are more generally relevant to transnational higher education discourse and
practice.
What does the case of Nepal hold for higher education scholarship in terms of building
partnerships among participants who have different kinds of relationships, including those
who share the same interests or view each other with suspicion and those on unequal power
footings based on national identity or prestige of other types?
The special case of “family members” of a given nation who dislike their “brothers and
sisters” when they leave home is an interesting, intriguing, even somewhat disturbing case;
however, this case also serves to highlight other kinds of uncomfortable realities about how
intellectuals treat one another across borders. Questions must be asked and answered in
the context of both the losing and the gaining societies, especially regarding the very terms,
“losing” and “gaining.” The intellectual, like knowledge or intellect, is never lost or gained;
rather, he or she is shared. The dispersal of intellectuals is a process of growth, not demise.
Their scattering from certain places into others is ultimately a gain for the world at large.
A recent report (2014) by the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Nepal found that young
people aged 16 to 40 comprise fully 40.33 percent of the total population of Nepal. These
young men and women deserve attention because they offer the greatest leverage for
change in the overall educational level of the national workforce. They also provide the
greatest returns on educational investments because of the long work lives they have ahead
of them. Instead, what has been happening to this major population sector is that a large
majority of it has been systematically dispirited, disillusioned, and declared to be failures.
Nepal’s education system has been failing a large majority of its students every year,
pushing them to despair.
At the same time, those who pass or somehow successfully navigate the system, usually
those from well-off families, go abroad citing the need for further study as justification.
Leaving Nepal for the United States, the United Kingdom, or Australia is a mark of great
success among Nepali youth. Not surprisingly, the exodus of young men and women to
overseas destinations over the past several decades has led to an expanded Nepali diaspora
around the world. The unseen yet most important result, however, is the emergence of a
cadre of successful professionals. This diaspora has grown to be an incredibly powerful
force, willing to contribute to the development of Nepal.
On the one hand, concerns about the damaging consequences of brain drain must be taken
seriously. Indeed, the outrage of the Nepali population regarding the abuse of transnational
professional and economic opportunities available to public servants should also be taken
seriously. On the other hand, however, it seems unhelpful not to tap into the tremendous
amount of potential offered by the diaspora of highly-skilled Nepalis who live around the
world. One of the largest groups that may not be making a direct economic contribution to
the progress of Nepal is that of professionals in the field of education. From university and
college professors to professional scientists and engineers, from nurses and doctors to
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researchers in many different fields and many countries around world, the highly-educated
Nepali diaspora has far more potential than is being utilized today.
As the number of Nepali intellectuals in the USA is increasing rapidly—and their potential
will similarly increase in the future—the Nepali government, Nepali institutions, and
Nepali scholars must begin to formulate appropriate policies and practices in regard to these
people. Nepali-Americans are forging their unique identity in the United States as a hardworking, happy people. Even as a young group, the involvement and influence of Nepalis
in the American democracy is constantly growing, but it was only in 1952 that the first
Nepali immigrated to the United States (Dhungel, 1999).
As this table from Dhungel’s study indicates, Nepali immigration to the United States is
not only a recent phenomenon, but it also began on a relatively small scale.
Table 1

Nepalese Immigrants Admitted to the United States. 1952 – 1993
Year
Number
Year
Number
Year
Number
1952
1
1967
9
1980
95
1953-55
0
1968
19
1981
83
1956
1
1969
32
1982
97
1957
5
1970
25
1983
105
1958
0
1971
40
1984
75
1959
4
1972
39
1985
63
1960
4
1973
46
1986
86
1961
5
1974
43
1987
78
1962
5
1975
56
1988
106
1963
3
1976
68
1989
134
1964
7
1977
80
1990
184
1965
4
1978
68
1991
174
1966
8
1979
79
1992
206
1993
296
Total number: 2433
Source:
U. S. Bureau of the Census and U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
Computer file, ICPSR, 1993

Currently, the Nepali population in the United States is comprised largely either of students
or of Diversity Visa winners.
Nath (2009) undertook an exploratory study of the Nepali diaspora in the United States. He
found that Nepalis are still grappling with the issues of settlement, assimilation, adjustment
to their new homeland and identity: “They are trying to create … and [are] also in the
process [trying to] define their image as members of the South Asian diaspora” (p. 118).
What is changing very rapidly is that the Nepali identity is now manifested in multiple
ethnic and cultural organizations based in educational institutions, cities, and states
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representing Nepali culture. While Nepali identity brings all Nepalis together, larger cities
tend to have various organizations representing differentiated identities, subgroups from
the diverse social fabric of Nepal. Nepalis, who are promoting specific cultures, (e.g.
Newars, Tamangs, Mahesis, etc.), have their own organizations.
According to a recent report released at the fifth General Assembly of the Non-Resident
Nepali Association (NRN USA), there are more than 251,000 Nepalese in the United States
including about 110,000 with permanent residency or citizenship status. The 2010 United
States Census listed 59,490 Nepali immigrants. Owing to the undocumented status of many
Nepalis in the United States, it is difficult to obtain an accurate number. It is even more
difficult to obtain accurate statistics on how Nepalis are involved in various projects in
Nepal. Describing such an involvement, even in the highly technical health sector,
Devkota, Devkota, and Ghimire (2013) argue that “there is no proper mapping and a clear
process of their involvement in Nepal's health sector.”
Figure 2. Distribution of the Nepali diaspora in the United States of America

Source: Kafle (2017).

Addressing the Resentment
While successful diaspora members abroad are frequently viewed by the public as models,
they are sometimes and ironically viewed as rivals by their Nepali counterparts. While
migrants leaving home primarily because of economic hardship are not viewed at home
with disdain, they are often discriminated against in the destination countries.
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A significant issue that needs to be explored in the context of increasing border-crossing
and cross-border collaboration among higher education experts is the reverse dynamic, the
resentment in the receiving countries of diaspora intellectuals. To what extent has this
phenomenon been influenced by the worldwide rise in ultranationalist movements?
What is being witnessed worldwide is a growing bitterness of division. The surprising
Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, the hardline party crackdown in China, the low intensity
Russian-Ukrainian war, the failed coup in Turkey, a serious presidential crisis in Brazil,
and the ongoing fragmentation of Syria as a result of its brutal civil war—all tell similar
stories (Luke, 2016).
While patriotic feeling is cherished by all, it can become dangerous when people intensify
it and begin to spy on one another in a competition to determine who is the most
nationalistic. The tendency to label sets of people, especially those living outside the
country, as “not-so-nationalistic” is becoming a new norm for Nepalis. A recent decision
of the Minister of Public Administration, Mr. Lalbabu Pundit, to ban dual citizens from
serving in the Nepali bureaucracy has gained popular support. While such decisions may
have had practical purposes, policy makers should not forget the positive power of their
national diaspora which can be channeled in support of national prosperity and security.
Negative perceptions are often complicated by power dynamics (e.g. within professions,
departments, etc.). Whether to treat western or foreign educated intellectuals as a cut above
the locals creates confusion and backfires owing to perceived competition. When the
government tries to bring back diaspora expertise and thus applies the same prejudicial
treatment to local counterparts, the system backfires again. Misconceptions abound. How
do professionals succeed abroad? Are diaspora members aware of the pernicious effects of
politics in education? Who, on either side, assumes that mistrust is all about money? How
should the government and society tap into the potentials of both sides and, thus, create the
right environment and incentives for all?
One welcome step has been taken by the Nepal Government in officially recognizing the
Nepali diaspora. A new “Non-Resident Nepali Act” signifies that Nepal is reaching out to
Nepali diaspora members by providing for the legal protection of Non-resident Nepalis.
The Preamble to the Act reads that “…it is expedient to provide for the legal provision to
motivate nonresident Nepalis to take part in [the] all around development of Nepal by
enhancing their attachment to Nepal” (Nepal Law Commission, 2008).
What follows is one particular approach to analyzing the resentment and rejection of
diaspora scholars by home communities. Because many people in developing nations are
jumping straight from a subsistence agrarian economy into the heart of the knowledge
economy (particularly individuals such as teachers and researchers), they often have
difficulty appreciating the very basis and mode of production in what for them is a new
economy. They fail to value knowledge as the product of their work.
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Sharma (2016) illustrates this issue in an article that he wrote for Republica by citing the
example of a high school teacher: “Leaving his parents' agricultural economy behind,
[Gokul] had jumped straight into the heart of the new knowledge economy as a publicschool teacher. But he didn't even realize that his teaching was his cash crop, that his
continued learning was irrigation for it” (n.p.). Sharma goes on to discuss the issue more
broadly: “Gokul's story can be used to explain why quality in education in the public sector
has stagnated and lagged behind the demands of our times” (Sharma, 2016.)
The dramatic changes in the ways large numbers of people in traditional societies now
make a living and transact knowledge seem even more confusing because higher learning
is also blurring traditional boundaries of nation states, ethnic divisions, social class statuses,
and the prestige of professions or disciplines. Higher education and knowledge are
simultaneously global, national, and local (Marginson and Rhoades, 2002). Owing to the
emergence of knowledge along with the advancement of information technology, the crossborder or global dimensions of activity are growing every day. Despite the general trend
in favor of an increased international engagement for higher education, the actual levels of
engagement with the knowledge economy are far from being uniform among nations and
regions. With its large concentration of world class research institutions, the United States
of America is still a magnet for world-wide talent, enrolling 100,000 international doctoral
students each year. At the same time, many Asian countries are rapidly developing their
strengths in science. Owing to these major changes in world higher education and research,
multiple channels of knowledge exchange have opened across the world (Marginson,
2010).
Challenges Facing the Foreign Scholar
As is evident in the case of Nepal, intellectuals who have gone abroad must deal with many
issues including being resented at home. As noted above, these intellectuals may also have
difficulty in being able to truly contribute their best while they are being rejected in their
new homes. The possibility of being sandwiched between resentment at home and rejection
abroad is quite real. Persons caught in this vise need to situate themselves in favorable
contexts, explore particular power dynamics, and identify pathways around roadblocks
once they are understood.
What are the major dynamics and roadblocks that impede the global scholar?
The first roadblock is of course outright rejection, for instance, the exclusion of nonnationals from certain types of employment opportunities (e.g. jobs related to national
security following the 9/11 tragedy in the United States). In addition to legal restrictions,
there may be outright discrimination by the host society that discourages foreign scholars
from even seeking opportunities in the host country. Then there is the implicit rejection of
the knowledge or experience of foreign intellectuals. They therefore are forced to reinvent
themselves in local terms. A Russian scholar reflecting the theoretical perspectives of
socialist fellow scholars back home might need to elaborate a substitute perspective more
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in conformity with American values, even if his or her socialist perspective might provide
a better grounding for his or her scholarship. Possibly the Russian socialist perspective
might introduce something new that could help American colleagues rethink the issue at
hand in productive ways.
So, the failure to translate, transform, and transact ideas on transnational terms,
compromising them, watering them down, or even discarding them in order to “fit better”
into the new environment could undermine both quality and opportunity in scholarship.
Even more significantly (and often painfully), discarding one’s foreign identity and
expertise while bringing back bits and pieces of it can cause a scholar to become very
unproductive and even to appear to be phony as well as confused. The ambivalence and
possible resentment arising from being rejected can be sufficiently frustrating to cause a
person to abandon any attempt at contributing. Such sentiments could undermine a person’s
honesty, originality, and nuance as applied to his or her work.
The second roadblock is linked to the larger political changes occurring and the adverse
economic or professional environment created by them. Given the lack of political stability
and mature leadership in Nepal, scholars at home may see themselves as rivals of their
counterparts in the diaspora. Such a perception prevents them from initiating calls to their
counterparts to contribute at home. Decreased opportunities for scholars at home can
undermine their self-confidence. They may feel threatened by the expatriates. Might the
institution that employs them as well as society, students, and other stakeholders be viewing
the counterparts in the diaspora as being better qualified? To make matters worse, the
expatriates may make mistakes inadvertently by not being aware of relevant power
dynamics and critical perceptions thus turning professional opportunities into social
landmines.
The lack of concrete models is another obstacle. One cannot claim that there are no success
stories in Nepal. What is lacking is a proper mechanism by which to document and
publicize even small success stories. For example, the activities of the Summer Advantage
Program implemented at the Midwestern University need to be documented and made
available to other institutions that might emulate them. Without such a mechanism, the old
discouraging narrative of the “kasari game” will prevail. Frequently many bona fide social
project initiatives fail. The situation is like that of offering a new kind of food to a person
without first preparing him or her for what is coming.
Fourth, the lack of appropriate government and/or institutional support can discourage
potential initiatives. Even though everything does not have to be done by the government,
government support is necessary at least at the policy level so as to provide necessary
resources, approval, and legal infrastructure. In fact, governments and education
institutions may also explicitly or implicitly discourage scholars from engaging in
transnational engagements. For example, few universities and colleges prioritize or even
recognize the work that their faculties do with academics in other countries. Other than for
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the exceptionally dedicated, the lack of institutional recognition for professional service
through transnational collaboration can become discouraging very rapidly.
There are practical challenges as well. For example, it is difficult for scholars to find time,
resources, and confidence to join and contribute. In transition as they are, they need to
learn new ways of life, a new language and culture, and the norms of the host society.
These necessities may even cause the mobile scholar to have to unlearn much previous
learning. Hence, while they are learning how to fit into the new culture, they may not be
able to maintain contacts with their respective professional communities back home. When
they are settled and want to reconnect, they may not know where to start or with whom to
start working. In such a situation, the risk of taking the flak of rejection or resentment may
outweigh the willpower to be helpful to the home country.
Pathways and Solutions
It is now time for Nepali scholars and researchers in the western world to initiate
conversations on how to accommodate and spread the news of small success stories thus
recognizing their stakeholders and developing the soft power of networking and the
creation of momentum by reaching out to fellow Nepali across the borders.
Diaspora scholars cannot afford to simply focus on roadblocks. Scholars of higher
education working across borders must explore potentials and possibilities for collaboration
and exchanges. The number of globally mobile scholars has been increasing at
unprecedented rates. There are both opportunities and challenges in international higher
education that this group of scholars can and should help to address as well as unique
opportunities that they can create.
The case of Nepal can serve to illustrate how intellectuals who are sandwiched between
spaces they may have left and spaces in which they may not be easily accepted can turn
themselves into productive assets by undertaking research and scholarship in higher
education in an interconnected world. If scholars can invest the right ingredients into their
work as transnational scholars, taking the right approach by using the “sandwich” situation
positively, the fact of being sandwiched may become less a liability and more an advantage.
An example of how a few expert scholars from Nepal and the United States of America
reached out to each other and collaborated productively across borders is described below.
Using information technology, the Midwestern University, a relatively new, small, but fully
publicly funded institution in western Nepal developed its “Summer Advantage Program,”
the object of which is to host returning expatriates during their summer visits to Nepal.
Colleagues of the returnees from other countries are also invited as visitors to take part in
the academic events. Accordingly, Midwestern University invited five professors from
the United States, including three Nepali expatriates and two American scholars (one of
Japanese origin) to Surkhet, where Midwestern University is located, for a weeklong series
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of academic activities. This education summit, called “Transformations,” involved five
tracks. The goal was to implement the semester system in Nepal and the task was to train
faculty, engage students, and involve senior administrators (including the Vice Chancellor,
who actively participated in the conference).
A part of the twenty-year educational transformation plan of Midwestern University, this
event was the culmination of monthly web-based training sessions led by Shyam Sharma
in which ten faculty members at Midwestern University participated. The author was
involved in facilitating the training and situating it in the broader framework of the mission
of the university. This collaboration among scholars in the United States and Nepal also
gave rise to a variety of other conversations and initiatives for implementing and enhancing
the semester system, promoting research and scholarship, integrating writing with research
and innovative teaching/learning approaches, and internationalizing higher education in
Nepal. A webinar series called WACAP (Writing Across the Curriculum and in the
Professions) offered training to ten teachers on how to integrate writing and communication
skills in teaching across academic departments. Based on this “training of trainers”
program, the ten teachers have also started training other teachers.
Given its broader context of implementing new teaching/learning methods across the
university, the project broadened its goals to include updating and improving
teaching/learning, incorporating educational exchange, developing academic support
facilities (such as a writing center), and integrating emerging technologies for enhancing
teaching/learning.
The conference in question was organized within this broader framework. At its heart were
five parallel programs led by the five visiting scholars and coordinated by their counterparts
on the ground. Working groups produced tangible materials, including outlines for syllabi
and assignments, handouts and guidelines for teaching and academic service, and
recommendations for program development and policy updates.
When scholars across nations can combine their knowledge, energy, and resources, even
small initiatives can make significant impacts. If the institution and its leadership provide
support or simply boost the morale of those who are involved, the initiatives can quickly
grow into impactful missions. As seen in the case of the interest of Midwestern University
in tapping into diaspora expertise, institutions can reach out to their national diasporas
around the world, creating a network of free but powerful intellectual resources.
An important nation-building step for developing nations should be the recognition of their
own diasporas as stakeholders in the nation-building process. While it is impossible to
contain or to force human resources to remain in one place owing to the forces of
globalization, these same forces, if complemented by information technology, make it
possible for developing countries to enjoy many benefits from their diasporas, particularly
in the field of education. The constitution of Nepal now includes a provision for non-
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resident Nepalese citizenship. It needs to be implemented in such a way that facilitates the
free flow of capital and ideas in a seamless manner.
Conclusions
The case of Nepal may be used to illustrate some of the implications for transnational
educational engagements that tap into the energy and resources of mobile scholars. Clichéd
as it may sound, Nepal is at a crossroads: the political conflicts of the past twenty years
have ended. The country has a new constitution, and the population is starting to be
invested in democratic institutions and new economic opportunities. The forces created by
globalization are prompting transnational higher education exchanges and collaboration.
But uncertainty and pessimism are also rampant. The constitution exists on paper, but will
it be respected in practice? Will the political chaos created by the conflict which followed
the end of the monarchy ever end? Will increasing numbers of educated minds in Nepal
continue to leave for better opportunities abroad?
Individual scholars are perhaps the most important agents in transnational educational
collaboration and exchange. Emerging technologies make communication across the world
easier to use—including videoconferencing, collaborative documents worked on
simultaneously around the world, internet-based telephones, wi-fi based connections, and
mobile devices. Collaboration is free or cost effective, intimate, and rewarding. In this age
of social media, individual scholars can spread the word, inspire others, rally support, and
put pressure on institutions and society to do more to provide educational development and
innovation.
Higher education institutions are the greatest beneficiaries of transnational educational
collaboration and exchange. If institutional leaders or even individual faculty or staff
members are passionate about educational progress through partnerships with nationals
living abroad, they can easily locate scholars and experts and contact them personally.
Asking for insights and resources to enhance and enrich curricula, for example, can be
accomplished through consultation with diaspora scholars who are usually willing and
eager to contribute. Clearly the emerging professional diasporas originally resident in
developing countries can provide unique opportunities for the economic and social
development of their homelands.
The public in both the receiving and the gaining countries and in the sending or the losing
countries tend to view the mobile scholar in stereotypical terms, as if he or she were a
question of loss versus gain. Given the rise of nationalistic fervor around the world, it is
difficult for people to imagine intellectual resources as inherently capable of crossing
borders. Much depends on individual initiative and resilience, goodwill, and the desire to
give back to both host and home countries. It may be that for the time being, the vagaries
of migration and politics may prevent a prominent figure such as Prem Baniya from serving
his homeland from abroad, but the sheer rise in the number of diaspora scholars across the
world could obviously benefit higher education in such countries as Nepal which face an
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unprecedented brain drain. Such collaboration should be increasingly valued because it is
in the interest of both host and home countries.
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Beyond Eurasia: Technology in Africa, the Americas, and Oceania in
pre-Modern Times
Norman Rothman

Introduction
The central landmass of Eurasia including the adjoining landmass of Northeast Africa,
mainly Egypt and the related Nile valley, has received the bulk of attention in terms of premodern technology. This is due to three basic causes. First, it has witnessed a series of
civilizations in ancient times such as Mesopotamia and the related Fertile Crescent which
along with Egypt/Nile River Valley formed the nucleus of the Middle East, the Indus River
Valley in what is now the northwestern part of the Indian subcontinent, and the first of the
continuous Chinese civilizations along the northern Hwang-Ho or Yellow River. Second,
the classical civilizations of Greece and Rome which laid the basis of western culture in
regard to law, government, language, and, in conjunction with the Hebrews, the basis of
religion. In terms of technology, all of these civilizations were linked from antiquity by
cultural transmission routes such as the inland Great Silk Road and the Indian Ocean.
As a result, technological developments in areas outside of Eurasia before 1400 have not
received as much attention as the world island. These areas—sub-Saharan Africa, the
Americas before Columbus, and Oceania before the arrival of European explorers—will be
examined in terms of technological development before the advent of modern times. Two
points should be made. Although in some cases, as in Africa, innovations in technology
came from outside, most of the technological accommodations were indigenous. In
addition, the adjustments that these societies made were in direct response to the particular
environment in which they live.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Africa was known as the “Dark Continent” but its darkness lay in the point of view of its
commentators who tended to look on areas outside the world island of Eurasia as marginal.
In fact, Africa had always participated in the development of civilization including
scientific and technological applications from Neolithic times. There had been areas of
cultural transmission north and south as well as east and west. The first was the Nile River
Valley which flow in its various tributaries from Ethiopia and the Lake states of Africa to
the Mediterranean via Egypt by 4000 B.C.E.
The second was the Sudanic grassland belt between the Sahara on the north and the rainforest areas in west and equatorial Africa and extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red
Sea. Metallurgy knowledge of first bronze and iron technology had spread along these areas
well before the Middle Ages. The Sudanic (also called the Sahel) states including Mali,
Ghana, Songhai, Kanem-Bornu, Hausaland, and various Nubian states beginning with
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Kush in 1500 B.C. and ending with Alwa and Dongola where the Nile interfaces with the
Sudanic belt had long had mining traditions by the Middle Ages. Ethiopia on the Horn of
Africa had also gone through the bronze and iron phases as these other areas had. The
Swahili city-states that extended from central Somalia to central Mozambique on the Indian
Ocean had also developed advance mining techniques related to metallurgy by the Middle
Ages. The interior of central Africa including the Lake states, the Luba-Lunda states
centered in what is Katanga and northern Angola also had advanced mining procedures as
did the empire of Zimbabwe centered on what in now northwestern Mozambique and
northeastern present-day Zimbabwe. 1
Various African states had also produced assorted textiles by 1500. Perhaps the most
famous had been the state of Benin which dominated south central Nigeria and the ancestral
state of the Yoruba peoples, Oyo-Ife, who became famous for both their textiles and
ironwork. Even today, Benin Bronze figurines and textile masks and brass products are
famous and shown in museums as are portions of their decorated doors. The quality of
Benin fabric as well as other Nigerian groups (Oyo-Ife and the Hausaland cities) was
recognized as very high. However when the British took over Benin and later Hausaland
these crafts were replaced by machine goods as earlier the Bengal crafts in India had been.2
The Middle Ages also witnessed the apogee of the Swahili manufactured goods. The
period between 1000-1500 was a high point for the cities—iron working, pottery
production, copper tools and utensils were produced as well as ornaments made from ivory
and gold based on items obtained by Swahili from trade in the interior (ivory from the Lake
States, copper from Katanga, gold from Zimbabwe) in return for products from Indian
Ocean countries (India, Persia, Arabia, China) as well as Egypt. Iron goods were especially
valued by Arabs and Indians because of their superior malleability. A number of cities
such as Kilwa in southern Tanzania and Mogadishu in central Somali had large spindle
whorls indicated large-scale textile production and copper mints for currency had been
established at Kilwa and Mogadishu. 3
The great age of Swahili civilization came to an end with Portuguese conquest in the early
1500’s. The future cultural patterns of Africa south of the Sahara exclusive of the Sudanic
belt were determined by iron-age technology. The origin of the Bantu or Niger Congo is
identified with the Nok site in north central Nigeria where iron working and terra cotta
working had taken place as early as 500 B.C. 4
The Bantu whose origins are in central Nigeria and nearby Cameroon were the first group
to make use of iron product and thereby secured their later expansion due to superior
technology throughout Central, eastern, and southern Africa. There is a debate as to
whether it was through military means as exemplified by iron spears or iron hoes which
gave them farming surpluses and led to a population explosion. It may have been a
combination of both.
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However, their expansion took place before and concurrently with the Middle Ages. The
Bantu-speakers followed the waterways around the rainforests and reached what is now
southern Congo or Katanga by the end of the first millennium BCE. From Katanga, which
had both metal products and fertile farmlands, they occupied much of central, eastern, and
southern Africa before and during the Middle Ages. Their offshoots gave way to various
kingdoms such as the Luba-Lunda and Kongo kingdoms, the Lake Kingdoms, Zimbabwe,
and the Bantu component of the Swahili states and so the continuous history of much of
the continent begins. (When Bantu-speakers reached East Africa, they came into contact
with Austronesian food crops which increased the population as well as watercraft via both
the Austronesian-settled Madagascar and the Swahili coast).5
When making iron, Africans used various methods. They were somewhat handicapped as
they did not always have large supplies of water outside of the major riverways to operate
smelting of iron. Therefore, they invented one method—the natural-draft furnace, which
is designed to reach the temperatures necessary to form and drain slag by using a chimney
effect—hot air leaving the top of the furnace draws in more air through openings at the
base. These natural-draft furnaces were particularly characteristic of African woodlands
(the Africa belt between the grassland and rainforest), and were used in two geographical
areas—across the Sahelian woodlands from Senegal in the west to Sudan in the east, and
in woodlands from southern Tanzania south to northern Zimbabwe(known as the savanna
belt in south central Africa). The oldest natural-draft furnace yet found is in Burkina Faso
and dates to the seventh/eight centuries CE in small forges. Large-scale iron production
also used this method. The large masses of slag (10,000 to 60,000 tons) noted in some
locations in Togo, Burkina Faso and Mali indicate that there was a great expansion of iron
production in western Africa probably after 1000 CE that is associated with the spread of
natural-draft furnace technology. 6 These methods in the first two areas are connected with
the arrival of the Bantu.
The Americas
Although there is so far no evidence of iron-making before the 9th century, Native
Americans did make progress in metallurgy before this period. They were smelting metals
such as gold, silver, and copper long before and continuing into the Middle Ages. Other
processes connected with metallurgy were in existence before and during the Medieval
period. They included using winds from the mountains to raise temperatures for smelting,
welding, annealing, hammering meteoric iron and copper, and working platinum well
before the Europeans did it in the nineteenth century, and how to solder, foil, and make and
use rivets in order to fasten metals together. 7
In response to the natural soil, Native American cultures developed corn, potatoes,
tomatoes, raspberries, and strawberries, and cocoa beans; altogether perhaps 60% of food
that contemporary people eat. They developed tobacco and a form of cotton in addition to
medications long before the rest of the world such as digitalis, aspirin, and quinine. Other
health applications included anesthetics, medication for diabetes, and brain surgery. 8
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2017

117

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 76 [2017], No. 76, Art. 27

Comparative Civilizations Review

111

Overall, Native Americans developed a wide variety of products and innovations. These
included petroleum jelly and rubber and an abacus machine called the Yupana based on
units of 20 long before the Chinese. Various Native American groups developed
astronomical devices that confirmed the earth floated in space, a black hole, and the
movements of the stars, sun, moon, and planet long before others, and some engaged in
embalming before the Egyptians. Apparently, they knew the concept of zero well before
the South Asian Indian. 9
Their most spectacular applications of science and technology lay in engineering. Their
road system pre-dated the Romans in the Andean civilizations; they developed the grid
pattern in urban planning long before others, some groups of Indians built houses with
central chimneys and cedar wrapped in bark to produce all-yearlong central heating. The
Mexica/Aztecs had running water long before the 19th century in their capital. Above all,
they used applied architectural principles to build pyramids in today’s Mexico and Peru,
the latter before the Egyptians.10 In all, they used the natural environment and applied it to
their individual needs in both daily life and for societal needs.
The three Native American civilizations in existence during the Middle Ages were in
regions where cultures had long existed even if there was no bronze/iron technology before
the 9the century and no developed industries in textiles/weaving. They were the Maya in
Central America, the Aztecs in central and southern Mexico (technically both in MesoAmerica), and the Inca (the latest in a series of Andean civilizations). The Mayas had a
civilization that began perhaps dated as far back as 1800 BCE; it reached its height during
the early phases of the Middle Ages (ca. 300-900 C.E.) termed their classsical period and
continued in some form until as late as 1600 C.E. Although never a formal empire, the area
influenced by Mayas extended to southern Mexico (Chiapas), the Yucatan Peninsula,
Guatemala, and Honduras, but was centered in the Yucatan Peninsula and the highlands of
Guatemala. 11
Technologically, they reached the highest stage of cultural development in the Americas.
They were accomplished mathematicians and astronomers. As mathematicians, they
developed a counting system based on units of 20. They used zero and 1-5 which enabled
both addition and subtraction.12 They were the only people in the Americas to have a
writing system that was in hieroglyphics and reached the phonetic rather than pictographic
and ideographic stage so that their syllables corresponded to sound.13 In astronomy, Mayas
created a solar calendar more accurate than anywhere else in the world and very accurately
measured the years and the months in calculations similar to those used today. With their
mathematical and astronomical calculations, they were able to measure the paths of such
planets as Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn and accurately predict eclipses of both the sun
and moon. They applied their learning in a technological fashion in the temples and
pyramids that they built. At Chichen Itza, perhaps their leading city during the classical
period, the principal pyramid had 91 steps on each of its four sides plus the platform which
correspond to the 365 days of the solar calendar. 14
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There were other technical applications. In the agricultural field Mayas developed
innovative techniques, using the fertile soils of the swamps and irrigation systems. In the
tropical lowlands of Guatemala, the Mayas built an agrarian civilization that supported the
highest population densities in the pre-industrial Americas, at least 20 times what it is in
today’s Guatemala, even though, their biggest cities were away from the water. Moreover,
in Maya and other Meso-American cultures maize was grown in an intricate system of
planting multiple crops together so that they would be nutritionally and environmentally
complementary. In Meso-America and North America the so-called three sisters’ method
combined physical and bio-chemical properties of maize, beans and squash in polyculture
agriculture and thus foreshadowed a technique now called companion planting, a technique
widely considered part of the modern organic gardening movement. 15
Mayas are often downgraded because they did not enter a “bronze” or “iron” age. The fact
is that they made full use of surrounding nature for applications in their engineering. Their
technological achievements include the fabrication of tools that are harder than iron, the
use of rubber from latex plants, and innovations used in their buildings: the invention of
high strength durable materials of construction including the fabrication of hydraulic
cement for producing cast-in-place concrete; and the development of the Maya arch as a
structural mechanism to create multi-story and clear span structures. Also they developed
elevated concrete paved roads; long-span bridges, and advanced water management
methodologies that permitted the Maya urban civilization to survive in a seasonal desert
environment. Most importantly, they used jade for their tools and implements which is
even more impressive as they are harder than bronze or iron.16
The other two civilizations lasted less than a century but they were built upon previous
civilizations. The Aztecs had full control of their empire which covered all of central
Mexico and part of Guatemala. They built upon previous civilizations beginning with the
Olmecs around 2000 B.C.E. and ending with the Toltecs and other groups, their immediate
predecessors that the Aztecs defeated to create their empire early in the fifteenth century.
They emulated the Mayas in the use of a solar calendar. The Aztecs were advanced
scientific thinkers as they followed the Mayas in both mathematics and astronomy. Their
pyramids and temples reflected information on their calendars. They were similar to the
Romans in their construction of roads, canals, and aqueducts. Their supreme achievement
in this respect was the construction of their capital city at Tenochtitlan which was built
upon drained land and connected to lands by man-made causeways. They were watered by
artificial lakes. They had running water and botanical gardens in their capital. (They also
emulated other cultures including the Mayas with ointments, drinks, and salves in their
medicine as well as performing cataract surgery and arthrodesis surgery on knees.) 17
As was the case of the Mayas, they compensated for lack of iron and bronze by using other
metals and minerals found in nature. Aztec tools were made with obsidian and chert. Just
before the Spanish conquistadors, advances in Aztec technology had led to the
experimentation of making tools with copper. Other advances included axe blades made
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with stone or copper. Specialization was so advanced that they even made drills which
were of reed or bone. In addition, Aztecs proved ingenious with weapons. One weapon,
the atlatl, made it easier to throw a spear. In addition, this weapon was used to aid in
fishing. The Aztecs also used a macahuitl, which was a wooden club containing sharp
pieces of volcanic glass, or obsidian. This weapon was used to disable an enemy or
opponent without killing him. In addition, the Aztecs utilized bows and arrows.18
The Incas also established an empire in the fifteenth century based on earlier cultures that
went back as far as 3500 years ago. They continued the tradition of elaborate pottery,
textile weaving, and metallurgy (albeit with bronze rather than iron) and an elaborate
pyramid building scheme that predates the Egyptians by 500 years. At their height, their
empire extended from Ecuador to Chile – an area of 1500 miles with a population estimated
at 16 million. They developed various ritual products based on gold and silver. Their
reputation rests on their engineering feats although in fields such as medicine where they
perfected anesthetics and in foods where they developed thousands of varieties of potatoes,
they were eminent. However, it was their massive engineering that has lasted. Their road
system of basically crushed stone was over 2,000 miles.
With only bronze and without mortar to bind materials together, the Inca were able to
establish temples and fortresses of astonishing size. The crown jewel in this area is the city
of Machu Picchu near their capital of Cuzco. An architectural marvel, the city was
constructed on two high peaks 9000 feet above sea level. In a city of three square miles,
through the use of just heavy stone hammers, the Inca built two-story stone buildings and
elaborate terraces (they also practiced terraced farming with mountain run-off in other
areas) which surrounded large ceremonial plazas—a prime example of advanced urban
planning. As advanced as the Inca (and Aztec) were, they had never developed the
technology that goes with gunpowder (of which they were ignorant) so that they fell rather
easily to European conquest. 19
Austronesia/ Oceania/Polynesia
The Austronesians, originally from South China before the Han Chinese, migrated from
Taiwan after 2000 B.C.E. Eventually, they colonized what is today island southeast Asia
including the Philippines, Indonesia, the isthmus of Malaya across from Indonesia, the
coast of New Guinea, and ultimately after 1650 B.C, the majority of the Pacific islands.
The Lapita culture, which is identified with origins of the Polynesians, and which
emphasized navigation and sailing, was established at this time, and was evident for two
millennia. Eventually, by the Middle Ages, Austronesians extended from Madagascar of
the coast of Africa all the way to Easter Island and Marquesas off the coast of South
America. Of this group, the eastern-most segment, the Polynesians were the most active
during the period of 500-1200. By this period an examination of sweet potatoes originally
found in South America present in Polynesia and chickens from Southeast Asia found in
Chile as well as Polynesian cocoanuts and bottle gourds found in Ecuador indicates crossPacific exchanges. By the conclusion of their explorations around 1200 C.E., they had
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settled perhaps one/fifth of the earth’s surface, three times the size of the continental United
States and larger than Russia during its Soviet phase. Its area of settlement ranged from
Hawaii at its apex to New Zealand on the Southwest to Easter Island on the Southeast—a
huge triangle.20
Faced with a limited land environment with relatively few resources and an ever increasing
population in a limited land area, the Polynesians used applied technology in both
navigation and shipbuilding. Polynesian navigators employed a whole range of techniques
including use of the stars, the movement of ocean currents and wave patterns, the air and
sea interference patterns caused by islands and, the flight of birds, the winds and the
weather. Birds were used in exploration. A typical Pacific island can be sighted on a clear
day from about 10 miles (16 km) away. Birds can significantly extend this detection zone.
The zones can range to 30 miles (50 km) from land, two types of species, masked boobies
and frigate birds, have an even longer can range much farther, up to 100 miles (160 km)
from land.21 Clouds were another sign of land that Polynesians used. Clouds accumulate
over islands, and an isolated pile of clouds on the horizon often signaled the presence of
land. Reflected light on clouds can be another clue. When sunlight (or moonlight) shines
on white sand and shallow bays, the light could reflect upward, thereby illuminating the
base of low clouds with a silver or greenish glow.22
Other innovations were used that implied adaptations to the environment via techniques.
Polynesians made use of waves. Wave patterns, too, can be altered by the presence of land.
Islands block, reflect, and refract ocean swells, creating distinct wave patterns that can help
steer a seasoned navigator to land—especially helpful at night or when visibility is low.
Bits of land vegetation such as seed pods or driftwood floating on the waves were another
sign of land nearby. 23
Astronomy was also used. Navigators near the equator view have a view which is
simplified since the whole celestial sphere was exposed. Any star that passes (overhead)
is on the equator which is the basis of the equatorial coordinate system. The stars are known
by their position and when they rise or set they can determine a bearing or navigation. For
example, in the Caroline Islands of Micronesia, natural navigation was studied with a star
compass which traced star directions. Another Micronesian island group, the Marshall
Islands (Micronesia was settled by Polynesians after 500 BCE and is mostly Polynesian
with an admixture of Melanesian) made stick charts that were used by the Marshallese to
navigate the Pacific Ocean by canoe. The charts represented major ocean patterns and the
ways the islands disrupted those patterns, typically determined by sensing disruptions in
ocean swells by islands during sea navigation. Therefore, these developments signaled
land ahead. The boats, constructed from materials found on the most islands such as logs
from wood which were tied together with bark from trees, grew to huge size to
accommodate a large number of people.24
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Conclusion

During the pre-modern period, the global cultural regions covered built upon previous
achievements and synthesized occasional influences outside of the region with internal
developments. These two trends are evident in the areas that we have covered. SubSaharan Africa built upon the arrival of iron and the subsequent expansion of the Bantu
while having access to external influences via the Sudanic grassland belt south of the Sahara
and the Nile River of Northeast. In addition, its Indian Ocean coast off the Horn of Africa
and East Africa brought it into contact with Asia and the Middle East.
Areas of the globe thought to have been static and isolated such as the Americas and
Oceania turned out not to be as totally singular as thought. Meso-America built upon the
achievements of the Olmecs and the subsequent civilizations such as the Maya and the
Aztec built upon previous patterns. In the Andean region, there were a series of
civilizations that went back 3500 years and exhibited certain similarities such as pyramid
and temple construction. Based on similarity of crops and livestock, there is some
empirical evidence that there were contacts at least between one branch of the
Austronesian-Oceanic group, the Polynesians, and South America during this period. The
other side of this probable trans-Pacific contact, the Polynesians, built upon the nautical
expertise of their Austronesian forbears and the Lapita culture to develop technologicallybased nautical and shipbuilding culture. Their voyages and that of their fellow
Austronesian seafarers covered a huge expanse of the earth and brought them into contact
with various cultures during this period. In summation, the pre-modern period can be
viewed as the true dawn of a global age.
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Workplace Bullying in the United States and Canada:
Organizational Accountability Required in Higher Education
Leah P. Hollis
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to compare the probable existence of two North American
civilizations, Canada and the United States, and then consider how each civilization has
addressed workplace bullying. Canada started to prohibit workplace bullying in 2004.
However, the United States only began to address the problem ten years later, in 2014, with
a few states passing statutes. Examining the differences in culture and the research on how
higher education in both Canada and the United States has dealt with workplace bullying
may give insights to how both Canada and the United States can better protect employees
faced with workplace bullying.
Brief Definition of Civilization
Many varying and competing definitions of the controversial concept of ‘civilization’ exist
in the literature. However, Permumpanani (2013), writing with the Comparative
Civilization Review, defined civilization as a “dynamic system that supports endogenous
cultural development through economic activity aggregated across elements of data” (p. 9).
He further noted that scholars have long debated the definitions for ‘civilization’ and
‘culture,’ failing to reach consensus. Huntington (2003) offered a list of eight major
civilizations, while the British historian Clark (1982) admitted “he still did not know what
civilization was, but thought he could recognize it when he saw it” (p. 18). In some
discussions, ‘culture’ and ‘civilization’ are interchangeable terms, reflecting both historical
and evolutionary dynamics. Nonetheless, Permumpanani (2013) considered at the basic
level that civilizations started as an undefined or inchoate group, and then became defined
by geographic, linguistic, or religious parameters. Once these parameters were established,
the civilization evolved over time within the interaction of people living in the group
(Permumpanani, 2013).
Within Permumpanani’s frame (2013) regarding civilization, Canada and the United States
emerged as different civilizations. While they both grew from roots by leaving imperialistic
governance in Europe, the United States secured independence close to one hundred years
before Canada. Further, the US culture has an indelible foundation in racism, slavery, and
the exploitation of different people for capitalistic gain. Until recently, the United States
was intensely committed to the English language to the exclusion of other languages, even
in the primary educational curriculum.
In contrast, Canada’s evolution involved more recent and still retained ties to the British
crown. For example, in the early 1900s, Canadians resisted the World War I notion that
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British engagement in the war assumed Canadian engagement in World War I. Further,
Canadian society was based on civic equity. Such values have been part of Quebec’s
struggle to maintain its French influence and language. Their official languages include
both English and French. While racism is a problem affecting most civilizations, Canada
did not codify racial differences by forbidding interracial marriage or institutional
segregation that occurred in the United States.
Further, the US and Canada maintain differences regarding economic competition. A focus
on capitalist growth yielded for Canada, a Canadian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of only
$1550.54 billion in 2013, compared to a mammoth $18036.65 billion in the United States
(Trading economics, 2017). Thus, in comparative terms, Canada represents 2.5% of the
world economy while the US contributes 29.09% of the world economy (Trading
economics, 2017).
These two different civilizations then have two different sets of values, with the US being
more competitive and more focused on capitalism than Canada. This difference in
economic dynamism and its implications for competition would inform a difference in
workplace values. In turn, the differences in values about work and competition could
inform the difference in commitment to anti-bullying legislation between Canada and the
United States.
Differences in Approaches to Workplace Bullying
With the aforementioned differences in mind, it becomes clearer perhaps, why Canada
started passing anti-workplace bullying legislation in 2004, ten years before the United
States did. Workplace bullying is a destructive behavior based on a power differential. The
target is left in an inferior position, often with psychological and emotional scars from the
trauma (Einarsen, 2003).
Quebec was the first to address this issue by introducing a law prohibiting workplace
bullying in 2004, followed by several other Canadian provinces, including British
Columbia, Ontario, and Manitoba (New Harassment Prevention, 2011; Labor Standards,
2004; Preventing workplace, 2011; Guidelines, 2013; Workplace bullying, 2012). In many
ways, Canada recognized workplace bullying as a health and wellness issue. For example,
the Ontario lawmakers prohibited workplace “psychological harassment” or bullying
through the Occupational Health and Safety Act, which stated that employers must
maintain a program to prevent workplace bullying and review this program annually.
Quebec’s Labour Standards, Sec. 81.18, which became effective on June 2004, prohibited
hostile behavior in the workplace. The law specifically declared that the employer has the
“responsibility to take reasonable steps to prevent psychological harassment and to put a
stop to such behaviour when it is brought to his knowledge” (para. 11). According to
WorkSafe BC, “If workplace bullying and harassment is not addressed, it can lead to lost
productivity, anxiety, and sometimes even suicidal thoughts or actions” (Guidelines, 2013,
para. 1).
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Researchers and practitioners have paid attention to workplace bullying in North America
and Europe since the early 1990s. Namie and Namie (2009) reported that 37% of all
American workers faced workplace bullying. As Björkqvist, Österman, and Hjelt-Bäck
(1994), Einarsen, Hoel, Zapf, and Cooper (2003), Nielsen, Tangen, Idsoe, Matthiesen, and
Magerøy (2015) and Salin and Hoel (2013) initiated empirical research in this field, the
Scandinavians seem to be leading the research endeavor on bullying.
Various researchers have analyzed the effect of workplace bullying; for example, Hollis
(2016b) examined the impact of workplace bullying on gender and organizational costs.
Bennadi and Konekeri (2015) looked at bullying in different fields. Sanmina, Salamon,
and Singh, (2014) researched how bullying affects employees’ trust of an organization and
Hollis (2016a) examined the effect of bullying online.
More specifically, Hollis (2015) conducted a study of workplace bullying in American
higher education, using a sample of 175 college and universities. The author reported that
62% of university administrators who took part in the survey faced workplace bullying.
Hollis replicated the study to examine a sample of 142 community colleges, where 64% of
employees reported workplace bullying (Hollis, 2016b). These results indicated that
women, people of color, and the LGBT community members face workplace bullying with
increased frequency than the general population.
McKay, Arnold, Frats, and Thomas (2008) conducted a similar study in 2007, examining
workplace bullying in Canadian higher education institutions. At the time of the McKay
(2008) study, Quebec was the only jurisdiction in Canada to directly prohibit workplace
bullying. However, Canadian courts were awarding complainants damages and other forms
of relief for enduring workplace bullying. In Quebec, 825 complaints were registered,
resulting in 38% of the complainants receiving settlements; further 32% chose to settle
outside of court. For example, in Sulz v. Canada Attorney General (2006), Sulz claimed
that her immediate supervisors intentionally, or negligently, harassed her to the extent that
she became so clinically depressed that she had no choice but to accept a medical discharge.
The Supreme Court of British Columbia awarded Sulz 950,000 CAD as a compensation
for back wages and future lost wages (McKay, 2008). This case was decided in 2006, seven
years before Workplace BC implementation in 2013. In another example, the Supreme
Court of Ontario ruled in favor of Keays in Honda Canada v. Keays on a bad faith discharge
and upheld that the award was related to harassment and discrimination.
Presumably, while XYZ University (the pseudonym used in the McKay et al. (2008) study)
was located in a province that did not prohibit bullying until after 2010, the Canadian
national trend was moving to protect targets of workplace bullying.
Higher Education Workplace Bullying in Canada and United States
Similar to American researchers (Hollis, 2015) and Scandinavian researchers Björkqvist,
Österman, and Hjelt-Bäck (1994), Einarsen, et al. (2003), McKay et al. (2008) reported that
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staff facing bullying at XYZ University tended to be newly hired or the untenured, and
consequently had the least amount of power. These workers also felt unsupported in
reporting the abuse to administration. The Hollis (2015) study on American higher
education and the McKay et al. (2008) study both utilized emailed surveys for the data
collection process and posed similar questions about the duration of bullying and how
bullying may affect career trajectory. In both the US (Hollis, 2015) and the Canadian
(McKay, 2008) study on higher education, the sample emerged from an area that did not
prohibit workplace bullying. However, at the time of these respective studies, Canada was
experiencing a trend of workplace bullying lawsuits, and the United States had Title VII
that should have provided some protections at work for protected classes (race, gender, age,
national, origin). Table 1 provides a comparison of data reported by Hollis (2015) for the
United States and by McKay et al. (2008) for Canada.
Table 1
Comparison of Higher Education Bullying in the United States and Canada
___________________________________________________________________
United States
Canada
N = 401
N = 100
Data collection process
Emailed survey
Emailed survey
Response rate
14.5%
12%
*Affected by bullying /^HBBFemale
73%
67%
*Affected by bullying/^HBBMale
62%
32%
Rate of bullying
18 months previous/ over 5 years
62%
62%
2 to 3 years/ Longer than a year
53%
30%
Considering leaving
15.19%
13%
Applied/interviewed /Searching for job
21.62%
25%
Did nothing/Would not make a difference 78%
49%
___________________________________________________________________
*USA “Affected by bullying" means endured or witnessed bullying, as literature on workplace bullying
indicates that the witness is directly affected (Hollis, 2015). ^HBB is an acronym for have been bullied,
used by McKay (2008).

In addition, 19.76% of the US respondents had left a previous higher education job due to
a bullying, and further 24.32% were considering leaving higher education altogether. In
the surveys, both United States and Canadian respondents reflected on how workplace
bullying affected their work environment and productivity in higher education. Further,
Hollis (2016c) found that civility remains an important element in the classroom, especially
for developmental students. Job performance was adversely affected in both societies, as
exemplified by synonymous remarks from respective respondents. Effects of workplace
bullying extended beyond a mere distraction, as the respondents in both studies perceived
bullying itself as demoralizing and psychologically paralyzing. Table 2 provides examples
from both United States and Canadian respondents about how workplace bullying hurts
work productivity.
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Table 2
Effects of Bullying in Canadian and US Higher Education Institutions
on Workplace Productivity
_______________________________________________________________________
Canadian responses about work productivity
1C) More time wasted . . . need to talk it out with a colleague (more than once) before I
could focus (p. 87).
2C) My various experiences at XYZ cannot be fully isolated. It has been more like a
snowball rolling down a hill. I felt so frustrated and angry I could not hide it. One event
leads to another leaving me unable to manage the whole job.
3C) He made my life a living nightmare. This impacted my self-esteem and my ability to
operate effectively in the classroom. (McKay 2008).
US responses about work productivity
1USA) It's draining on the person managing this individual and it has an impact on an
entire area when they are dealing with the nonsense. It's an unhealthy workplace when
this is allowed to continue week after week.
2USA) Overall, it is a toxic and hostile environment for those who are not part of the boss
group (Hollis, 2015).
__________________________________________________________________
In regard to organizational support, Canadian and American respondents provided similar
remarks regarding bullying and reported the lack of support from human resources,
supervisors, and the management. In the McKay et al. (2008) study, 49% of respondents
stated that reporting workplace bullying would not make a difference, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3
Canadian and US Respondents’ Statements on Administrative Support
______________________________________________________________________
Canadian Comments
1C) Management not only does nothing about protecting myself and others from bullying.
2C) I have also seen them [HR] protect those who bully. This enables the cycle to
continue.
3C) Equity Services are the enemy! A consistent record of uselessness, a bad PR joke.
_____________________________________________________________________
United States comments
1USA) Many times, HR errs on the side of management.
2USA) This is a real problem in higher ed—we are not immune. HR and legal counsel
"get it" but don't want to address it with a policy—they suggest our non-discrimination
policy is strong—but bullies are equal opportunity discriminators. I left my university
once because of a bully.
3USA) I think bullying is overlooked and Human Resources work for the institution and
not the employee. I therefore think that HR is hoping that it will just go away!
______________________________________________________________________
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Canadian researcher Westhues (2006) echoed the findings on bullying reported by many
researchers, noting that those who were perceived as different or weaker tended to be the
bully’s prime target. Further, Westhues (2006) examined the origins of ‘mobbing’ studied
by Konrad Lorenz, the Austrian-German founder of ethology. Lornez (2002) noted that
mobbing or ganging up on an individual, much like members of the same animal species
turning on each other, was a survival technique. Arguably, humans are intrinsically wired
to be aggressive, supporting the “survival of the fittest” point of view of some
anthropologists.
In addition, Westhues (2006) identified conditions that increased vulnerability to mobbing
in academia, such as being foreign-born and having a foreign upbringing and/or accent, or
being different from most colleagues in an elemental way (e.g., sex, sexual orientation, or
credentials). His arguments were consistent with the findings of American researchers
(Hollis & McCalla, 2013; Hollis, 2016b). He also posited that amorphous structures and
ambiguity are conducive to bullying, as there are no guidelines to govern behavior
(Westhues, 2006). Similarly, Powell and KRC Research (2013) reported that financial
strife and economic hardship, such as the recent Great Recession in 2008, would also
increase the frequency of bullying, because threats to livelihood arouse the survival
mechanism in humans to prevail in a challenging environment.
Westhues (2006) noted that the extent of bullying overall is directly related to the
organizational culture. Organizational culture may contribute to employees’ lack of
awareness regarding bullying, or lack a systematic method to identify the bullying
behavior. Therefore, when an organization does not have a clear policy for managing bad
behavior, incivility and abuse are dealt with individually and in isolation. Instead, with a
policy, an organization can reflect on the organizational culture as a whole and develop
proper interventions. In addition, the organization may be inconsistent in its response to
workplace bullying. “As a result, some faculty, instructors and librarians believe they are
not supported when they raise concerns. This also contributes to the ineffectiveness of
administrators in addressing such issues as best practices” (Westhues, 2006, p. 82).
The Canadian findings seem to indicate that, even with national policy, the organizational
leadership needs to be accountable, police abusive conduct, and protect vulnerable
employees. With such organizational commitments in mind, many Canadian organizations
include mediation as part of workplace bullying intervention (Hollis, 2016; Satov, 2004).
In many Canadian higher education organizations, leaderships support a mediation process.
The more economically aggressive United States culture calls for strong anti-bullying
policy. The capitalistic ideology that prevails in the US society often subordinates human
civility for capitalistic gain. If aggression is linked to survival, then those with power will
continue to bully as a means to survive, unless the work environment and its respective
leadership is legally held accountable for bullying behaviors of the perpetrators. However,
even once a state, country, society or perhaps civilization works to prohibit bullying
behavior, the community does not automatically comply. For example, although the
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American Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964, prohibiting workplace racism and sexism,
harassment and discrimination have continued. Similarly, bullying and harassment
continue in Canada, despite anti-bullying legislation in several provinces.
Conclusion
At the time of this writing, in March 2017, Utah, California, Tennessee, and Minnesota are
the only US states that have passed healthy workplace laws. The United States has started
to prohibit workplace bullying at the state level; however, the history of such legislation in
both Canada and the United States shows that passing laws prohibiting workplace bullying
is a necessary starting point, rather than a finish line. Federal and state or provincial
legislation are beneficial for holding organizations accountable in court; however,
organizational leadership has to craft and fairly apply anti-bullying policy. As McKay et
al. (2008) noted, “The solution requires an organizational culture approach wherein policies
and guidelines are used to steer individuals in the environment to more appropriate social
interactions” (p. 95).
In short, the solution cannot be limited to the mere introduction of a policy that states that
bullying will not be tolerated within an organization. As Westhues (2004) commented, the
focus should be on prevention, instead of remedies or resolutions. A compliance strategy,
relying on codes, regulations, and guidelines, will have an effect in changing the
organizational culture. Nonetheless, true change occurs when leadership, reflecting the
emergence of broader cultural values, is committed to prevention and prohibiting
workplace bullying at the organizational level.
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Essays
Leveraging Diasporic Power for Nation Building
William McGaughy
Five Epochs of Civilization, a book that I published in 2000, proposes a way to organize
world history that is focused upon the development of society. The suggested periods of
history each exhibit characteristic topics and themes.
In the first period or epoch of world history (the centuries before Christ), humanity would
be organizing in cities, states, and ultimately world empires such as the Roman and Han
Chinese. In the second epoch (the next fourteen hundred years), world religion would come
to dominate human societies. The Renaissance, which marked the beginning of the third
epoch in world history (from the 15th through the early 20th centuries), saw the
development of commercial and educational institutions as dominant influences in people’s
lives. We have now (since the 1920s) moved into a fourth epoch focused on news and
entertainment. A fifth, computer-driven age is on the horizon.
Along with the changes in society have come a transition from ideographic and alphabetic
writing in handwritten forms to printed literature, to images broadcast electronically, and
finally to computer messages. And so we have changes both in the structure of society and
in communication technologies associated with each age.
All this is by way of introduction to my talk. The book, Five Epochs of Civilization,
describes world-historical trends in broad strokes; but where are we specifically in the
process? Clearly, the age of large political empires is past. Christianity and other world
religions no longer dominate society with the exception of Islam in some places. That
brings us to the epoch of commerce and education. It is still with us though, I would suggest,
in a stage of terminal decline.
World civilization has gone through several cycles of growth and decay. Now, in the
opening decades of the 21st century, I think there is a crisis in the third civilization, the type
of society that emerged in Europe during the Renaissance. This was a society given to
commerce--to trade, production of goods, and financing mechanisms--as well as to the
study of literature, the fine arts, and other subjects as a preparation for leadership in career
fields.
In that tradition, young people today study these and other subjects to obtain college
degrees, which they will need to convince employers to hire them in promising entry-level
positions. The connection between education and employment is a defining characteristic
of our culture. With a college degree comes a good job, we believe.
Higher education is therefore at the center of the impending crisis. While our colleges and
universities should be treasured as repositories of knowledge and culture, the fact is that
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students attend such institutions mainly for the sake of degrees that will help them obtain
attractive jobs. To become exposed to intellectual challenges and interests is of secondary
interest.
Employment opportunities in stimulating and lucrative fields depend on obtaining an
academic degree. A threat is found in the fact that, as such opportunities become less
plentiful and the experience of higher education becomes common, the years devoted to
higher education lead increasingly to debt and disappointment rather than to a successful
career. That may not be the fault of the educators so much as changing conditions in the
economy. We simply do not need all the people educated for intellectually challenging
careers.
We need therefore to rethink the relationship between occupations and educational
preparation. The state of technology dictates how many people will be needed to handle
particular economic functions given a certain level of demand. The key concept is labor
productivity. In a common definition, productivity equals output divided by the product of
employment and average working hours.
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics has kept track of working conditions since the late
1940s. Its statisticians have gathered information from manufacturing industries and other
sectors of the economy to show trends in economic output, employment, work hours, and
productivity. Output and productivity have shown large and steady increases, except
during recessions, while employment has increased to a lesser degree. Average working
hours per person have remained largely the same.
Government statistics show that the productivity of labor in the U.S. business sector
increased by around five times between 1947 and 2013. Output increased nine fold during
the same period of time. The hours of work roughly doubled. This doubling of hours,
representing man-hours of labor, reflects a two-fold increase in the number of persons
employed rather than changes in their work schedules.
In theory, we could have had a smaller increase in output if working people had worked
fewer average hours and the other factors had remained unchanged. But the U.S. economy
did not go that way. When in 1933 the U.S. Senate passed a 30-hour-workweek bill, the
incoming Roosevelt administration would not support it. Instead, the administration
sponsored legislation to support a 40-hour week. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
provides for time-and-a-half pay after forty hours of work in a week.
The ultimate effect of keeping work schedules the same since the 1940s has been to push
U.S. employment out of productive sectors of the economy and into occupational areas
such as government employment, health-care services, business and professional services,
educational services, and hospitality, which are less productive. In 2010, those activities
together claimed 59.2% of total U.S. employment, compared with 10% for manufacturing
and 1.6% for agriculture.
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I see a threat both to businesses that depend on tapping consumer purchasing power and to
educational institutions that promise their graduates employment with high incomes. It is
a threat to the twin pillars of the society that emerged in Europe during the Renaissance.
Higher education promises to put everyone in the category, to paraphrase Garrison Keillor,
of being “above average.” Supposedly, we can all be leaders and none of us followers.
Greatly increased productivity without an hours reduction is a threat to continuing high
levels of employment and income. If working hours are not substantially reduced,
employment will be pushed out of productive enterprise into activities that might be called
“necessary evils.”
For instance:
The United States incarcerates more people than any other nation. There were 2.22 million
adults in prisons and jails in the United States in 2013, compared with around 300,000 in
1970. More than six million Americans are under “correctional supervision.”
We Americans spend far more money for military preparedness and activity than do the
citizens of any other nation. In 2015, the United States spent $597.5 billion for military
purposes. China was in second place at $145.8 billion; and Saudi Arabia, in third place at
$81.8 billion.
Our health-care system is, by far, the most expensive in the world. In 2014, such spending
reached $3.0 trillion or $9,523 per capita. Americans spend fifty percent more on health
care relative to GDP than those living in western Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan but
experience worse outcomes in the rate of chronic conditions, obesity, and infant mortality.
Prescription drug costs are much higher here than in other industrialized nations.
The point is that waste and correction of erroneous behavior seem to be driving economic
growth rather than activities that improve the human condition. If that is so, output in those
forms could be sharply curtailed without ill effect. But it will take political will to do that
and, so far, the will has been lacking.
I would argue that we Americans are approaching a point of crisis in our policies regarding
work. Because productivity increases reduce the manpower needed in productive
enterprise, the superfluous workers are pushed out into areas of economic activity that offer
less real benefit to society.
Not only have we Americans failed to maintain balance in the supply and demand for labor
by reducing work hours but we have pursued policies that aggravate the oversupply of
labor. In the 1980s and 1990s, there was a sharp increase in outsourced production to lowwage countries such as Mexico and China. Free-trade agreements such as NAFTA and
CAFTA and permanent trade relations for China have made this possible. How so?
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The concept is simple: The U.S. government agrees not to burden products imported from
certain countries with tariffs or other import restrictions. American manufacturers then
close down factories in the United States and build new factories in the low-wage countries
to produce goods for the U.S. market. They are sold at the same price as before. The
money saved in wages for production of those goods boosts corporate profits. With higher
profits, the corporate managers persuasively argue that they deserve a share of the increased
profits because of their superior managerial performance. Managerial salaries and benefits
skyrocket as a result.
U.S. government officials ought to look out after the interests of U.S. workers but incentives
are great to do otherwise. Union wages are said to be too high. Prudent, tough-minded
management would, of course, want to seek a better deal in purchasing laboring services.
And so, with free trade pushed to the limit, we have an economy where production is done
in one country and consumption in another. That arrangement is not sustainable.
In summary, we have technology making it possible for American workers to produce five
times as much output in an hour as their counterparts did seventy years ago. We have
production from low-wage countries, primarily in East Asia, supplementing what is
produced in the United States and beating it soundly on price. We have low-paid foreign
guest workers replacing Americans in certain jobs under the H-1B visa program. And,
finally, we have illegal immigration to the United States from low-wage countries, said to
be 11 million persons strong. It’s a quadruple whammy that adds to the U.S. labor supply
while the demand for laboring services is steady or shrinking.
Accordingly, the American worker is thrown on the defensive. Labor supply chronically
exceeds demand. Worst hit are the young who lack work experience but are expected to
compete on the basis of educational credentials. With an increased educational
requirement, the American dream becomes converted to “opportunity for a price.”
Under those circumstances, the price of admission for landing a well-paying job is to obtain
a four-year degree from a certified institution of higher learning or, in some cases, an
advanced degree. If the student or his parents cannot pay for the education, the
recommended solution is to take out a student loan. The average student-loan debt in 2015
is estimated to be $35,000, up sharply from $20,000 in 2005 and from less than $10,000 in
1992. Educational debt has risen twice as fast as inflation. Borne by society’s more
vulnerable persons, it has now reached $1.2 trillion in the United States.
In conclusion, today’s young generation will bear the brunt of inadequate incomes if real
job growth does not keep pace with need. Not only will people become disillusioned with
the bargain that educators propose for their service with respect to careers, but defaults on
educational debt may become common. Far fewer may then choose to go to college. If
that happens, it may signal the end to a dream that has inspired western societies for more
than a hundred years.
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In my opinion, this is nothing less than an existential threat to world history’s third
civilization.
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Meaning of the Twenty-First Century: From Internationalism to Globalism
Ronald Glossop
In the The Meaning of the Twentieth Century[1] economist Kenneth Boulding makes the
point that the 20th century is significant because it marks the time when the industrial
revolution, what he calls the second great transition in the life-style of humans, had spread
beyond the “developed countries” to almost all the nations of the world. He notes how
much more rapid this transition has been than that of the agricultural revolution, the first
great transition in the way that humans live. It started about 10,000 years ago and still has
not reached a few remote places in the world.
The industrial revolution greatly changed not only the way that goods are produced but also
the kinds of goods that get produced. New means of transportation (bicycles, trains,
airplanes, automobiles, and jet planes) changed the distances people could and would
travel. New means of communication (telegrams, telephones, radios, films, television, the
internet, and cell phones) changed the ways people communicate with each other. As is
often said, "Modern technological developments in transportation and communication are
making the world smaller every day.”
These changes brought about by the new products of industrialization are in turn producing
changes in ourselves and in our society as we move from the internationalism of the 20th
century to the globalism of the 21st century.[2] I want to call attention to the cultural shifts
taking place in three areas: (1) how we think of ourselves, (2) how we communicate with
each other, and (3) what kind of political commitments we make, that is, where our political
loyalties lie.
The Transition from Nationalism to Internationalism
Just as the transition from an agrarian society to an industrialized society didn’t occur
everywhere at the same time, so the transition from nationalism to internationalism hasn’t
taken place everywhere at the same time. Internationalism came to Europe much earlier
than to the United States. The first international governmental organization was the Central
Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine, created by the Europeans in 1815; and the
second was the European Commission of the Danube created in 1856. The first worldwide
international organization was the International Telegraphic Union. It was established in
1865 and incorporated into the International Telecommunication Union in 1932. Its work
and that of other international functional organizations created about the same time was
much more important in Europe than in other parts of the world.
The formation of the European Union in the last part of the 20th century is moving
Europeans toward internationalism, but there is still much nationalistic restraint on that
effort toward integration. The nationalism in Europe is being overcome to a large extent
by the feeling that European integration is necessary to compete with the United States,
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Japan, and China, but the use of many different national languages is a major obstacle to
unification.
The United States, separated by oceans from both Europe and Asia, tended to view internationalism as a matter of U.S. domination of Latin America as proclaimed in the Monroe
Doctrine of 1823. The intent of the Monroe Doctrine as originally expressed was to warn
the Council of Europe powers not to support Spain in any effort to reconquer their Latin
American colonies. It is the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (1904) that
represented a certain degree of US domination of Latin America. One indication of the
extent to which nationalism has remained the prevailing outlook in the United States is the
fact that it is one of only three countries in the world (the others are Burma and Liberia)
which still does not use the International System of Units (the metric system of
measurement), despite the fact that Congress adopted a law in 1866 saying that no contract
using the metric system can be invalidated by a court plus the fact that other more recent
laws declare it to be the preferred system of weights and measures in the United State.[3]
Despite some movement toward internationalism, nationalism is still a very powerful force
in Europe as well as elsewhere. Nations continue to compete with each other economically
and for status in all areas (science, entertainment, sports, art, literature). The two world
wars were motivated by struggles for status between Germany and Britain, between Japan
and China, and between Russia and Germany while the Cold War was a struggle for status
between the Soviet Union and the United States. Similar struggles for status are now
developing between nations such as the United States and China as well as between India
and China. Nationalism is hardly a spent force.
The Transition from Internationalism to Globalism
Now let us look at the transition from internationalism to globalism. The difference
between these two outlooks is one of viewing the world as made up of a collection of
nation-states as contrasted with viewing it as a single planet where national boundaries are
relatively insignificant. The appropriate image for internationalism is a map of the world
or a traditional globe where the different countries appear in different colors, each one
bordered by a solid black line. The appropriate image for globalism is the photo of Earth
from space where there are no national boundaries and the unity and solitariness of the
planet in space are most evident.
The word “internationalism” comes from Latin and means “between” or “among” nations.
In this framework people do not relate directly to each other as individuals but usually
interact with each other as citizens of different nations and in formal settings by means of
national representatives. Crossing a national boundary usually means getting inspected,
being subject to different laws, using a different language, and using different money.
Although it is not possible to point to some single moment when the transition from internationalism to globalism begins, it seems that a significant event relevant to this transition
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was the photographing of the Earth from space which was done in the late 1960s and early
1970s.
We are living in the age of globalization. That term “globalization” is usually taken as
applying to the domination of the global economy by transnational corporations, and that
shift certainly is a major factor in the way that the global society is changing. It is these
corporations more than any other institutions that are operating in a world where national
borders are more and more irrelevant.
But we are also witnessing globalization, that is, the progressive diminution of the
importance of national borders, in all facets of human life: disease (avian flu, HIV/AIDS),
the internet, music, science, education, athletics, tourism, crime (drug trafficking,
smuggling people and weapons across national boundaries, pirating patents and
copyrighted material), and so on. Consider how a growing proportion of people are even
marrying across national borders. Is there anyone who doesn’t know at least one such
couple?
Another indication of globalism is the growing concern for preservation of the environment
of the whole Earth. When we think of problems such as global warming, depletion of the
ozone layer, the growing disparity in the average standard of living in different countries,
and unrestrained consumption of non-renewable resources, it is obvious that national
governments focused on limited geographical areas and acting separately in terms of
national interest are not likely to deal successfully with these problems which are global in
scope.
Identity, Language, and Loyalty in the Global Community
Let me focus now on how the three areas of identity, language, and loyalty change as we
shift from internationalism to globalism.
The first area of personal identity refers to how people identify themselves. In the age of
internationalism people regard themselves as definitely members of one country, but have
come to be aware that their country exists in a world where there are other countries with
which cooperation is possible in many circumstances. In the age of globalism people think
of themselves primarily as members of humanity on the planet Earth, and only secondarily
as citizens of this or that country. One does not cease to be a citizen of a particular nation,
but it is even more important to be an Earthling. Consider how most residents of the U.S.A.
think of themselves first as Americans and only secondarily as citizens of a particular state
such as Missouri or Illinois. Think of that and go up one more geographical level to where
people think of themselves first as citizens of the whole Earth and only secondarily as
citizens of a particular country. One recent book focused on this new view of personal
identity is Joseph Rotblat’s World Citizenship: Allegiance to Humanity.[4]
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The second area to be noted as we shift from internationalism to globalism is language use.
With internationalism one accepts the situation that different nations and different
nationalities often use different languages and that communication may require interpreters
and translators, possibly assisted now by various kinds of modern technology. This internationalism will also function better when individual persons learn to use several different
national languages. But in the case of globalism there must be one common language for
all Earthlings, [5] not only to facilitate communication but also to promote global solidarity.
We cannot ignore the connection between identity and language use. When people do not
use the same language, it is difficult for them to view themselves as belonging to the same
community. Consider the difficulties that occur when there is no single language for the
whole society such as with Quebecois in Canada, the Basques in Spain, and the Hungarians
in Romania. Consider also the present problems with regard to language use as efforts are
made to create a European Union.
When we begin to think of one language for the whole Earth, the natural question to ask is,
which language should it be? At the moment, it seems that English is on its way to
becoming the single language for the whole world, but the proportion of the world's
population which uses English as its first language is declining, from about 10 percent in
1950 to about only 5 percent now. There are two and three quarters times as many people
who use Mandarin Chinese as their first language (and the economic influence of China in
the world is increasing rapidly), and the native speakers of Spanish now outnumber the
native speakers of English.[6] Furthermore the influence of Spanish within and outside the
United States is growing.
There is a justice problem with using any existing national language. The speakers of that
national language are a minority of the world's population, but they are given a huge
advantage in international communication. This injustice arouses resentment, as is now
occurring in much of the world against the use of English on the internet and in international
contexts. And why not? After all, there are 23 languages in the world with at least 60
million native speakers.[7]
The logical and morally appropriate solution to this world language problem is to use a
created language which is no one's native language but which has been designed to be easy
to learn and to use.[8] That was the aim of Polish physician L. L. Zamenhof when he
created Esperanto and gave it to the world in 1878, just two years after the invention of the
automobile with an internal combustion engine. Unfortunately, Esperanto has not received
nearly as much attention as cars, but neither has it been completely forgotten. The use of
Esperanto has spawned a movement of idealists committed to the welfare of a global
community based on a common language which at the same time will help to preserve the
use of national languages within the national communities. Esperanto is used in addition
to the national languages, not instead of them. The development of the internet has made
Esperanto even more useful.
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The third area influenced by the shift from internationalism to globalism is the locus of
people’s political loyalty. In internationalism the primary loyalty of individuals is still to
the national governments. International policy-making organizations such as the League
of Nations, the United Nations, UNESCO, the World Health Organization, the Universal
Postal Union, and the International Atomic Energy Agency may be created to deal with
international problems, but these organizations aim to assist cooperation among the
national governments, not individuals. In globalism the primary loyalty of individuals
would be to a global government, some kind of democratic world federation which is over
the national governments, similar to the way that the U.S. national government is over state
governments.
Patriotism (loyalty to the nation-state) is not eliminated, but it is subordinated to
humatriotism (loyalty to all of humanity). Even now some individuals may have a greater
commitment to the welfare of the global community as a whole than to their own national
government, but until the political institutions are changed, such global citizens are likely
to face many obstacles as they try to act in accord with that commitment. They can try to
work through various non-governmental organizations, but they often find it difficult to get
around the restraints placed on them by the national governments. National governments
typically require primary loyalty to themselves, and they will be reluctant to relinquish that
requirement until they decide to become part of a larger political unit, as occurred in the
United States when the U.S. Constitution replaced the Articles of Confederation and as is
now occurring in Europe as the various countries there agree to become part of the
European Union. Globalism will be fully implemented only when the idea of unrestricted
national sovereignty is abandoned[9] and the various national governments of the whole
world are integrated into a democratic world federation, just as the U.S. state governments
have been integrated into the United States of America.
Conclusion
Kenneth Boulding noted that the significance of the 20th century is that it was when the
new products of industrialization spread from the industrialized West or “developed
countries” to the whole world. The significance of the 21st century is that that is when the
new products of industrialization have produced the unprecedented transformation in
human society from internationalism to globalism, a change that is reflected in the way
people identify themselves (as citizens of the world rather than a particular country), in the
way language is used in the global community (a common global language in addition to a
large number of national languages), and in the shift in political loyalty (from the nationstate to a democratic world federation).
Our educational systems should be enlightening our students (and our mass media should
be raising the awareness of our adults) about this transition from internationalism to
globalism currently taking place. We should be preparing our children (and our adults too!)
both intellectually and emotionally for life in this emerging 21st century world community.
Consider what life is going to be like in a democratically governed global community where
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol76/iss76/27

142

Civilizations Review: Full Issue

136

Number 76, Spring 2017

all people (children and adults) everywhere think of themselves as citizens of planet Earth
and where all are able to communicate with each other via the internet using a common
neutral global language familiar to everyone.

Endnotes
[1] Kenneth E. Boulding, The Meaning of the 20th Century: The Great Transition. New York: Harper &
Row, 1964.
[2] Many but not all the changes related to this transition from internationalism to globalism are discussed at
length by Peter Singer in One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002;
2nd ed., 2004. Singer presents his thesis in these words on page 9: “Rawls’s model is that of an inter-national
order, not a global order. This assumption needs reconsidering.”
[3] The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 2008. New York: World Almanac Books, 2008, p. 344.
[4] Joseph Rotblat (ed.), World Citizenship: Allegiance to Humanity. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.
[5] The case for a common global language is presented by Amitai Etzioni in “A Global, Community Building
Language?” The Federalist Debate, XXI, No. 2 (July 2008), pp. 16-20, and he argues that it is going to be
English.
[6] The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 2015, p. 716.
[7] The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 2015, p. 716. French is now fourteenth in the world in number
of native speakers. Four of these 23 languages are mainly in India.
[8] Ronald Glossop, “Language Policy and a Just World Order,” Alternatives, XIII (1988), 395-409.
Unfortunately, even those globally minded thinkers such as Peter Singer who address the problem of cultural
imperialism (see pp. 139-144 of One World) generally completely overlook the issue of linguistic
imperialism.
[9] Peter Singer, One World , pp. 4-5, 8, and 144-149. As Singer says (on page 148), “A global ethic should
not stop at, or give great significance to, national boundaries.” Other books arguing for the need to move
beyond unrestricted national sovereignty to a world federation include, James A. Yunker, Political
Globalization: A New Vision of Federal World Government (Lanham, MD: University Press of America,
2007) and Strobe Talbott, The Great Experiment: The Story of Ancient Empires, Modern States, and the
Quest for a Global Nation New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008. For him a “Global Nation” means having a
government for the whole world just as we have national governments for nations.
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Spengler’s Worldview: A Retrospective Analysis
Rudolph Zalter
Next year marks the centenary of Spengler’s prophetic, prescient, and master work of
history and philosophy, The Decline of the West. Its impact on generations of political and
academic figures during the 20th century cannot be underestimated. A lifelong disciple, I
find his historic predictions of the state of our world today to be a mirror image of his poetic
prose, nothing short of a Biblical revelation.
Reading through the complex text it becomes clear that this monumental thesis is anchored
in the subtle implications and specific connotation of one single key word -- soul. Without
full appreciation of this key word, his world view remains a difficult concept to grasp. But
we must first dissociate the implied meaning of the word from standard definitions, such
as these:
American Heritage Dictionary (1975)
“Soul”
1. The animating and vital principle in man credited with the faculties of thought, action
and emotion and conceived as forming an immaterial entity distinguished from but
temporally coexistent with his body.
2. Theology: The spiritual nature of man considered in relation to God, regarded as
immortal, separable from the body at death, and susceptible to happiness or misery in a
future state.
3. The disembodied spirit of a dead human being; a ghost, shade.
The Columbia Encyclopedia, Second Edition
Pantheism declares the individuation of human soul and materialism declares the soul
nonexistent. One of the most widely accepted concepts in the world is immortality and
this almost always postulates the existence of a soul to live apart from the body after
death.
The idea of body vs. soul is conventional in language and thought.
“Soul”
1. The principle of life, feeling, thought, and action in humans, regarded as a distinct
entity separate from the body, and commonly held to be separable in existence from the
body; the spiritual part of humans as distinct from the physical part.
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2. The spiritual part of humans regarded in its moral aspect, or as believed to survive
death and be subject to happiness or misery in a life to come: arguing the immortality
of the soul.
3. The disembodied spirit of a deceased person.
These definitions are not Spengler’s intended meaning of the word. To Spengler, the
following excerpts from volume one of his great work come nearest to a definition:
•

“A culture is born in the moment when a great soul awakens out of the protospirituality of ever-childish humanity and detaches itself, a form of the formless, a
bounded and mortal thing from the boundless and enduring.
“It blooms on the soil of an exactly definable landscape to which plant-wise it
remains bound. It dies when this soul has actualized the full sum of its possibilities
in the shape of peoples, dogmas, arts, states, sciences, and reverts into the protosoul.”

•

“Every soul has religion, which is only another word for its existence. All living
forms in which it expresses itself – all arts, doctrines, customs – are ultimately
religious, and must be so. But from the setting–in of Civilization they cannot be so
any longer. As the essence of every culture is religion, so - and consequently – the
essence of every civilization is irreligion – the two words are synonymous.”

I would like to offer another definition, one that clarifies and extracts the implicit, though
not the overtly stated, essence of the intended meaning: The “soul” is a quasievolutionary, transient mindset.
“Quasi-evolutionary” implies a biological, organic phenomenon that is not a response to
environmental challenge nor a simple conditioned reflex, but an evolutionary mutation
that transcends causality. It is an organic entity that spans a predetermined initial phase
of a biphasic sequential dichotomy, generic to Homo sapiens, specific to members of a
given particular culture.
“Transient” is a corollary of its organic nature. It implies a limited, allotted timespan (a
millennium at most).
“Mindset” is a psycho-neural turn in any given member of a live culture that perceives the
world in a distinct specific way and then acts in compliance with that specific outlook. It
is a mental process that infuses reality with a set, specific pattern.
Alternatively, the mindset may be viewed as the working “format” of the waking
consciousness, specific to any given culture.
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For Spengler, the soul is a unique living expression whose existence is deduced from its
fulfillment, life, covering the sequential unfolding of its potentiality over its life span. As
such it is transient and spontaneous, an unplanned and unpremeditated phenomenon that
has arisen in various formats some twenty-six times in the course of recorded human
history, following Arnold Toynbee’s calculations.
None of today’s civilizations, including our own Western civilization, is in the cultural
phase, excluding perhaps Russia. Thus, the impact of the soul is strictly historical,
according to Spengler.
Graphically, we may say that the soul is analogous to a fully loaded but unused cassette
tape. Playing out its full contents is analogous to the actualizing of all possible potentialities
of the soul. And finally, the play-out time simulates the allotted lifespan of any given live
culture as an organic entity. A fully wound unused cassette is thus analogous to the end of
what Spengler sees as the culture phase.
This analogy, however, breaks down at the rewind mode. Unlike the playing out of a real
tape recorder, what is to come in the virtual recorder is irreversible and directional
conjuring the concept of time, implicitly that of destiny. Thus destiny is the true expression
mode of time.

Figure 1
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Spengler wrote in the first volume of The Decline of the West: “The world of incident is the
world of once-actual facts that longingly or anxiously we live forward to as the future, that
raises or depresses us as the living present, and that we contemplate with joy or with grief
as the past. The world of causes and effects is the world of the constantly possible, of
timelessness.”
For Spengler, “culture” refers to the transient phase and “civilization” to its post-expiration
phase. Reviewers have often denoted the sequential phases that characterize the evolving
nature of any given civilization in Spengler’s thought but most have failed to take into
considering this dichotomy.
Yet, once the transient nature of the key word soul is accepted and assimilated, the
dichotomy between “culture” and “civilization” is transformed from an arbitrary choice to
a necessary logical, sequential phase, the organic living culture phase and then the strict
and necessary successor, the civilization phase.
For Spengler the Enlightenment marked the end of the culture phase and the advent of the
civilization phase. In contemporary terms we may say that for Spengler, Western culture
has been fully played out, having exhausted all its potentialities, and thus we are now in the
final, civilized phase of existence. The United States Constitution would be, therefore, a
reflection of the post-Enlightenment phase.
At the conscious level, the potentials of the soul, fulfilled in the stream of life, are mutated
to the perceptible view of nature and governed by the principle of causality. This is
manifest throughout Spengler’s text by the emphasis assigned to the attributes of the living
organic culture and through the stress on its reverse manifestation in the rational causal
worldview.
Consciousness
Consciousness is thus the manifestation or outward display of the unique, genetically
transcribed and evolved program played out on the complex neural circuitry, energized
metabolically during lifetime.
The Human brain has about 100 billion neurons (100x109) with an estimated average
of one thousand connections between each neuron and its neighbors. We have about
100 trillion connections (100x1012), each capable of simultaneous calculation. That’s
massive parallel processing.
Consciousness, then, is the manifest expression of the ON state, the simultaneous
depolarization of trillions of neurons. Death is the OFF state, and Sleep is the temporary
partial suspension of consciousness. Time is therefore a derived parameter of the ON state.
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For the first time in the history of life, an organic form turned its power of perception
back upon its own self, rendering it aware of its own existence.
While being unaware of the underlying physical chemical process, one is acutely aware
of its overwhelming presence in the affirmative tone of ‘I am.’
To invert Descartes famous dictum into “Je suis, donc je pense” is to stress that
consciousness precedes thinking. It reverses the traditional idea, that thinking is the
prime essence of the self. The dichotomy between organic life flowing unconsciously
and the inorganic construct of its conscious counterpart is the essence of Spengler’s
worldview.
Unless each of these categories is fully comprehended, the flow of the historical panorama
remains elusive. It can only be fully cognized by reference to its opposite, to its reverse.
To this end a tabular approach to might prove helpful in bridging the gap confronting the
reader.
Using the very same words of Spengler’s magisterial text, the juxtaposed dichotomy of the
table reinforces and explains the essential divide.
The following table is a brief illustration of a silent dichotomy that permeates this entire
thesis. It offers a brief selective sample of the necessary correlation between the perceptible
actual word and its life flow counterpart.
Fulfillment
Becoming: Fact of Life
Symbol
Time
Destiny: Logic of Time
Inner Certainty
Destiny: Existence Mode of the
Prime Phenomenon
Morphological element destiny =
Idea
Creative Art
Logic of Direction
Future
Organism
World as History
Organic world-impression
Symbol and Picture
Ordering according to plan
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Actuality
Become: Result of Life
Notion
Space
Causality: Logic of Space
Law-bound Reasoning
Causality: Existence Mode of Objects
Morphological element causality = Principle
Physical Epistemological System
Logic of Extension
Past
Mechanism
World as Nature
Mechanical world-impression
Formula and System
Dissecting according to scheme
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Fulfillment
Organic necessity in life, that of
Destiny: The Logic of Time
Chronology and the idea of Destiny
lead to a historical ordering of the
world
World as Organism
Every Culture has its own Civilization:
Strict and necessary organic Succession

Actuality
Mechanical necessity of cause and effect:
The Logic of Space
Mathematics and the principle of causality
lead to a naturalistic ordering of the world

World as Mechanism
Civilization as the organic logical sequel,
fulfillment and finale of a Culture. It is a
conclusion, the thing become succeeding
the thing becoming, death following life.
An irrevocable end
The old landscape of the culture
In place of a world, there is a city, a point;
here a new sort of a nomad, the parasitical
city dweller lives
Philosophy of Becoming
Philosophy of Being (having become)
Intuition
Analysis
Proper: involved in the basic fact
Alien: Related to Perception, i.e., the Outer
known as feeling, i.e., the Inner Life
World, the life of sensation
Life – becoming – Direction
Hard Set – become – Death Extension
Time
Space
In Direction: The possible is called the In Direction: The actualized is called the
Future
Past
Still to be accomplished LIFE [?]
Accomplished Life: The form in which the actualizing of the possible is
accomplished
The Accomplishing: The present
Higher History is the actualizing of possible culture
Becoming possesses the property of
Become possesses the property of
Direction (irreversibility)
Extension
Chronological number is linked with
Mathematical number is the symbol of
becoming, with life, with the necessity causal necessity, the ultimate meaning of
of destiny
the world-as-nature. The essence of
mechanical demarcation, akin to word
Form: world of history
Mechanical: causal picture of the world
Art: works are not calculated or
Calculation and cognition are kin
thought out
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Fulfillment
Cultures are organisms, and world
history is their collective biography
Organic logic: logic of direction
History: The physiognomy of all
becoming
Destiny is the true existence-mode of the
prime phenomenon
Destiny is the true existence-mode of the
prime phenomenon
Time is a word, made by thinking.

Actuality
Systematic natural science is based on
causality
Inorganic logic: logic of extension
Nature: The system of all things become

Numbering and drawing are a
becoming, numbers and figures are
things become

Irreversible directional time is transmuted
into a quantitative dimension that can be
mathematically manipulated, a fourth
dimension of the spatial concept

That I calculate is the business of
organic logic

What I calculate is the business of
inorganic logic

Causality is the existence-mode of objects

Space is a conception out of which the
projected image time, the phantom time, is
derived.

The main thesis of Spengler is that the organic aspect of life is regulated by a necessary
logic governing life in the time domain, while the laws governing the intellectual aspect of
life are promulgated in the domain of space.
Further, each culture and each civilization is genetically endowed with a unique soul
mindset that transforms its organic living and becoming life into an inorganic format
depicting the world as Nature-Science.
Civilizations are thus biological phenomena. They are the expressive forms of distinct
historical racial entities, the material expression of their quasi-genetic origin. This view is
the exact opposite of that stipulated by the “Ascent of Man” in which a linear progression
of ideas from one civilization to the next is postulated. Thus, to Spengler, history, art and
science are culture-specific.
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Book Reviews
Tseggai Isaac and Andrew Targowski (eds.), African Civilization in the 21st Century.
Focus on Civilizations and Cultures Series. New York: Nova Publishers, 2015
Reviewed by Leland Conley Barrows
Some fifty-two years ago, the eminent journalist-turned-historian, Basil Davidson,
published Which Way Africa? The Search for a New Society (London: Penguin, 1964), a
book that asked questions about the future of economic and political development in Africa,
pan-Africanism, the role of elites, the colonial heritage, and much more. It ended with a
number of question marks but with the hope that by adopting a radical reform agenda
enlightened leaders would be able to offer Africa a bright future.
Half a century later, the five contributors to the present volume, two of whom are its editors,
have asked the same question. Their answer falls somewhere between non-committal and
pessimistic given what they consider to have been the negative heritages of Islam, the slave
trade, and colonialism—“400 years of Africa’s devastation by outsiders…” (p. ix).
Modernization, the editors assert, is required, and they group modernization policies under
four headings: Westernization, Africanization, Sinozation, and Globalization, proposing to
evaluate them “with the civilization approach which is characterized by a big-picture view
of the integration of society, culture (including religion), and infrastructure over a longtime on a large territory” (Ibid).
The leading spirit behind this book, who is also its co-editor, is Professor Andrew
Targowski, a Polish-born Informatics specialist. Currently Distinguished Professor of
Computer Information Systems at Western Michigan University, his reflections about the
effects of the communications revolution pushed him to become a humanist, mastering the
social sciences and the humanities. In addition to co-authoring the “Foreword” along with
Dr. Tseggai Isaac, Associate Professor of History and Political Science at the Missouri
University of Science and Technology, Professor Targowski has written five of the fourteen
chapters of this book including the concluding chapter; Professor Isaac, four chapters;
Professor Sisay Asefa, Director of the Center for African Development Policy Research at
Western Michigan University, two chapters, and Dr. David Wilkinson, Professor of
Political Science at UCLA and Professor Herménégilde Rwantagbugu, Professor of
Comparative Intercultural Education at the University of Burundi, one chapter apiece.
The various chapters do not necessarily speak to one another in a systematic way. Many
of them give the impression that they were written as conference papers or for publication
as journal articles but ended up as contributions to this volume. Nevertheless, the first five
chapters, two by Professor Targowski, two by Professor Isaac, and one by Professor
Wilkinson, propose varying approaches to the identification, conceptualization, and
characterization of civilizations, particularly African civilizations. The remaining chapters
of the book elaborate further on points raised in the first five chapters. The emphasis of the
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book is on Sub-Saharan Africa even though the title designates Africa as a whole. Also,
given that Professor Isaac is of Eritrean origin and Professor Asefa, of Ethiopian origin, the
book as a whole offers a strong Ethiopian/Eritrean slant. The editors strive to present
African civilization in holistic terms. They stress the importance of Africa as the continent
on which humanity evolved and spread to the rest of the world. They recognize that the
Nile Valley gave rise to one of the earliest and greatest civilizations, that of ancient Egypt.
Although Professor Isaac states in Chapter 1, “The Civilization Approach to Analytical
Orthodoxy: Solution for or Conveyor of Political Decay to Africa’s Post-Colonial Struggles
in the 21st Century” that he “will defer in providing a definition of civilization” (p. 3), he
nevertheless asserts that “What is civilized is not coarse or pedestrian. Civilizations
empower and ennoble human beings, because a civilized social or political environment is
a reflection of an enlightened mind” (p. 1). He criticizes the attempts made by western
scholars to deny the African origins of the civilizations of ancient Egypt, Nubia, Axum,
and Ethiopia. In Chapter 4, “Making the Case for Ethiopian Civilization”, he stresses the
originality and richness of Ethiopian civilization that received Christianity from outside
Africa in 330 CE and survived as a distinct Christian African civilization, despite serious
challenges.
In Chapter 2, “Africa as the Hub of Mankind and Its Civilizations”, Professor Targowski,
acknowledging eastern Africa as the birthplace of humanity, cites the pioneering efforts of
African societies to develop iron smelting. In parallel he characterizes the evolution of
civilizations in terms of the developing information-communication system (INFOCO) that
he traces through six stages: speech, writing, the printed book, computerization,
telecommunication networks, and virtual civilization (pp. 34-37). Today a billion people
have access to INFOCO 5 and 6 Some 5.2 billion do not have access. Which group has the
better chance of survival, Targowski asks, homo electronicus or homo tributus (those with
no computer access)? Targowski does not answer his question but indicates that Africa has
not yet reached the stages of INFOCO 5 or 6 (p. 37).
In Chapter 5, “The Civilization Index and African Civilization in the 21st Century”,
Professor Targowski assesses the status and role of African civilization with regard to what
he calls “rising Global Civilization in the 21st century” (p. 85). Taking into account the
criteria of a Civilization Index that he has devised and that includes “communication
system”, “power system”, and “infrastructure system” (p. 95), he concludes that Africa is
the lowest-ranked among the civilizations of the contemporary world. For African
civilization to escape from this negative situation , it must strive to become a “Wise
Civilization” (p. 104).
“Wise civilization” is a concept that Professor Targowski has developed to designate a
society that is ecologically sustainable in every way and that rejects the excesses of “TurboCapitalism” that is oriented towards global business and excessive profits, democratic
socialism that he judges to be excessively expensive, and communism that he views as
murderous to people and dangerous to the environment. African Civilization, indeed
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humanity in general, must develop what Professor Targowski calls “Ecologism…a new
socio-political system” (p. 101) that includes a number of ecology oriented subsystems:
“eco-education”, “eco-democracy”, “eco-justice”, “eco-infrastructure”, “deep economics
[that] includes environmental and social costs alongside those of business and
administration into cost-effectiveness calculations” and “deep media” [that] informs the
society of the plight and development of the sustainable civilization” (Ibid). Professor
Targowski insists that Africa must vastly reduce its rate of population increase, invest
heavily in education to create a “sustainable intellectual elite”, expand its sources of clean
water, improve governance and end regional conflicts, and define “the goals and strategies
which are specific for African Civilization” (pp, 97-99). The cement holding together the
components of a Wise Civilization is a kind of social gospel that Professor Targowski labels
as Spirituality, a composite of the most positive teachings of the world religions and secular
philosophies having the greatest universal relevance. Thus Africa can strive to modernize
without necessarily westernizing and, as Targowski hopes, can “correct the actual model
of world development, which is based on super-consumerism, never-ending
industrialization and unwise applications of technology” (p. 104).
Altogether, it is evident that Professor Isaac and Professor Targowski approach African
Civilization in ways that are holistic, humanistic, and subjective. In Chapter 3, “The
Civilizations of Africa”, Professor David Wilkinson, proposes a different approach. He
conceptualizes African civilizations strictly in terms of quantifiable data and thus argues
that only independently developing societies that have evolved “citified” population
centers—cities—with over 10,000 human inhabitants apiece can be counted as
civilizations. Prior to incorporation into “global civilization”, according to him, there were
six independently developing civilizations in Africa: Egyptian/Northeastern African, West
African, Gold Coast, East African Coastal, West Central African, and South African.
Added to these, six more civilizations may have had independent origins, and five are
extensions of these twelve. An additional civilization labeled African Great Lakes may
also have been an independent civilization (p. 41). For him, “civilizations are societies of
states and cities networked by war, diplomacy and power (and not cultures)…, [and]
judgments as to the civilizational status of societies [are] a mere matter of fact (and not of
value)….” (p. 53).
The eight topical chapters that follow develop specific points raised in the first five
chapters. In Chapter 6, “The Impact of Religion on African Civilization in Light of the 21st
Century”, Professor Isaac evokes the role of Africans in establishing the early Christian
churches. Later, as Isaac argues, indigenous African Christian civilization was snuffed out
by Islam except in Ethiopia where it survived heroically. The Christianity brought to Africa
by Western European missionaries was tainted by its involvement first in the slave trade
and then in colonialism. Africa, he concludes, became a “victimized Continent,
transgressed by Islamic and European Civilization”. (p. 105).
In Chapter 7, “Language and Education in African Civilization in the 21st Century”,
Professor Isaac deplores the poor development of education in the post-colonial societies
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of Sub-Sahara Africa. He cites the poor linkages between the use of indigenous languages
at local level and colonial languages at national level. Children, he argues should receive
their primary education in their mother tongues. While he recognizes the usefulness of the
colonial languages, he would like to see greater use made internationally of certain regional
languages like Swahili and Hausa. Education, he insists, must be made available to
everybody, a difficult task in Africa given that the many dictators who seized power in
various African countries restricted the scope of education so as to reduce threats to their
power. Ultimately and despite Professor Isaac’s doubts about the pervasiveness of the
colonial languages, he believes that Africans should continue to rely on them while
becoming increasingly multi-lingual.
In Chapter 8, “Globalization and the Fate of African Traditional Institutions: The Case of
the Bashingantahe Order in Burundi in the 21st Century”, Professor Herménégilde
Rwantabagu makes the case for reviving the Bashingantahe, a council of wise and righteous
elders in pre-colonial Burundi that safeguarded peace and social harmony. The colonial
and post-colonial regimes marginalized the Bashingantahe. In post-conflict Burundi a
modernized Bashingantahe is being restored to its traditional place. Modernizing and
restoring such organizations in other African societies, Professor Rwantagagu states, will
assist in maintaining stability and peace and will contribute to the revalorization of
traditional African institutions in a globalizing world.
In Chapter 9, “The Impact of Global Geopolitics on the Ethiopian Civilization, One of the
Earliest in the World”, Professor Sisay Asefa traces the history of Ethiopia from its
Axumite origins to the present stressing its location in that part of Africa where humanity
arose, its resistance first to Islamization and then to Italian colonialism, its attempts to
modernize under Emperor Menelik II and Emperor Haile Selassie, and its involvement in
the Cold War. For Professor Asefa, the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 and
the establishment of a Marxist government was a disaster from which Ethiopia and Eritrea
have not completely recovered even though this government was overthrown in 1991.
In Chapter 10, “African Civilization and Infrastructure in the 21st Century”, Professor
Targowski judges African infrastructure to be inadequate in almost every respect. He
points out that “long-distance trade and commerce [functioned] better during colonial
times…” (p. 194). Africa is urbanizing rapidly, but the cities cannot support their
inhabitants, increasing numbers of whom live in slums. A success, however, has been the
African adaptation of wireless communication which has enabled many Africans to expand
their possibilities of communication with the world at large.
In Chapter 11, “The Impact of Agriculture on African Civilization in the 21st Century”,
Professor Targowski recognizes the potential for Sub-Sahara Africa to feed itself many
times over; however, this potential is not being realized because of bad governance, poor
planning, and water shortages. Indeed, half of the African population lacks access to clean
water. Nevertheless, various African countries have initiated projects to increase
agricultural output, and Africa continues to be the recipient of agricultural aid from
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international organizations like the FAO, from NGO’s, and from individual donor
countries. Greater success has been achieved in promoting small-scale but modernized
farming rather than large-scale agricultural projects.
In Chapter 12, “The African Governance Challenges in Global Economy and Society in the
21st Century, the Case of Ethiopia”, Professor Asefa suggests that the authoritarianism of
colonial rule led to the takeover of many African countries by military and/or civilian
dictators whose self-serving regimes set back the economies of the given countries,
hindered education, and destroyed popular participation in government. The end of the
Cold War in 1991and the ending of apartheid in South Africa have sped up the
democratization of African countries that had begun slowly in the 1980’s.
In Chapter 13, “African Civilization versus Global Waves and Civilization in the 21st
Century” Professor Targowski asks whether African Civilization can compete with other
civilizations in a globalized world given that prior globalization waves harmed Africa.
According to him, the first of these waves that was initiated by the Portuguese in the 15th
and 16th centuries led to the Atlantic slave trade that removed around 20 million persons
from Africa (p. 236). The second wave, the “Pax Britannica”, contributed strongly to the
generalization of colonial rule which limited economic development, particularly
manufacturing, and eventually led to mass poverty. Arbitrarily set colonial frontiers led to
ethnic violence. Although the Third Globalization Wave in the 20th century, the “Pax
Americana” and the “Pax Sovietica”, did stimulate decolonization, the involvement of the
newly independent countries in the Cold War often had negative consequences. The Fourth
Globalization Wave, the Pax Consortia, which began in the 1990’s has led to greater
prosperity for some countries through increased investment in the extractive industries in
Africa.
Today African Civilization is faced with what Professor Targowski calls the Fifth
Globalization, the “Pax Virtualiziana”, the global economy supported by the “integrated
information infrastructure”. Will Facebook, as a result, become the first example of the
Global Virtual Nation? “Can Africans be part of the Global Virtual Nation or could they
develop the African Virtual Nation” (p. 246)?
Professor Targowski has doubts about the capacity of Africa to profit from globalization.
He fears that the continent will continue to be used as a source of raw materials the
extraction of which will not benefit the African masses even though such exploitation
enriches a westernized elite. He is particularly worried about what he calls the second
scramble for Africa: the competition of China, the United States, and the European Union
to carve out economic niches for themselves in Africa, the Chinese being particularly
persistent in doing so. He ends the chapter by suggesting that the UN-sponsored
Millennium Developmental Goals, although laudable, are not all too suitable for Africa
because they do not include the need to reduce the rate of population increase by promoting
efficient birth control methods. Thus he proposes a set of African Sustainability Goals that
stress birth control and environmental education and protection.
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In Chapter 14, “Where is Africa Heading?” that concludes the volume, Professor
Targowski once again evokes the importance of his African Sustainability Goals arguing
that they will “bring in a new perspective on the sustainable development of African
Civilization” (p. 268). But will these goals be adopted and if so, how and by whom?
Altogether this book is a very good read for non-experts wishing to obtain a broad spectrum
of information on contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa even if it is overly focused on
Ethiopia. For readers who wish to learn more about given topics, the chapter bibliographies
offer many suggestions for further reading. The figures, graphs, and charts appearing in
the chapters written by Professor Targowski are useful learning aids. Unfortunately Nova
Press did not copyedit and proofread the manuscript before publication. There are
numerous typographical, stylistic, and grammatical errors. Frequently references cited in
the text are not included in the lists of references appearing at the end of each chapter.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol76/iss76/27

156

Civilizations Review: Full Issue

150

Number 76, Spring 2017

Ian McGilchrist The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of
the Western World. Yale University Press, 2009.
Reviewed by Marek J. Celinski
This book is recommended to scholars interested in the opportunities and limits which the
human brain and mind reveal to us about who we are and how we are able to make sense
of our experiences which shape our relationships to each other and to the world at large.
The book has two parts: The Divided Brain and How The Brain Shaped Our World.
The Divided Brain describes how our divided brain (and mind) appreciates reality, an
appreciation which is then projected back on the psychosocial and physical environment.
The primary reference is to the anatomical structure of the brain, which consists of two
hemispheres that create two fundamentally opposed visions of the world; these world
images and representations need to be integrated, but there is a tendency of one hemisphere
to dominate over another one which is reflected in cultures and civilizations.
The differences between the hemispheres are not attributed to language, which is a
specifically human ability, but, more deeply, to the phylogenetic development of
vertebrates. The differences are noted in attention, perception and an attitude to reality and
others. Some differences in divided attention are observed even in the lower animals and
birds. On one hand, there is a need to focus attention narrowly and with precision, for
example, to focus on the grain of corn that must be eaten; on the other hand, and at the same
time, there is a need for paying attention as much as possible to guard against a possible
predator.
The point is that hemisphere functional specialization brings evolutionary advantages
particularly in carrying out dual attention tasks. The right hemisphere enables breadth and
flexibility of attention, whereas the left hemisphere provides a capacity for focused
attention. This has the related consequence that the right hemisphere sees things as a whole
and in their context, whereas the left hemisphere sees things abstracted from the context
and broken into parts from which it then reconstructs a whole which becomes different
from the original object. In general, the right hemisphere seeks to identify individuals,
whereas the left hemisphere’s tendency is to classify them; but both hemispheres are
involved in recognition.
Each hemisphere helps us to make sense of reality by creating a recognizable image which
otherwise would be an amorphous mass of impressions. The right hemisphere’s version is
a more global and holistic recognition of similarity, giving an idea of how a particular object
is positioned in the relations to other objects, whereas the left hemisphere identifies single
features that would place the object in a certain abstract category.
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The right hemisphere has an affinity with whatever is living; the left hemisphere has an
equal affinity with what is mechanical. The left hemisphere’s principal concern is utility.
It is interested in what is made and in the world as a resource to be used. It is, therefore,
natural that it has a particular affinity for words and concepts for tools, man-made things,
mechanisms and whatever is not alive.
It turns out that the capacities that help us, as humans, form bonds with others (empathy,
emotional understanding and so on) involve the broadly spread awareness of the world
which is largely a function of the right hemisphere. Self-awareness, empathy, identification
with others, and, more generally, intersubjective processes are largely dependent on righthemisphere resources. When we put ourselves in another’s shoes we are using the right
inferior parietal lobe and the right lateral prefrontal cortex which is involved in inhibition
of the automatic tendency to impose on others one’s own point of view. The right
hemisphere plays an important role in what is known as “theory of mind,” a capacity to put
oneself in another’s position and to see what is going on in that person’s mind. This
capacity emerges in primates along with self-recognition and self-awareness, and is closely
linked to it.
It is the right hemisphere that understands the emotional or the humorous aspects of a
narrative and recognizes emotions through facial expression.
There is some evidence that whereas control of body functions through the sympathetic
nervous system is more influenced by the right hemisphere, the parasympathetic nervous
system is more under left hemisphere control. Whereas the parasympathetic nervous
system produces relaxation of autonomic functions appropriate as responses to the familiar,
the known and the emotionally more neutral environment, responding to new, uncertain
and emotionally demanding situations is the special domain of the vigilant right
hemisphere. The right hemisphere is more intimately connected with the unconscious and
automatic systems for regulating the body and its level of arousal through the sympathetic
nervous system that modulates heart rate, blood pressure and neural endocrine functions in
connection to emotions.
In the perception of time, the right hemisphere is required for sustained monitoring of
temporal information, whereas the left hemisphere is more efficient for detection of brief
temporal flow interruptions where there is needed focus on the moment.
Moral judgment involves a complex right hemisphere network (particularly the right
ventral, medial and orbitofrontal cortex as well as the amygdala in both hemispheres).
Damage to the right prefrontal cortex may lead to frank psychopathic behaviour. Our sense
of justice is underwritten by the right hemisphere, particularly by the right dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex. With inactivation of this area, we act more selfishly. This is probably
related to the right frontal lobe’s capacity to see the other’s point of view and to exhibit
empathy in general.
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The self is a complex concept but the self is intrinsically, empathically inseparable from
the world in which it stands in relation to others and the continuous sense of self is more
dependent on the right hemisphere, whereas the self as an expression of will is generally
more dependent on the left hemisphere. The personal sense of the self with a history and
emotional memory as well as what is sometimes called the self-concept, appears to be
dependent to a very large extent on the right hemisphere. The self-concept is impaired by
a right hemisphere injury, wherever in the right hemisphere it may occur, but the right
frontal region is of a critical importance here. It is also the right hemisphere which is
responsible for maintaining a coherent, continuous and unified sense of self. Right frontal
damage impairs the sense of self over time, which relies on the self narrative and gives us
a sense of a continuous flow-like existence.
The right hemisphere (usually involving the right frontal lobe) plays the principal role in
activities that involve creative imagination, the capacity for spiritual (religious) inspirations
and morals, music, dance, love of nature, a sense of humor and laughing, and the ability to
change one’s mind. Whereas the left hemisphere's relationship with the world manifests
as reaching out to grasp, use and control, the right hemisphere’s activity appears to be one
of reaching out without purpose. The main difference between the hemispheres is that the
left hemisphere always has in view the purpose or use, and is more the instrument of our
conscious will than the right hemisphere. The fundamentally opposite tendencies are for
the left hemisphere to evaluate the objective reality for its personal utility, whereas the right
hemisphere tendency is towards the sense of connectedness and a relationship with
whatever lies outside the self. One tendency drives people to acquire power and control in
the service of unitary survival; the essentially opposite drive is toward cooperation, synergy
and mutual benefits based on collaboration in the service of the survival of the group.
The two hemispheres give us an opportunity to understand reality from their two opposite
perspectives. The left hemisphere makes sense of reality by amalgamating the parts from
the bottom up to create a cohesive structure, while according to the right hemisphere, our
understanding of reality is derived from the whole since it is only in the light of the whole
one can truly understand the nature of the parts. The right hemisphere gives a global
intuitive impression of the world that was a whole before the left hemisphere’s separation
and analysis transformed it into something else, a “representation” of reality which
eventually needs to be reintegrated in the light of the whole.
By representing the world in a more abstract way, the left hemisphere provides us with the
more detached representation of reality, whereas the right hemisphere gives an opportunity
for experience of reality in a more direct manner and to take us beyond to something new,
something other than ourselves. The right hemisphere is always open to nature, to whatever
is new that comes from experience from the world at large. The left hemisphere’s
dependence on language and abstraction yields the clarity and power to manipulate things
that are static and isolated but ultimately lifeless; by contrast, the right hemisphere yields a
wealth of individual experiences with the nature of things that are never fully graspable and
can potentially cause harm because of their uncertainty. This is an inspiration for
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philosophy which begins with wonder and sense of incompletion and ambiguity. The
process of acquiring knowledge typically proceeds from the right hemisphere to the left
hemisphere and back to the right hemisphere.
Western philosophical thought, especially Heidegger's or Nietzsche’s, represents a
combination of the right hemispheres desire for understanding something beyond
immediate reach and the left hemisphere efforts to achieve that ends. McGilchrist connects
his ideas with Heidegger’s concept of truth. Heidegger regards truth as “unconcealing,” a
process moving towards something which is hidden but never fully seen. This is by contrast
to understanding truth as correctness, which assumes that in principle complete knowledge
can be achieved.
However, the story of the Western world is one of increasing the left hemisphere
domination. This is specifically addressed in the second part of the book, “How The Brain
Has Shaped Our World,” which documents how in the Western civilization the balance
between the hemispheres has switched towards the left hemisphere, which makes us believe
that we can do anything, and achieve everything through our own efforts. By comparison
the hemispheric balance in the Far Eastern cultures is based on more equal representation
of the two hemispheres. The left hemisphere dominates our understanding of reality as
viewed through the selection of words and through an organization resembling a
mechanistic system. Heidegger noted a gradual encroachment of rationality on the natural
territory of intuition or instinct. We transmit this attitude through culture when we select
the behavioral models to imitate, and we become what we imitate. The contemporary
hemispheric imbalance represents not a structural shift in the brain but a functional shift
which was initiated by imitation of beliefs and practices of how reality was seen and by
ways of being in the world which favor one or the other hemisphere. In the next generation
such habits of mind and brain may be replicated by epigenetic mechanisms that encourage
the trends. As we rely on choosing our own values and ideas, this process is guided by the
left hemisphere.
It is McGilchrist’s thesis that in recent Western history our contemporary world skills have
been downgraded and converted into algorithms so that we are busy imitating machines.
Initially there was more symmetry and balance in manifestations of the hemispheric
functions in our behavior; however advancement in the functioning of the frontal lobes
(whose major purpose is to allow for appreciation of distance in space and delay in time)
caused our detachment from our world and from ourselves.
There are positive implications of such an attitude, reflected especially in the Western
culture and civilization. This attitude enables us to rise above the world in which we live,
to plan, to think flexibly and inventively, and, in brief, to take control of the world around
us rather than simply responding to it passively. This development at its best offers far
greater capacity to speculate, to consider the lessons of the past, to project a vision of the
possible into the future. It requires recording to externalize and establish more permanent
traces of the mind’s working. This results in a huge expansion of written words in
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documenting observations of nature and keeping records of historical events, as well as a
development of diagrams, formulas and maps. But it also stops the flow of life and
necessitates more reliance on the left hemisphere.
Ancient Greeks began the process of standing back by theorizing about the political state,
developing maps, and observing the stars and the objective natural world, all activities that
may be mediated by the left hemisphere, even though the urge to perform them comes from
the right. The story of Prometheus portrays human nature as facing a dilemma of the two
hemispheres which ends in tragedy; there is a desire to help people and a downfall through
hubris. This represents the paradox of self consciousness and the beginning of the mind
coming to know and understand its own nature.
From the perspective of bicameral brain diversity McGilchrist offers an insightful analysis
of the Ancient World, Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment, Romanticism and
Industrial Revolution along with Modern and Post Modern Worlds. These sections may be
particularly interesting for students of civilizations. Those readers who do not wish to go
through the anatomical and functional details that underlie evolutionary societal changes
may go directly to these chapters based on the summary of the previous chapters that I
provided in this review.
I consider this to be an important book for understanding who we are because of our brain
structure and what our brain compels us to discover about ourselves in the course of our
individual lives and historic development. Knowledge of brain-related inclinations and
predispositions also forces us to ask the question how predetermined we are by our brain
structure (and the corresponding functions) and whether there is room for it to be
transcended.
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M. Alper Yalcinkaya, Learned Patriots. Debating Science, State, and Society in the
Nineteenth –Century Ottoman Empire. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015.
Reviewed by Toby Huff
It has been known for some time that the glory days of science within the Muslim world
occurred between the late tenth and the end of the thirteenth century. Other outstanding
astronomers, mathematicians, physicians and philosophers have appeared in the centuries
since then, but no revolutionary developments occurred like the 11th century revolution in
optics pioneered by Ibn al-Haytham (d. 1040/2). A great many resources were devoted to
astronomy but aside from some minor technical innovations, no revolution in astronomy
occurred. Over time the burst of energy stimulated by the translation from Greek into
Arabic of seminal works in science and natural philosophy between 750 and 950 C.E.
dissipated. Some observers have suggested that it was the autocratic ways of the Ottoman
Turks who became the dominant ethnic group across the Middle East after the conquest of
Mamluk Cairo in 1515. While that is probably an exaggeration, it is true that the Ottomans
scarcely measured up to the earlier advances in Arabic-Islamic science.
Other scholars have given us glimpses of seventeenth century Ottoman science and the
exceedingly cautious assimilation of elements of the European scientific revolution which
also illustrated the fact that the Ottomans had little interest in the work of Copernicus,
Galileo, Kepler and Newton.
Now we have this new work, Learned Patriots, which sheds light on the nineteenth century
debates taking place mainly in Istanbul. This interesting book is both informative and
dispiriting. The author provides a comprehensive discussion of the many nineteenthcentury Ottoman discussions of the importance of science to Ottoman society. The problem
was that neither Arabic nor Turkish had an exclusive word for “science.” Instead from the
outset the parties to the debate had to use some variant of the Arabic word ilm that
generically means knowledge, and in the Islamic context it meant religious knowledge. As
such, ilm was taken to be the highest, most profound and ethically correct knowledge
available to humankind. Beyond that, Islamic religious scholars contrasted that knowledge
to the “foreign” or ancient sciences (meaning the Greek tradition). As Yalcinkaya shows
us, all the way to the early twentieth century, defenders of “useful knowledge” or the new
“needed knowledge” (meaning the applied and modern sciences) had to offer subsidiary
arguments that this “new knowledge” contributed to both the well-being of society and the
moral quality of the individual. For the view persisted that the “foreign” sciences were
inherently unIslamic.
Unfortunately the author gives us only a hint of the historical context during which the
Ottoman education system and especially the medreses (Islamic colleges), took over the
model of education established in the eleventh and later centuries by the Arab ulama, the
religious scholars. As we recall the madrasas (using the Arabic transliteration) were totally
devoted to the “religious” or “transmitted sciences,” meaning Quranic exegeses, hadith
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studies, Arabic grammar and genealogy, some mathematics, and with the highest esteem
given to the study of Islamic law, the shari’a. No natural philosophy or natural sciences
were allowed in. Consequently, it was just because the Ottomans thoroughly took over and
institutionalized this form of education, based essentially on rote memorization, that no
graduates of the medreses were prepared for scientific inquiry as practiced in Europe, and
this hundreds of years after the scientific revolution. The medreses failed to produce a
cadre of “scientists” (for which there was no Turkish word), and due to external pressure,
it was only diplomats, bureaucrats and “science appreciators” who called for the
importation of the European-based sciences, technology and new learning.
This is why the book’s focus is on the occasional appearance of Ottoman scholars or
bureaucrats rather than indigenous scientists who rose to champion the new “knowledge.”
For it was only those who had visited or been trained in Europe, or perhaps trained in the
Ottoman Military Academy or Ottoman School of Medicine, who had sufficient familiarity
with the new sciences and saw them as the indispensable new and “needed knowledge” that
could rescue the Ottoman state and Empire from its slow drift downward.
The story told by the author is largely about these aspiring bureaucrats and job-seekers
who, with their greater or lesser understanding of the modern sciences, jockeyed for state
positions, sincerely hoping that their understanding of the “new knowledge” could be
introduced to Ottoman society, through the use of new textbooks, or more effectively, by
introducing new institutions of higher education, most of which failed. Perhaps the most
ambitious of these was the proposal to create a Darülfünun, an Ottoman styled university,
but which only materialized in the first years of the twentieth century.
As mentioned, defenders of the new knowledge faced a great deal of opposition from those
who suggested that this new knowledge could be dangerous to the youth and harmful to the
Empire. The opposition had to be reassured that this new knowledge would not corrupt its
possessors, especially the youth. It is clear that the prime motivation for all this selfreflection came almost wholly from the competitive international context within which it
was plain to Ottoman observers that a major reason for the West’s ascendancy and
domination was its great abundance of science, technology and new learning.
The debate ended inconclusively with pro-science and anti-science expostulators
presenting convoluted arguments about whether education had to be basically religious
(Islamic), whether there was once a Muslim contribution to the new sciences, whether such
masters of the new sciences could be real patriots, and so on, all of which barely advanced
the discussion. Yalcinkaya needs to dig deeper into the religious and philosophical contexts
that so inhibited nineteenth century thinkers from making more profound arguments than
they did for the pursuit of modern science. For other scholars have long noted an interesting
temporal comparison between Turkey and Japan in the early twentieth century: both hoped
to modernize and acquire modern science, yet only the Japanese succeeded, leaving many
scholars puzzled about the Turkish case. This could be a useful supplementary book for
history of science courses yet it is just the author’s greater knowledge of the social sciences
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than the history of science, especially Middle Eastern science, that weakens its appeal. A
case in point, apparently unknown to the author, is the arrival of the telescope in Ottoman
lands in the 1620s. It generated no interest among Ottoman astronomers who might have
used it as a new discovery machine and served to reform Arab-Islamic astronomy. In a
word, the Ottoman nineteenth century discussion of the role of science in society remains
flat-footed, barely cognizant of its previous history.
The young Turks championing the modern sciences lacked what Europeans always had,
namely, the idea that there are objective techniques and logical means for getting at the
truth, what the Greeks (and Newton) called natural philosophy. Such a position assumes
that whatever is found out using such means transcends religious and “denominational”
boundaries. The new Turks had to convince the traditional knowers (ilmiyye, Turkish;
ulama, Arabic) that there is such a thing as objective knowledge of the natural world (and
how it operates), and such knowledge transcends “good and evil,” so that we do not have
to question the religious commitments or moral standing of such seekers after truth. These
deep philosophical questions elude the writer, who otherwise gives us a valuable starting
point.
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Patrick Manning, Migration in World History, 2nd ed.. Routledge, 2013.
Reviewed by Connie Lamb

This book is part of the series, Themes in World History, which proposes to provide
exciting, new and wide-ranging surveys of the important themes of world history. Each
theme is examined over a broad period of time allowing analysis of continuities and change.
Manning’s book certainly fits this pattern, in its broad time coverage, analysis of local
movements, and historical methods for discussing migration. Manning defines human
migration simply as the “movement from one place to another and from one social context
to another” (191).
Patrick Manning is a well-known world historian and is currently the Andrew W. Mellon
Professor of World History at the University of Pittsburgh. He is also a specialist on Africa
and has written many books and articles on world history and African topics. Besides being
a teacher and author, Manning is the president of the World History Network, Inc. a
nonprofit corporation fostering research and graduate study in world history. His education
includes a BS in chemistry with a minor in history from the California Institute of
Technology and a Masters in history and economics as well as a PhD in history from the
University of Wisconsin-Madison. He was trained as a specialist in the economic history
of Africa and went on to explore demographic, social, and cultural patterns in Africa and
the African diaspora. Manning has published numerous articles and several books and
teaches classes on world history and interdisciplinary methodology, the use of which is
evident in his world migration book. He has been active in the American Historical
Association and is currently serving as the President of that society.
This book on migration seems to build on his past work about Africa and global history,
especially two of his books, World History: Global and Local Interactions (2005) and
Migration History in World History (2010). Migration in World History is organized
chronologically but by topic within time periods. There are many books on migration, but
Manning’s has a unique approach, covering the entire history of the world with a broad
scope of places and topics. Most other authors discuss current migrations globally or focus
on particular places or peoples.
Chapter one, as the introduction, talks about modeling patterns of human migration, giving
various methods of research and Manning’s own way of studying local and global human
migration. Chapter two covers the emergence of human beings and their earliest migrations
to 40,000 BP. The next seven chapters discuss large time periods and issues that
characterize them: peopling northern and American regions, agriculture, commerce, modes
of movement, spanning the oceans, labor for industry and empire, and urbanization to 2000.
Many disciplines may be used to study migration including sociology, anthropology,
economics, linguistics, history, archaeology, demographics, genetics, chemistry and
political science. Manning sets out his theory or model of migration by defining a human
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community as the speakers of a given language, so he bases his work mainly on linguistics.
He then identifies four categories of human migration: home-community migration,
colonization, whole-community migration, and cross-community migration. Manning
focuses mainly on the last one: cross-community migration (7).
Cross-community migrants are generally rather small in number and the author categorizes
them as settlers, sojourners, itinerants and invaders. Settlers are those who move to join an
existing community with the intent to remain there; sojourners are those moving to a new
community with the intent to return to their home community; itinerants move from
community to community but have no single home to which they expect to return; invaders
are those who arrive as a group in a community with the objective of seizing control rather
than joining. Migrants may journey on their own, but, more often than not, their movement
is facilitated by cross-community networks that involve cooperation across distance and
across boundaries of language and culture, aiding the movement of migrants from one place
to another (8-9). As individuals and groups move, they may absorb the culture and
language of their new locale, and they may, in turn, affect the community they enter. Thus
migration results in stories of human development, the complex process of transformation
in human society (10). Manning discusses how migration affected human behavior and
culture by presenting individual stories of migration to illustrate the experience of each
type.
Migrations, whether of long or short distance or duration, are central to human experience.
This book emphasizes the continuity of human migration over our long history, and the
similarity of processes and functions of migration over time and space (191). Looking at
the migration process world-wide, Manning draws on examples from a broad range of
geographical regions and thematic topics throughout history. His use of both global and
local examples provide readers both an overall view and insights into specific areas and
topics.
In his chapter on agriculture, Manning states that agriculture developed in several regions
of the world and that agricultural development was mainly a long process of
experimentation and discussion (59). Certain crops originated in particular areas: yams,
millet and sorghum in Africa, rice in China, taro and bananas in Indonesia and squash in
South America. Later, beans, potatoes, maize, and manioc were developed in South
America. The spread of agriculture to every area of the world was accomplished both by
colonization by the original developers of agriculture and as the result of crop migration
through a long term pattern of cross-community migration (74). Using his linguistics
model, Manning states that agriculture affected the distribution of subgroups of the great
linguistic families rather than the movement of entire language groups.
The period from 3000 BCE to 500 CE was a formative period for today’s societies, which
saw accelerated human development, the spread of agriculture, and increased commerce,
especially through the development of civilizational centers. Migrations brought about
interactions of groups and the increase in commercial ventures (77).
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In the chapter “Modes of movement, 500 to 1400 CE,” Manning states that habitual human
patterns of cross-community migration linked regions to each other, spread earlier
innovations, and brought about new innovation. Such travel took place by foot, on
horseback and by boat, not only mixing cultures and languages but also spreading diseases
(83-94). The author speaks of these modes and how settlers, warriors and merchants
changed the old world.
In his chapter on “Spanning the oceans, 1400 to 1700,” Manning discusses how improved
maritime technology helped humans to succeed in encompassing the globe. Those involved
in such travel included explorers, conquerors, merchants, missionaries, and family groups.
All their travels resulted in the carrying and borrowing of cultures revealed through changes
in language and material culture (109).
From 1700 to 1900, humans endured forced migrations and difficult race relations. It was
a time of empires, nation building, an increased global economy, and unprecedented
voluntary migration throughout the world. In the 1900s the world experienced even greater
human mobility especially from rural places to the cities, diasporas of certain groups, and
the increase of refugees. Ideas, literature, culture, religion spread from place to place.
“Migration brings the connections that spread innovations all across the planet, but it also
brings the improvement in communications that enable people to resist or transform global
influences” (182). Language communities remain significant even in this global world and
are important to further innovation and development especially through migration.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

As a summary, the book covers the following:
the earliest migrations and the spread and development of Homo sapiens;
the rise and spread of major language groups;
exams civilizations, farmers and pastoralists from 3,000 BCE to 500 CE;
trade patterns including the early Silk Road and maritime trade in the
Mediterranean and Indian Ocean;
the effect of migration on empire and industry between 1700 and 1900;
the resurgence of migration in the later twentieth century, including movement to
cities, refugees and diasporas; and
the various leading theories and debates surrounding the subject of migration.

Manning’s writing is very readable and his subheadings make the book easy to follow. His
vast knowledge is evident in the many places and topics he discusses, his use of various
disciplines, and his discussion of the controversies about migration theories (given in the
appendix). In his book, Manning traces the movement of people, crops, diseases, religion,
technology, ideas, and, of course, language. The figures and maps he provides, which
include several maps of language groups and movement, plant origins, and large group
migrations, are especially helpful as visual companions to the discussion. Migration in
World History is a fascinating read for anyone interested in the history of the world through
the lens of migration.
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Hanwen Fang, A Study of Comparative Civilizations. Beijing: Zhonghua Book
Company, 2014.
Reviewed by Shi Yuanhui

In 2014, Professor Fang Hanwen of Soochow University, China, published his 5-volumed
monograph, A Study of Comparative Civilizations, offering his understanding of the main
civilizations in the world. Professor Fang won his doctorate in Beijing Normal University
in 1990, and he continued his studies of comparative literature and comparative
civilizations, having published 34 books. As he wrote in the epilogue, he had been working
on the book, A Study of Comparative Civilizations, since he was still reading for his doctor’s
degree and finally completed it when he was invited to be a full-time research fellow in
Peking University. (p. 414-15, Vol. 5)
The first volume of the book consists of an introduction and discusses the origin and
systems of civilizations. Volume 2, Volume 3, and Volume 4 describe the major
civilizations in the world in terms of historical growth, political factors such as nations,
states and powers, as well as religion and spiritual belief. In the last volume, Professor
Fang makes a comparative study of western and eastern civilizations, and gives his own
judgment about the future of the world.
In the book, Professor Fang divides the world into 8 systems of civilization: Asian Pacific
System, South Asian System, Mediterranean Atlantic System, Mid-Eastern Arabic System,
North American & Australian System, Latin American System, African System, and
Jewish System.
Contrary to Max Weber’s judgment that Confucianism preaches getting accustomed to the
world rationally, Professor Fang affirms the value of traditional Confucianism, which,
Professor Fang believes, advocates the active transformation of the world. Professor Fang
accepts the idea of Guo Moruo about the origin of Confucianists, who Guo believes derived
their belief from the change of spiritual human belief from primitive worship of oracles and
witches to humanism. (p. 128-29, Vol. 4) In this sense, Confucianism is actually focused
on how to improve human life, and thus make a more habitable world and a more peaceful
and friendly human community. Fang states his disagreement with Weber in the viewpoint
of the latter, pointing out that firstly Weber shouldn’t have drawn analogy between
Christian priests and Confucianists; secondly Weber neglected the demand of Confucius
and Mencius that true man should make efforts to implement the principle of tiandao (“Way
of Heaven”) to establish a Chinese Garden of Eden for people, and thirdly Confucianism is
not a religion as Weber argued. (p. 10-17, Vol. 4.) In fact, in The Analects one of
Confucius’ disciples once said, “The true man has to be strong-minded and persevering,
for he is taking a very formidable mission with an endless journey ahead” and in the same
book Confucius was once frowned on by a common gatekeeper for he believed the sage
was “one who knows that what he pursues is impossible and yet persists anyway.” (14.38).
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Zhang Zai, a Confucianist in Northern-Song Dynasty, tasked the intellectuals to “Find the
central principle of the natural world, defend the normal life of the people, learn and pass
down the doctrines of the past sages, and establish eternal peace for thousands of
generations.” The strong sense of responsibility to make a more humane world is selfevident in Confucianists.
Of course, Fang doesn’t deny some defects of traditional Confucianism. He points out that
the golden mean of Confucianism, preaching being open-minded and tolerant, is at the same
time liable to suffocate deep and metaphysical recognition and understanding of things,
especially paying little attention to science and technology and often making compromise
between truth and fallacy, for the traditional idea emphasized that people should be
moderate and always ready to achieve a comprehensive balance between various things,
thus making the world more harmonious, instead of pursuing some particular and detailed
knowledge by being interested in only one thing, or several things. (p. 137-140, Vol. 4)
In this sense, Fang believes that Confucianism, especially Neo-Confucianism which
exerted profound influence over Chinese psychology for about 800 years, as a moral
philosophy, could make a complement to western rationalism. He wrote in the book,
“Chinese Confucianism, as a humanism doctrine, will make a better spiritual support for
the human future than monotheisms. This is an advantage in Chinese civilization, although
this doesn’t mean Confucianism is the best. But it is undoubtedly a far-reaching social
ideal, and of course, western science and technology will still certainly function as a
motivation in social history.” (p. 410, Vol. 5.) Here Confucianism, as Professor Fang said,
could provide the human future with spiritual or psychological reassurance and guidance
which western rationalism would most probably fail to offer. But it shouldn’t be denied
that western rationalism, although problematic in some ways, would still be the backbone
and driving force to human history, especially western science and technology. In this
sense, Confucianism would function as a complement to western rationalism, for the latter
seems to be focused too much on some profoundly mechanical, instrumental and logical
methods of thought, while the sense of compromise, tolerance of ideological differences,
and mutual care and help in Confucianism would bring to human world, especially different
civilizations, some means of getting united peacefully and staying as different ones at the
same time, softening largely or even diminishing the excessive rigidity of western
rationalism.
In the book, Professor Fang points out that the deep root of western-centricism of rationality
can be found in Hegel’s doctrine. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of History, Hegel once
declared that rationality should be the only factor in whose yardstick history could be
measured in terms of philosophy and that world history was actually a course of
rationalization, for rationality was the arbitrator of the world. Hegel was obviously
preaching western rationality and at the same time rejecting eastern mode of thought, thus
exhibiting a western-centricism of rationality. In his Lesser Logic, Hegel often mentioned
the two conceptions of identity and disparity and declared the two co-existed side by side,
but he believed at the same time that absolute rationality could bring itself to reality, making
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idea identical with existence. In this sense, Hegel highlighted identity more than disparity.
(p. 377-78, Vol. 5)
In 1993, Huntington published his article “The Clash of Civilizations?” in Foreign Affairs,
arguing that after the collapse of the Soviet Russia, Islam would be the foremost challenge
to western civilization. That article was expanded in 1996 into a book entitled The Clash
of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Huntington believed that the world,
after the Cold War, would have to face the cultural clashes instead of the ideological ones,
and conflicts between major civilizations would be most likely to occur for the cultural
tensions were irreconcilable. The September 11th Attack in 2001 and some other Islamic
terrorism incidents seem to be some confirmations of Huntington’s understanding of
civilizations. But in fact, Huntington’s conception is a new version of Hegel’s emphasis of
identity, only preaching the predominating position of western civilization, neglecting the
mutual cultural understanding and tolerance and thus being very dangerous to the peace of
the world. After all, those Islamic terrorists shouldn’t be considered as true representatives
of all Muslims, and what’s more, the imposition of western values and the frequent military
interference are the direct causes of the terrorism. In cultural communications, it is
undeniable that each person has his or her own judgment whether some certain cultural
values are acceptable or not, and that those universal ideas such as democracy, freedom,
equality and human rights established in Enlightenment have their own life and would
sooner or later bloom in the world. That is to say, we should be pretty self-confident that
with the gradual cultural communications, those truly universal western values would be
finally accepted by the world, while their rude imposition through violent interventions
would only lead to disorder and trouble, even though these actions are justified regarding
their purpose. Besides, it should be mentioned that even though those universal ideas have
been accepted by the whole world, cultural differences will still exist, because identity and
disparity coexist side by side. In this sense, the west ought to be patient and respectful to
cultural differences.
Fukuyama’s end of history is another version of Hegel’s highlighting of identity, because
Fukuyama believed that western democracy would be the last and eternal social system, or
the world politics would be westernized with the end of Cold War and the collapse of Soviet
Russia. In this sense, the conception of end of history also preaches the predominating role
of western political system in the whole world, believing the western political system would
be sufficiently applicable to the whole world and ignoring the fact that different
civilizations would absorb western political conceptions with their various choice based on
their various national tradition and culture. What’s more unacceptable is that Fukuyama
believes that since individuals have achieved their “equality” and needs, they would lose
the desire to be superior to others and then the history of human race would be static without
the motivation of individuals. About this point, Professor Fang points out that Fukuyama
has put his studies of human history on the foundation of individual psychology, that he
has misunderstood Hegel’s relationship between master and slave, and that his doctrine has
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something to do with Reich’s idea that human psychology was determined by social
politics. (p. 344-49, Vol. 5.)
In his book, Professor Fang writes about his own understanding of the human future. First,
he argues against theological and secular conceptions of Utopia, declaring that they,
although pursuing progress, are actually denying continual historical progress by saying
that Utopia is the final and perfect social state. Secondly, he talks about Fukuyama’s end
of history. Finally, he rejects any prophecy that the human world will end in doom. He
believes that the human world will persevere in spite of many problems and that in the
future western rationality will be eventually replaced by a New Dialectical Rationality that
would grow out of the long communication between western rationality and Chinese
rationality as articulated in the ideas of The Book of Changes and Mohist Canon. Of course,
although he expresses his deep concerns about social problems provoked by the unlimited
overuse of rationality, especially instrumental rationality, Professor Fang doesn’t deny the
true value of western rationality, which he believes has brought about such progress in the
world and will still function as the motivation of human history. (p. 336-410, Vol. 5.)
As is mentioned at the beginning of this paper, Professor Fang has been working on this
book for more than 20 years, and he has put his own insightful understanding of world
civilizations in the book. But will his ideas be accepted by readers? We have to wait and
see.
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Mary Elise Sarotte, The Collapse: The Accidental Opening of the Berlin Wall, Basic
Books, 2014.
Barry Rubin & Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, Nazis, Islamists, and the Making of the
Modern Middle East, Yale University Press, 2014..
Reviewed by Laina Farhat-Holzman
These two books treat one important subject that dominated 20th century history: the rise,
fall, and influence of Germany.
Mary Elise Sarotte, The Collapse: The Accidental Opening of the Berlin Wall.
In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, a dramatic end to the cold war between the west and the Soviet
Union. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union collapsed too, greatly reducing the size and
power of what had been a de facto Russian Empire.
This monumental event, when analyzed later from the accumulated archives, shares with
many such events a confluence of accidents, mistakes, and unintended consequences.
Historians who present events as predictable and inevitable are missing the mark.
The November 9th fall of the wall surprised everybody. Officials who could have prevented
this were ill, traveling, or otherwise indecisive. In the book, we meet the players: the young
radicals, the Stasi officer on duty at the wall that night, and the Politburo member who
decided to open the wall to a press conference that included (by chance) Tom Brokaw from
NBC News. As crowds massed, nobody seemed to know what to do. This had not been
the case for decades, when an East German citizen daring to cross into the West usually
ended with death or imprisonment.
The Fall of the Berlin Wall should remind us of the confluence of events that triggered the
French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, and (not yet acknowledged) the Iranian
Revolution.
This should also be a reminder to all tyrants that they cannot count on their oppression to
keep people permanently in line. Oppressors do fall.
Not only did the imprisonment of the East German population collapse during one night,
but the reunion of East and West Germany has been so successful that Germany is now
being led by two East Germans, the most famous of whom is Angela Merkel. Under
Gorbachev, the Soviet Union was already going through a reformation, but the collapse of
the wall overwhelmed this careful process and brought the roof down on the USSR.
This is a book worth reading and mulling over how accidents can change the world.
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Barry Rubin & Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, Nazis, Islamists, and the Making of the
Modern Middle East.
Not long ago, Israel's Prime Minister Netanyahu commented in a speech that Hitler was
influenced by his ally, the Palestinian Grand Mufti, Amin al-Husaini, to murder rather than
expel Europe's Jews. There was an immediate uproar that this statement was historically
incorrect, and that by saying this, he was diminishing Hitler's role in the Holocaust. It
seems that it was not incorrect, and this book, written by two very solid scholars, has not
only validated this assessment, but has provided documents, letters, and photographs
hitherto not widely available.
Why should this matter? The Holocaust was a Nazi program, no matter what the inspiration
for it. But it does matter in another way: it reveals something that has not been widely
understood: the long-standing parallel developments during the 1920s and 30s of a
murderous brand of fascism that allied the Nazis with the Muslim world. We see the
continuum of this ideology today in the similarity of ISIS genocidal practices in their
conquered territories with those of the Nazis as they rampaged through Poland and Russia.
The values are the same.
The authors spell out their rationale: “The story of Nazi Germany's involvement in the
Middle East has hitherto largely been viewed as a dramatic tale of might-have-been that
was nevertheless marginal to Middle East history and the course of World War II. In fact,
however, this episode was central to the modern history of the Middle East and continues
to reverberate many decades later given its profound effects on Arab nationalism, Islamism,
and the course taken by the Palestinian Arab movement” (ix).
The rise of the Nazis after World War I paralleled fascist movements all over the world at
that time. Dictatorships blossomed, all sharing the same disdain for democracy, votes for
women, and tolerance for some ethnic diversity. The Muslim world, such as it was
(ethnically divided) followed the same track. What that world had in common were
authoritarian rule in their newly minted countries, a religion frozen in the Middle Ages, and
injured pride over their obvious backwardness.
The new Nazi party played on this commonality, and one charismatic figure who emerged
in the Palestinian territory (still under British control) was a man of Circassian ancestry
(blond and blue-eyed), claiming descent from the Prophet Mohammad, and through family
pull, appointed as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. Al-Husaini was not a cleric, nor was he
pious; he was, however, ferociously ambitious and aspired to become the next Caliph, a
dictator over all Muslims. (The last “Caliph” had been the Ottoman Sultan, both roles
abolished when the Ottomans were defeated during World War I.)
Hitler and the Grand Mufti became allies, an alliance ignored in history until now. They
met several times and the Nazis protected him throughout the war, even though the jihad
he promised never materialized. Husaini had little luck in organizing an Arab army, but he
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did better with the Muslims of the USSR, India, Afghanistan, and the Balkans, creating
Muslim corps who assisted the Nazis in their holocaust.
Husaini was definitely a war criminal and was on Britain's list for trial and (hopefully)
execution. The Swiss would not give him refuge as Germany fell, but the French did, out
of spite against the British, and they released him to create decades of Islamist mayhem in
the Middle East. The French did it again when they gave refuge to the Ayatollah Khomeini.
Without these two men, world history would have been very different.
The great irony here is that the Muslim world always managed to choose losers: first the
Nazis, and then the Communists. Now they are following the latest Islamo-fascist cult,
ISIS. Saudi money is still supporting that movement, along with stolen oil, extortion taxes,
“Islamic” fines on their conquered subjects, and criminal enterprises such as human
trafficking and drugs. National borders are in meltdown, hordes of citizens fleeing, and the
region's anarchy moving global.
The connection between the Nazis and the Muslim World is alive and well, but is doomed
to the same end that the Nazis earned. This is a definitive book on this very current subject.
These reviews demonstrate how important Germany’s involvement was in the worst 20th
century events. Nothing that they did in World War II was a one-time only. The seeds
were already planted in World War I, and before that, in the encouragement of the Muslim
Arab world to revolt against their colonizers (Ottoman, and later British and French) and
side with Germany in the world wars and after.
This is a sad observation when one thinks of the wonderful contributions of Germany before
that to science, music, literature, and philosophy.
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Peter Demetz, Prague in Black and Gold: Scenes in the Life of a European City.
New York: Hill and Wang, 1997.
Reviewed by William McGaughey
Peter Demetz, a retired professor of comparative literature at Yale, has written a
comprehensive, detailed history of his home town, Prague, in the Czech republic. A Yale
graduate in the class of 1964, I remember Demetz as an occasional lecturer in the “Directed
Studies” program given freshmen and sophomores in the humanities.
The book is not easy reading because of the great number of unfamiliar names and places
that enter into the story. Our world history tends to neglect nations not neighboring the
Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic. Prague is in central Europe as a kind of bridge
between Germanic and Slavic cultures. Yet it has a fascinating history which Demetz
brings to life.
The city of Prague begins with Duke Borivoj, a Christian ruler of the late 9th century A.D.,
around the time when two missionaries from Greece, Cyril and Methodius, invented the
Slavic script. He belonged to the Premyslid clan. A virgin soothsayer named Lubussa had
rescued Czech people from the plague and, on her advice, they built a castle called Praga.
Lubussa then married a clever plowman named Premysl who became the ruler of people
living in that area. She is the mythological founder of Prague, prophesying that it was
destined to become “a great city whose fame will touch the stars.”
Demetz describes how the city of Prague was initially a collection of villages on both sides
of the Vltava (Moldau) river. The Prague castle was constructed on the Hradcany plateau
to the northwest. It became an early seat of power and center of various churches and
communities. Another ancient community was Vysehrad, near the junction of the Vltava
and Botic rivers. The royal residence shifted between these two places. North of Vysehrad
and east of Hradcany was the “Old Town”, a much larger community. A “New Town”,
south of the other, was settled later. The settlements consisted of Czech, German, Jewish,
and Italian peoples. Their principal landmarks were churches, synagogues and monasteries.
The first noteworthy ruler of Bohemia was Otakar II, 1233-1278, whose mother was a
granddaughter of the Byzantine emperor. By strategic marriages and divorces he built a
powerful kingdom which extended between the Baltic and Adriatic seas. Otakar’s nemesis
was Rudolf of Hapsburg, who outmaneuvered Otakar in the election for Holy Roman
emperor and later defeated him in battle.
Demetz’s book focuses upon the principal Bohemian monarchs of late medieval times. The
ongoing struggle between Popes and Holy Roman Emperors or, as they were called, the
Guelf (pro-pope) and Ghibelline (pro-emperor) factions, became a distinguishing feature
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of European politics. Otakar’s kingdom attracted Italian refugees from the Ghibelline
camp.
Czech political power may have reached a peak during the reign of the 14th century
monarch, Vaclav, who was later named Charles. Prague went through a period of political
turmoil after Otakar’s death in 1278. An agreement was reached for the youngest son of
King Henry of Carinthia, John of Luxembourg, to marry Eliska of the Premyslid family
and become the future king of Bohemia. King John was not much interested in Prague or
its people. John sent his son, Vaclav (Charles), to France to be educated. Later, Charles
was sent on diplomatic missions for his father. Before long, Charles and his father became
political rivals.
After Charles ascended to the throne, he embarked upon an ambitious building project for
Prague. He established a New Town south of the Old Town, replete with new churches,
monasteries, and markets. He also renovated the Vysehrad area. Charles ordered the
fortifications dividing the New and Old Towns to be demolished but then, after turmoil,
ordered the old division to be restored. Most notably, in 1347, Charles established a
university, authorized by Pope Clement VI, to serve the Bohemian people. This was to
become politically important. The university was organized in separate blocs or “nations”
for the Bohemians, Poles, Saxons, and Bavarians.
Charles took an interest in literature and in codifying law. He became a patron of Petrarch,
the Italian humanist, and also became acquainted with the political visionary, Cola di
Rienzi, who wanted to restore the Roman Empire. As Holy Roman Emperor, Charles had
much political influence at a time when the Papacy was divided between Avignon and
Rome. Under Charles, Prague became a center of European culture. The King cultivated
the political legacies of Charlemagne and of his Premyslid forbearers.
In the second half of the 14th century, cracks began to appear in the structure of culture and
power. The Inquisition became more aggressive. In 1389, eleven years after Charles’
death, Jews were massacred in Prague after Jews were supposed to have abused a priest.
Charles’ son, Vaclav IV, was not much interested in his royal duties, preferring to hunt
game, carouse with his friends, or get drunk. He also had to contend with rebellious barons.
The Hussite revolution of 1415-1422 completely upset the political order. Jan Hus was a
well-respected scholar and preacher at the Bethlehem church. John Wycliffe’s influence
was becoming strong. Passions were aroused by corruption in the church. Hus himself
condemned the selling of papal indulgences. King Vaclav ordered Hus to leave the country.
Pope John XXIII convened a grand council at Constance to reform the church. Jan Hus
went to Constance hoping to participate in the reform but was instead arrested. After
refusing to recant his heretical beliefs, Hus was burned at the stake.
The treatment of Hus at Constance galvanized his supporters in Prague. A group of
powerful barons came to his defense. Soon preachers were speaking to audiences at mass
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rallies. Church loyalists and the Hussites engaged in battles in and around Prague. By
trickery, the Old Town alderman lured the principal Hussite general, Jan Zelivsky, to his
death and displayed his severed head to crowds before they themselves were killed.
Eventually, peace was restored.
The Hussite rebellion was a precursor to Luther’s successful protest a century later as well
as to similar events in 17th century England, 18th century France, and 20th century Russia
and China. So, in a way, these early events in Prague laid the foundation for future
revolutionary or democratic governments.
A number of Bohemian kings followed Vaclav - the Polish king Louis, Ferdinand of
Hapsburg, Ferdinand II, and Maximilian II. Demetz focuses, however, upon Maximilian’s
son, Rudolf, who had a Spanish mother. Rudolf was an active and effective ruler in the
early part of his life. He was also a notable collector. He collected paintings, writings, and
even scientists.
King Rudolf was a patron to the Danish astronomer Tycho Brache and to Brache’s assistant
Johannes Kepler. Alchemists, including charlatans, also gathered at Rudolf’s court. This
was a golden age of Jewish culture. Rabbi Lowe, best known for his association with the
golem, was a leading intellectual. After 1600, Rudolf became increasingly detached from
his public duties. A revolt broke out between religious factions in 1618 which led to the
Thirty Years war.
The book goes on to describe Mozart’s time in Prague, the counterrevolution of 1848, and
the career of T.G. Masaryk around the time of World War I. This review does not do justice
to Peter Demetz’s magnificent work, more productive than grading papers at Yale. The
book Prague in Black and Gold: Scenes in the Life of a European City is recommended.
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Peter Zeihan, The Accidental Superpower: The Next Generation of American
Preeminence and the Coming Global Disorder.
Twelve, Hachette Book Group, 2014.
Reviewed by Laina Farhat-Holzman
Peter Zeihan launched his own firm: Zeihan on Geopolitics, in 2012, after working for 12
years with the geopolitical analysis firm, Stratfor (Strategic Forecasts), where he was Vice
President of Analysis.
Zeihan’s definition of geopolitics explains how important this discipline is to understanding
the world we live in. “Geopolitics is the study of how place impacts…everything: the
clothes you wear, the food you eat, the size and serviceability of your mortgage, how long
you live, how many children you have, the stability of your job, the shape and feel of your
country’s political system, what sorts of war your country wages or defends itself against,
and ultimately whether your culture will withstand the test of time. The balance of rivers,
mountains, oceans, plains, deserts, and jungles massively influences everything about both
the human condition and national success.”
He warns, however, that geopolitics is not the ONLY determinant. Human agency can
provide surprises. But geography cannot be ignored. It just cannot be used to say that some
human beings are better than others; they are just luckier; and sometimes the less lucky can
use what they have with more intelligence.
“At its core,” he says, “The Accidental Superpower is about the advantages and
disadvantages that geography imposes. How such characteristics interact to create the
world we now know. How fluctuations in those interactions are about to turn that world
on its ear. How the most powerful state of the ending era will evolve into something far
greater in the new.”
The book begins with the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 (during WWII), which set up
an agenda that established a global system of rule of law. Out of it came the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund. These were all institutions for putting back together
devastated Europe and the foundations of the free-trade-dominated global economic
systems that endure to this day. The US called the shots; they were the war effort in
manpower, money, and materiel.
And this was what they were fighting for: the closed systems of the past (European colonial
networks) would no longer be permitted. What was new was that America would open up
all the world with our Navy to free trade. No more closed systems. No more excuses for
war. None of these empires (British, Dutch, French) would have rival navies after this war.
They would have to give up their empires. Including Japan, of course.
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The book details the rebuilding of Europe and Asia, and the enormous prosperity it
engendered, despite the USSR’s attempt to undo it.
Now, says Zeihan, it is time to retire the Bretton Woods deal. It is winding down. This
will not mean the end of US American power, but it is the end of this particular phase and
the beginning of a period of chaos and the rise of a new one in its place. The US will be
the only stable one in a world of collapse.
The second section of the book covers how geopolitics works: Place matters. Zeihan
analyzes the benefits of nature and culture of the US and then every other possible major
power of our time. There is little contest, he believes. The US has the balance of transport,
deepwater navigation, and industrialization. In all three cases, the US enjoys the physical
geography most favorable to their application. (More than any place else in the world.)
The next chapters look at our military defenses, a hard-eyed estimate of which seems to
render us invulnerable. This invulnerability is not a matter of our cleverness but rests on
the extraordinary geopolitics we command. He asks: Who could duke it out with our
population of 300 million of us? China? India, The combined EU and Russia? Even
combined, it appears that we are secure.
The book provides a keen analysis of World War II, its deadly costs and its aftermath in
which the United States was the only intact superpower.
We could have been a nasty victor, but we were not. The US could have occupied by force,
but we did not. The Russians did. We made alliances and did everything through voluntary
cooperation. We waged peace, using trade as a weapon.
But our largesse was expensive. Free trade isn’t cheap from a military point of view. The
Cold War ended in 1989. Now what? Do we still patrol the world? He addresses next the
energy revolution and demographics.
In a final chapter on migration and terrorism, he notes that Militant Islam will continue to
roil the world, but much less so for us. We will be the beneficiaries of a flood of immigrants
who are already educated and are looking for a safe place for their families and their money.
This is all to the good for the United States.
This book might seem to some triumphalist about the United States. I don’t see it that way.
Zeihan is a geopolitical analyst and he has provided a hard-eyed look at our recent past,
present, and future. Most of what he has written makes sense to me.
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Michael Romann and Alex Weingrod, Living Together Separately: Arabs and Jews in
Contemporary Jerusalem. Princeton University Press, 2014.
Reviewed by Mary Tepfenhart
Michael Romann and Alex Weingrod are professors at Tel Aviv University and BenGurion University of the Negev, both residents of Jerusalem. This comprehensive study
focuses on the everyday ethnic relations between Jews and Arabs, both in residential and
business locations within the ancient Holy City. Utilizing a mix of documents, studies,
official reports, field interviews and observations, detailed investigations in large factory
and a major hospital, the book covers two decades from 1967 to 1987. As the authors
stated, the study is an attempt to present “Jerusalem’s realities without ideological
preconceptions” and to examine the variety of exchanges from the view point of both Jews
and Arabs.”(xxii)
The first of the nine chapters of the book deals with the history of this very contested city,
from biblical times to the 20th century. The Jews cannot envision a state without Jerusalem
as the capital. The city holds great religious significance for the Arabs, Muslims and
Christians, who inherited that land for thousands of years. In time, Jerusalem was divided
according to religious and ethnic times into four sections: Muslim, Jewish, Christian and
Armenian. Despite this voluntarily segregation, there were frequent contacts between
them. In the 19th and 20th centuries, the political forum in Jerusalem was made up of a
Muslim mayor and Christian and Jewish councilors. The same pattern continued under the
British Mandate system.
After the war in 1948, the city was partitioned into two different and disconnected entities.
The border line became dangerous and both communities moved away, in opposite
directions. Jerusalem was reunited in 1967 under Jewish jurisdiction, and this created
different kinds of problems. There were problems regarding the legal status of the Arabs
(some had Jordanian passports, some took Israeli citizenship). The Jewish government
wanted to impose laws on the Arabs, who did not recognize their authority. Arabs
expressed their resistance in different forms such as demonstrations, strikes, terror or
noncooperation. However, many worked for Jewish companies and have continued to do
so.
The authors exemplify the complexity of problems with an example of a village, Abu Tur,
inhabited by Arabs before 1967, where Jews moved in after the war. The two groups have
separate schools and hospitals. There are few incentives for these two groups to interact.
Jews are apprehensive of Arabs for terrorist attacks. Arabs are also afraid the Israeli police
might pick them up following an incident in the neighborhood. However, this does not
mean the groups have no contacts whatsoever. Many Arabs work for Jewish companies
and stores, though it is not common to see Jews working for Arabs. There are Jews who
rent apartments from Arab landlords. In the past, some of these landlords dealt with British
and Jewish citizens. There is an economic incentive. Many times, these Jewish renters
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would act as brokers for the Arab landlords and for other Arabs. At the same time, the
landlords became “protectors” for their tenants against any kind of harassment.
Michael Romann and Alex Weingrod continue the study with an analysis of work relations
between Jews and Arabs. According to Israeli Labor Legislation, Arabs are entitled to the
same wage and benefits as Jews. Arabs are represented in local labor committees.
However, Arabs find it difficult to climb the professional ladder. This is the result of lack
of the certifications required to obtain a better position. The classes offered for these
certificates are conducted in Hebrew.
There are some paradoxical situations where Jews have complained that they are
discriminated against and Arabs favored by a boss:
“When one of the Arabs asks the boss for a loan, he’ll always get it. Let’s say that it’s a
few days before payday and the Arab comes along and says that he has a big payment that
he must make now. The boss will say: “How much do you need?” and he’ll give him an
advance on his salary. And then, let’s say that a Jew comes along and asks for the same
thing. The Jew will be refused. He’ll tell him that he must learn to live within his means,
has to budget his money and all of that. That’s the way he is, I’m telling you. He helps
Arabs but not Jews.” (135)
Jews and Arabs work together out of economic necessity. They can have very good
relations at work, but outside, these relations do not continue. There are other constraints
for both groups. The Jews will work with the Arabs but not for the Arabs. The Arabs are
confronted with the dilemma that they are employed by a Jewish company.
The last chapter and the conclusions cover the problem of integration. Their research
showed that there is a “widespread segregation” (221) in commercial and residential public
institutions. Because of deeply rooted antagonism, differences in religion, and culturalethnic prejudice and violence, neither the Jews nor the Arabs want to be totally assimilated
to the other. Low-level integration in commercial locations and employment enables both
groups to keep their identity and avoid conflicts.
Segregation in Jerusalem is more intense than in other cities such as Haifa and Acre, which
have large Arab minorities, and where Arab businesses have moved into Jewish
neighborhoods. There, Arabs vote in municipal and national elections. They also
participate more in politics, setting up exclusive Israeli Arab parties.
Occasionally, there are outbreaks of violence (like the intifada) or civil disobedience, such
as refusal to pay taxes. Arabs have been urged by their leaders to boycott Jewish businesses
and products, but this has had negative effects on both communities from an economic
point of view, since Jewish merchants use Arab brokers to channel their products to the
Arabs while the Arabs do the same thing to channel their products to the Jewish population.
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The authors conclude that low-level integration based on everyday interests will continue
in the future but that major issues such as political rights and fair distribution of resources,
and employment still remain unresolved. It rests upon these ethnic groups to decide how
much compromise they are willing to accept in order to reach peaceful coexistence.
Grounded in important issues of our time, this book addresses questions of integration,
tolerance and making a living in changing times. This volume offers thought-provoking
observations, and is an excellent source of information for everybody interested in the topic.
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Joseph E. Schwartzberg, Transforming the United Nations System: Designs for a
Workable World. Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press, 2013.
Reviewed by Michael Andregg
This was among the last books published by the UN University Press before it went out of
business due to chronic funding shortages at the United Nations. That is testament both to
this book’s importance to the UN system, and to the profound challenges that the UN faces
today fulfilling its ideal missions with an organizational structure created in 1945 by the
major powers that won the largest and costliest war in human history.
That noted, Professor Schwartzberg (an emeritus geographer at the University of Minnesota
who has devoted his life to promoting fairer, and more functional forms of international
governance) did the best any scholar could to address both obvious flaws in the current
system. It would include the five vetoes on the Security Council, and more obscure
problems such as how tiny island and municipal nations like Nauru, Monaco and Singapore
have the same weight in General Assembly voting as great powers like China and the USA.
He starts with the General Assembly where he introduces his most comprehensive reform
idea, a weighted voting system to replace the archaic one state one vote principle in place
today. Simply expressed, Dr. Schwartzberg suggests adding measures of national
populations and state contributions to the UN budget to one state one vote, and grouping
the world into regions. Populations and budgets obviously change every year, so this would
be a dynamic way of scoring actual votes on issues under consideration. That is
complicated, but it would also match much more closely the actual power of states to
influence events at the UN and elsewhere.
Then, Schwartzberg suggests creating an entirely new body of parliamentarians selected by
nation-states, a World Parliamentary Assembly whose fundamental and ultimate purpose
would be representing people instead of just nation-states. Schwartzberg envisions a threestep process going from an advisory body with MPs selected by existing governments to a
body with real powers elected by actual people of the world, according to the one person
one vote principle. That would be change of a truly transformational nature at the UN. If,
of course, the dominant powers of the existing UN would allow and fund this new World
Parliamentary Assembly. Which they probably will not unless battered by new existential
threats. Those come.
Prof. Schwartzberg is well aware of such obstacles, which he notes explicitly in many
chapters and in great detail. But he is not deterred from asking how things could be made
better anyway. His fourth chapter deals with that pesky veto in the UN Security Council,
which alone is empowered to act on life-and-death security challenges. But since the five
permanent members of that Council all have vetoes (the USA, China, Russia, Great Britain
and France) little if anything can be done about dozens of conflicts and issues that bedevil
the world, from Chinese expansions in the South China Sea to nuclear issues involving Iran
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and Israel to what to do about Syria, if any one of those five legacy nations with vetoes
objects. They often do. Meanwhile, much of the world wonders why Britain and France
still have such power, when much larger countries in the 21st century like Japan, Brazil,
India and Germany are excluded.
Schwartzberg is very thorough. He marches on through weaknesses in environmental
protection (Ch. 5 on reforming ECOSOC) human rights (Ch. 6 to create a credible human
rights system instead of the sad and sometimes morbid joke that now exists) and reform of
the international judicial system (Ch. 7). In every case he is searching for solutions to
daunting problems that he tends to see very clearly. Along the way he provides as much
education as space allows on how the UN system evolved to where it is today (or was in
2013). The ossified UN bureaucracy we all observe changes more slowly than glaciers
today, so that is just another problem to be solved.
But Prof. Schwartzberg is not done. Subsequent chapters outline the many great things that
UN functional agencies have done, and continue to do despite such obstacles, like the
World Health Organization eliminating smallpox and almost polio, rationalization of global
air travel protocols and international postal regulations. In Chapter 10 he calls for greater
engagement with tens of thousands of NGO s and other civil society groups. And in
Chapter 11 he takes on the perennial problem of UN funding which is chronically held
hostage to the desires of major powers.
In Chapter 12 he takes on the porcupine of UN Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding operations,
and in Chapter 13 the daunting challenges of creating more sustainable economies as
globalization, technology, and emergent phenomena like climate change tear existing
institutions apart.
Every one of these problems has stimulated many books searching for solutions in isolation.
Dr. Schwartzberg is exceptional in trying to tackle them all together in an integrated effort
focused on helping the UN to better do the jobs it was created for.
Chapter 15 is devoted to the obvious elephant in the room, how to get from here to there.
He does the very best he can. But here, publisher’s constraints have the greatest impact.
He had to reduce his magnum opus by almost half to meet the constraints of the soon to
close UN University Press. Anyone who has written such books knows how painful such
reductions can be. I think Dr. Schwartzberg felt his careful explanations of how to fix
existing structures required the detail he gave them. How to get publics that seldom see the
UN at work to care about improving those systems is another vast problem that he attempts
in the last chapter, but in much less detail than elsewhere.
Schwartzberg ends with two extensive appendices loaded with data and a 14 page index.
His work has been endorsed by a really stellar list of international thinkers and practitioners,
like former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and former US Ambassador to
the UN, Thomas Pickering, among 18 others.
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So, in my final analysis Professor Schwartzberg’s work is an essential reference for anyone
serious about UN reform or concerned about the generally weak state of international
governance institutions in the 21st century. Despite its daunting topics, the text is clearly
and lucidly written for any general audience. It includes a long list of abbreviations of
bureaucratic acronyms necessary to get a grip on the UN System as it exists today. He
presents dozens of good ideas that might be implemented someday when circumstances
allow, and provides dozens of maps, charts and tables to illustrate them, in addition to his
big ideas about transformation. That might require an invasion of space aliens or another
catastrophic world war to stimulate. My note is that if we wait long enough, nuclear and
other WMDs will probably be used again.
So I say press on with the search for solutions to global problems in our time. And I thank
Dr. Schwartzberg for his seminal contribution to that noble task. When he passes on as we
all must, the world will be better for the path breaking work he created.
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CCR Style Guide for Submitted Manuscripts
Begin the document with title, author’s name, author’s position (e.g. professor, lecturer,
graduate student, independent scholar), author’s academic department and affiliation, if
any, and the article’s abstract (maximum 200 words).
Do NOT include page numbers, headers, or footers. These will be added by the editors.
Do NOT utilize automatic formatting for indents, space following subheads and
paragraphs, etc.
Write your article in English. Submit your manuscript, including tables, figures,
appendices, etc., as a single Microsoft Word or PDF file. Page size should be 8.5 x 11
inches. All margins (left, right, top and bottom) should be 1-inch, including your tables
and figures. Single space your text. Use a single column layout with both left and right
margins justified. Main body text font: 12 pt. Times New Roman. If figures are included,
use high-resolution figures, preferably encoded as encapsulated PostScript. Maximum
length of article is 20 pages including endnotes, bibliography, etc.
Do NOT indent paragraphs. A line space should follow each paragraph. Subheads are in
bold, flush left, separated by a line space above and below. Long quotations should be
placed in a separate paragraph with a .5-inch hanging indent, no quotation marks, and
preceded and followed by one-line spaces.
Except for common foreign words and phrases, the use of foreign words and phrases should
be avoided. Authors should use proper, standard English grammar. Suggested guides
include The Elements of Style by William Strunk, Jr. and E. B. White; and The Chicago
Manual of Style, University of Chicago Press.
Underlining in the text is discouraged. Whenever possible use italics to indicate text that
you wish to emphasize. Use italics for book titles, movie titles, etc and for foreign terms.
Using colored text is prohibited. However, we encourage authors to take advantage of the
ability to use color in the production of figures, maps, etc. To the extent possible, tables
and figures should appear in the document near where they are referenced in the text. Large
tables or figures should be put on pages by themselves. Avoid the use of overly small type
in tables. In no case should tables or figures be in a separate document or file. All tables
and figures must fit within 1-inch margins on all sides, in both portrait and landscape view.
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Footnotes should appear at the bottom of the page on which they are referenced rather than
at the end of the paper. Footnotes should be in 10 pt. Times New Roman, single spaced,
and flush left, ragged right. There should be a footnote separator rule (line). Footnote
numbers or symbols in the text must follow, rather than precede, punctuation. Excessively
long footnotes are probably better handled in an appendix.
The subhead References (denoting Bibliography, Works Cited, etc.) should appear right
after the end of the document, beginning on the last page if possible. They should be flush
left, ragged right. Use the format with which you are most comfortable, such as APA
(American Psychological Association), MLA (Modern Language Association),
Chicago/Turabian.
Carolyn Carpentieri Potter
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CONFERENCE 2017
47rd ISCSC International Conference
Marconi Conference Center, Marshall, CA. USA
June 30 to July 3rd 2017
Marconi Conference Center is part of the California State Park System located in Marshall,
California USA in Marin County, 90 minutes northwest of San Francisco. See maps on
ISCSC or Marconi websites.
Address: 18500 State Highway One, Marshall, CA 94940
ISCSC Website: http://iscsc.org
Marconi Conference Center Website: http://www.marconiconference.org/
THE CONFERENCE FACILITY
The 62-acre Marconi Conference Center State Historic Park in scenic West Marin County
is located along the east shore of Tomales Bay near the quaint community of Marshall CA.
The location provides dramatic views of the bay and the lush inland hills of the Point Reyes
Peninsula.
Rich with history of the ancient coastal Miwoks and the 1912 American Marconi Wireless
Telegraph Company, the historical significance of the property was recognized with the
classification of the facility as a State Historic Park in 1991.
REGISTRATION, LODGING ACCOMMODATIONS AND MEALS
We have a great package for this year’s conference! Conference Registration includes a
one-year membership to the ISCSC for new and any renewing members! All lodging and
meals for the conference are provided on-site.
Attendees make their own Conference Registration ($275), and lodging arrangements
directly with the ISCSC. Registration has been extended to May 15. Lodging cost includes
all meals, occupancy tax AND sales tax for all 3 nights. Rates are the equivalent of: $245
Single; $165 Double or $135 Triple per person, per day. Meals begin with dinner on the
arrival date and end with lunch on departure date. Lodging/meal package reservations will
be for the entire 3 days. It will be important to use the on-line link via the ISCSC website
to make your room/meal reservation which must be paid in advance. It is part of our
conference package and ensures the agreed upon rates. Attempting to make individual
reservations through the Marconi Conference Center, even if available, will result in much
higher costs to participants and are not part of our conference package and activities.
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CONFERENCE REGISTRATION
Conference Registration includes conference attendance, welcome reception on June 30th,
invitation to submit abstracts for conference presentation, necessary technical amenities for
the presentation and fully paid year-long membership in the ISCSC with its many benefits
of professional affiliation, subscription to the organization’s acclaimed journal,
Comparative Civilizations Review, and, last-but-not-least, fun raffle prizes.
AIRPORT AND TRANSPORTATION OPTIONS
Attendees will most likely fly directly to San Francisco International Airport (SFO). From
there, transportation to Marconi Conference Center can easily be accomplished via rental
car or a shuttle service called Marin Door to Door: http://www.marindoortodoor.com/ or
telephone at +1-415-457-2717. Marin Door to Door will take you directly to the Marconi
Conference Center for $115 each way. If more than one person is traveling in your group,
the second person is only charged $12.00. It is beneficial to book more than one person for
the shuttle ride for cost-savings. Booking the shuttle should be done at least 48 hours in
advance.
Please visit the ISCSC and Marconi Conference Center websites for additional trip
planning references, local sites of interest, and detailed information about the lodging and
dining facilities. If you have any questions, please contact Vice President, Lynn Rhodes,
831-600-5209 or lynn.rhodes@iscsc.org or Executive Director Peter Hecht 917-494-8936
or peter.hecht@iscsc.org.
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In October 1961, in Salzburg, Austria, an extraordinary group of scholars gathered
to create the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations. Among
the 26 founding members from Austria, Germany, France, Switzerland, The Netherlands,
Spain, Italy, England, Russia, the United States, China and Japan were such luminaries
as Pitirim Sorokin and Arnold Toynbee.
For six days, the participants debated such topics as the definition of “civilization,”
problems in the analysis of complex cultures, civilizational encounters in the past, the
Orient versus the Occident, problems of universal history, theories of historiography,
and the role of the “human sciences” in “globalization.” The meeting was funded by the
Austrian government, in cooperation with UNESCO, and received considerable press
coverage. Sorokin was elected the Society’s first president.
After several meetings in Europe, the advancing age of its founding members and
the declining health of then president, Othmar F. Anderle, were important factors in the
decision to transfer the Society to the United States.
Between 1968 and 1970 Roger Williams Wescott of Drew University facilitated
that transition. In 1971, the first annual meeting of the ISCSC (US) was held in
Philadelphia. Important participants in that meeting and in the Society’s activities
during the next years included Benjamin Nelson (the Society’s first American president),
Roger Wescott, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko, David Wilkinson, Rushton Coulborn
and C.P. Wolf. In 1974, the Salzburg branch was formally dissolved, and from that year
to the present there has been only one International Society for the Comparative Study
of Civilizations (ISCSC).
The presidents of the ISCSC are, in order: In Europe, Pitirim Sorokin and Othmar
Anderle; in the United States, Benjamin Nelson, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko,
Michael Palencia-Roth, Roger Wescott, Shuntaro Ito (from Japan), Wayne Bledsoe, Lee
Daniel Snyder, Andrew Targowski, David Rosner, and the current president Toby Huff.
To date, the Society has held 46 meetings, most of them in the United States but also in
Salzburg, Austria; Santo Domingo, The Dominican Republic; Dublin, Ireland; Chiba,
Japan; Frenchman’s Cove, Jamaica; St. Petersburg, Russia; Paris, France; New
Brunswick, Canada; and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
More than 30 countries are represented in the Society’s membership. Its
intellectual dynamism and vibrancy over the years have been maintained and enhanced
through its annual meetings, its publications, and the participation of such scholars as
Talcott Parsons, Hayden White, Immanuel Wallerstein, Gordon Hewes, André Gunder
Frank, Marshall Sahlins, Lynn White Jr., and Jeremy Sabloff.
The Society is committed to the idea that complex civilizational problems can best
be approached through multidisciplinary analyses and debate by scholars from a variety
of fields. The Comparative Civilizations Review, which welcomes submissions from the
Society’s members as well as other scholars, has been published continually since its
inaugural issue in 1979.
Prof. Michael Palencia-Roth
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Membership Information
If you are not a member of the ISCSC please consider joining. For a $70
USD yearly membership fee, plus $8.00 USD for non-contiguous USA
postage. Members receive a one-year subscription to this journal, are
invited to attend the annual conference, receive the ISCSC newsletter, and
may participate in ongoing dialogues. Membership is open to all
interested in civilizations. Visit www.iscsc.org for further information.
To Obtain Issues of This Journal
Back issues of this journal may be purchased by contacting the ISCSC
on our website:
www.iscsc.org

Online Access
This and previous issues published since 1979 may be accessed, searched
by keyword or topic, read, downloaded, and printed by going to the
following website: http://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr
OR by going to this additional website:
https://ojs.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/CCR
We thank the Brigham Young University for providing this service for
free to all who are interested in the topics our journal covers.
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